[Serious Phil] Saving Dualism

[SWM]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:
> 
>  >In sum then, I don't think you gain much by reporting that on your
>  >view, the position I have expressed matches the position defined by the
>  >SEP as "predicate dualism". Insofar as it does that without any
>  >significant differences from my position, I would happily accept the
>  >nomenclature and that wouldn't change my views in the slightest. But my
>  >guess, if history is any guide, is that there are some important
>  >nuances you're either not reporting or not noticing.
> 
> there would likely be a consequence for anyone who realizes that your
> position (linguistic dualism plus non-identity of brain and experience)
> is a form of dualism: a description of brain activity does not explain
> HOW phenomenality (qualia) arises from that brain activity.
> 
> Joe
> 
>

You're simply confused. An account like Dennett's does explain how phenomenality arises. It just doesn't do it in the way you and some others think is warranted -- only there's plenty of reason to think THAT way ISN'T warranted (i.e., category confusion and the strange idea that an explanation should do something more than explain as in instantiating). The problem with your view on this is that you're so anxious to save an ontologically based dualism that you will grab any straw out there (e.g., "predicate dualism") lest THAT ship go down. You read the word "dualism" and think your job done. It's not. -- SWM