[Serious Phil] Predicates Without Properties

[walto]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <Philscimind at ...> wrote:

> 
> if I assert, "res extensa is a substance" I am ascribing a predicate to
> the subject of predication, res extensa; but, I am not ascribing any
> property to it; and, I am most certainly not attributing to res extensa
> the property of being a substance instead of a property.
> 

Why not?


> similarly for 'phenomenon'.
> 

Same question.


> 
>  >And in [3], by 'x is' do you mean 'x exists'?
> 
> that depends on whether you mean by 'x exists' what I mean by 'x is'.
> 
> according to Parmenides, what is not is not and can not be spoken of.
> consequently, to say of x, 'x is' implies that x is not nothing at all
> (or something to that effect).


What prevents us (other than Parmenides' proscription) from speaking of what does not exist?  People thought, e.g., that phlogiston and the fountain of youth existed: they were wrong, weren't they? 

> 
> consequently, I take 'x is' to be identical in meaning to 'x is not
> nothing at all'.
> 

I have no problem with that, but, while the "consequently" may be ok, it's a one-way implication.  From "x is" implying "x is not nothing at all" we cannot infer Meinongian flotsam.


> do you mean by 'x exists' exactly what I mean by 'x is not nothing at
> all'?
> 
>  >And is there an implicit quantifier? That is, are you are referring to
>  >some predicate P such that (x) (Ex <-> Px)
> 
> I would express it as (x)(Px) read as 'for any x that is, Px' where P is
> 'not nothing at all' or some other predicate defined to mean 'not
> nothing at all'. I suspect that most people would prefer a universally
> applicable predicate that is not phrased as a negative; and, that's fine
> with me as long as it means just 'not nothing at all'.
> 

That would probably be ok with everybody, so long as it isn't used to infer the Parmenidean baloney above.


W