[Serious Phil] Getting Serious on Frege

[SWM]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:

> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> >
> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> >  
> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > >  
> > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "larry_tapper" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > PDJ tells SWM:
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > PDJ> So back to the usual dilemma: either you are not talking about
> > > > > > > Frege's reference, or you are a dualist.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > SWM,
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > PDJ hits the nail on the head here and IMO you would be well advised to take this criticism seriously rather than dismiss it as habitual grouchiness or nitpicking or whatever.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > If 'mind' and 'brain' both denote real things, and if you say that the two terms have different referents in the Fregean sense, then you think mind and brain are two different things and you are a dualist. 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > I'm guessing that it would be easier for you to admit that your usage of 'referent' is inconsistent with Frege's than it would be for you to admit that you're a dualist after all. But you have to pick one or the other.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > LT    
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > To acknowledge duality is not to be a dualist (though this seems to be a common confusion on this list). 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Even by your own account, certain dualities , such as mind body
> > > > > duality are dualism.
> > > > >
> > > > 
> > > > Any position that holds that a duality can only be explained by asserting two ontological basics, each distinct from the other, at bottom, is dualism. Acknowledging dualities and trialities and so forth is not. 
> > > 
> > > If the Subjective is
> > > 1) not expressible in terms of the Objective, it is categoreally
> > > different from the Objective (as you say), and is also therefore "different at bottom", (as you deny)
> > 
> > 
> > Being different categories, as in being amenable to different modes of communication/expression does NOT imply being traceable to different ontological basics.  
> 
> Still doesn't make sense. If the Subjective is a mode of expression,then my introspected Salty or Red is not subjective *unitl*
> I  express it. But I can't express it!


No, you can't describe it in objective terms. You certainly can express it as in "ah, that's salty!" The category confusion arises when you think that what is experienced should be objectively describable, like a baseball or a planet. While we can describe objectively what experience amounts to, we cannot replicate experiences by doing so. But, of course, we can't replicate baseballs or planets by explaining them either. 


>  The idea that the Subjective
> is a kind of language


No, no, no! Language doesn't work the same way when applied to the subjective aspects of our experience because language is build on public (objective as in intersubjectively observable) phenomena. Being subjective is not "a kind of language". It's just that language plays a different role vis a vis the subjective.


> has two fatal flaws: there is no subjective language, and non-linguistically enable entities such as infants
> still have subjective experience.


See above.

>  (And that is actually a THIRD theory compared to the theory
> that introspected mentality is a "side of the coin", whether
> linguistically expressed or not, and the theory that the mental
> is reducible to the physical, but not vice versa).
> 

Since you misunderstand the point about language in all this, your conclusion as to a "THIRD theory" based on that is mistaken, too. 

> > > On the other hand, if the Subjective is
> > > 2) expressible in terms of the Objective, it is not categoreally
> > > different from the Objective (contradicting what you say), but is "different at bottom".
> > > 
> > > Choose your poison.
> > 
> > 
> > Your first item is just wrong. 
> > 
> > 
> > > You have made two incomaptible claims--that
> > > the O and the S are not a duality,
> > 
> > 
> > au contraire
> > 
> > 
> > >  and therefore not different 
> > > at bottom, and that they are incompatible categories...and therefore
> > > different at bottom.
> > >
> > 
> > See above (for a change).
> >  
> > > >  
> > > > > >Dualism implies holding that, for consciousness to exist in the universe, a physical account of what brains do is not enough, that something else is required, e.g., Chalmers' "extra ingredient" (posited along side the four principles or forces he says modern physics posits).
> > > > > 
> > > > > "Brain" refers to the sum total of the physical contents
> > > > > of the cranium, so if "mind" refers to something else,
> > > > > whether necessary or not, that something must be 
> > > > > non physical, and so it is dualism.
> > > > >
> > > > 
> > > > Only if you imagine that there are two ontological basics underlying the two referents.
> > > 
> > > This is about your claims, not what I imagine.
> > > Tell me what the "Mind" could be referring to, if not brain.
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > The features we recognize as part of a mental life.
> 
> That is clearly a different *sense*. To say that it is also
> a different referent is blatant dualism. Or you are just
> confusing the meanings of "sense" and "reference".
> 

Acknowledging a duality, such as the subjective/objective distinction is NOT dualism in any relevant sense. The ONLY dualism that matters in discussions about minds and bodies is a dualism of ontological basics as in what is needed, at bottom (the lowest possible level of existence) to account for the presence of minds in the world along with physical phenomena.  


> > > > > > We'll disregard other possibilities for the moment, such as supernatural dualism.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Since I hold no such position I am not a dualist, even while acknowledging that, among other dualities,
> > > > > 
> > > > > You don't explicitly hold it; it is an implication
> > > > > of your claim that Mind and Brain have different referents.
> > > > > (and the claim that you are using Fregean reference).
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Nope, it's not implied by that at all. 
> > > 
> > > That's gaisnaying, not argument. I give the inference above.
> > >
> > 
> > 
> > Which, as I pointed out, is mistaken.
> 
> 
> > > "Brain" refers to the sum total of the physical contents
> > > of the cranium, so if "mind" refers to something else,
> > > whether necessary or not, that something must be 
> > >  non physical, and so it is dualism"
> > >
> > 
> > Dualism is about what is ontologically basic and the view I've presented does not imply that consciosness is
> 
> If concs  is reducible to brain activity, then it just is
> brain activity, and so "brain activity" and "consc" would
> have the same referent.


Only in terms of causal description but not in terms of the roles each plays in our experience. A thought that we have and which we choose to refer to (whatever its underlying basis/cause) is still a thought and not the physical phenomena that presumably underlies it. A coin may have more than one side (and some, in history, have had more than two). 


> Inasmuch as you deny that, you deny
> reducibility, and to deny reducibility is to affirm
> ontological basicness, since the one is the criterion for the
> other. Of course, you also affirm reducibility. Your claims,
> reducibility+different referents, are contradictory.
> 


You simply persist in confusing the language of causal description with the language of motivational (and other subjective experience) references.  


> >, even while affirming the appropriateness of speaking about consciousness, subjectivity, experience, etc., etc.
> > 
> >  
> > > That's an argument. You need to counter-argue, not just offer opinions.
> > > 
> > 
> > Oh come off it already. If you ever paid attention to the points others make, you might actually get somewhere here rather than just robotically repeat the same denials over and over again.
> 
> ie put forward the same criticisms , because they never get answered.
>


You've been answered so many times by now it's ridiculous.

 
> > > >And my claim is that I am using "referent" as it's used in ordinarly English and that it turns out it's not inconsistent with Frege. Do try to get it straight.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > > > there are mental as well as physical things in the universe.
> > > > > 
> > > > > There you go Standard physicalists regard the mental as 
> > > > > a particular type of physical structure/function,
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > I'm not arguing for physicalism, standard or otherwise, only that an account of consciousness as physically derived is perfectly reasonable given what we currently know about the world and a model like Dennett's. 
> > > 
> > > Distinction that doesn;t make a difference.
> > >
> > 
> > False.
> 
> Pointless gainsaying again. Say why it is false.
>


Like your "Distinction that doesn;t make a difference" is an argument! This is really tiresome. On your view you can gainsay anytime you like but a response which does the same is out of bounds. Sorry, but that's all you're gonna get when you do your own "gainsaying".

 
> > > > > so
> > > > > that the mental is a subset of the physical. That is not
> > > > > only not a dualism, it is, more importantly not a duality
> > > > > either. That some birds are ducks is not bird/duck dualism,
> > > > > likewise the claim that some physical activity is mental.
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Dualities are still not dualism.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Your Dennettian model is not a duality OR a dualism. Your 
> > > Two Sides arguement *is* at least one of those. Therefore
> > > they are not equivalent. But you are too confused to realise that.
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > You are still confusing acknowledging dualities (and such) with believing in at least two ontological basics (dualism).
> 
> 
> No, my argument above does not rely on that in any way. The Two
> Sides theory is symmetrical. D's M is not, because Mind is reduced
> to Brain but not vice versa. Therefore they are different theories.
>


Causal reduction and referential (linguistic) reduction are not one and the same.

 
> > 
> > > > > > To say that "mind" and "brain" denote real things does not imply dualism. 
> > > > > 
> > > > > No.That comes from the claim, made by you, that they denote
> > > > > DIFFERENT real things.
> > > > >
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > A duality doesn't imply dualism.
> > > 
> > > If Mind is reducible to Brain, you don;;t have duality OR dualism.
> > > 
> > 
> > Mind is causally reducible to brains (what they do when they're working properly and are of the right type). The features which constitute our mental lives (experience, subjectivity) are thus produced by brains doing the right thing.
> 
> Surely you mean "constituted by"? Surely you don't mean Mind is
> some sort of effulgence given off by the brain?
>

Surely, you're right. I don't mean that and nothing I said suggested it so you shouldn't be putting words into others' mouths in order to set up your silly strawmen. 

 
> > But just as we can refer to the wheel's turning and not mean the wheel,
> 
> 
> Wheels can be stationary and brains can be inactive, dead or comatose.


Wow, that's quite an insight!


> But the claim that minds are reducible to brain *activity*
> means that "mind" and "activity of the brain that constitutes
> mind" have the same referent. 
> 


Only in a context involving identifying and describing causal factors. But we do other things with our language than just pick out and describe causal relations.  

> > so we can refer to minds and not mean brains. Linguistic irreducibility does not imply causal irreducibility. 
> 
> Lingusitic "irreducibility" need not mean anything more
> than differnt *senses*. You have *still* not explained
> why you go beyond that to insist on different *referents*.
> 

The word "sense" (as in meaning) has other meanings than the one imparted to it by Frege. Check the dictionary. So the fact that we may use "sense" for "meaning" (and I do that a lot since it's ordinary usage) doesn't imply that the Fregean notion of "sense" is operative, in the context of discussing different references, in lieu of "denotation" (sometimes, in some quarters, equated in English with "reference" and, hence, the choice to sometimes speak of "referents" in that context).  


> > > If Mind is not reductible to Brain, but is instead a "side" or
> > > "aspect", then you have two things which are different "at bottom".
> > > 
> > > Choose your poison.
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > Nope, because causal questions are different from linguistic ones. 
> 
> What you mean by "causal" implies constituion, which in turn implies
> identity.


Nope because the identity that you are after is one of referential equivalence and references vary by context. In the present case, asserting that X causes Y (even in a constitutive sense of "cause") is lingusitically distinct from asserting that X is Y. Why? Because "is" can sometimes mean "equals" and sometimes "no more than" and sometimes "a member of" and sometimes "possesses" and this has all been discussed before many times. Water's wetness is the behavior of its molecules under certain conditions but that behavior, if observed at the atomic level isn't wet, nor are the molecules behaving in that way. Still, that's all wetness is.

All you're doing with your carping is playing on the vagaries and nuances of "is" to try to force a claim of logical contradiction when that's irrelevant.


> What you mean by "linguistic" is differnt reference, which
> implies non identity. Some people could say that they causal
> is not the linguistic, but you are not one of them.
> 

See above.

> > > > > >After all, "real" does not have to be construed at an ontologically basic level. Lots of things are real which can be reduced, on examination, to something else, and yet they are no less "real" for that.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Yes. But that does not imply difference of reference. If Mind
> > > > > is a such-and-such physical activity, then "mind" refers to
> > > > > the same thing that "such-and-such physical activity" refers
> > > > > to. Reduction implies identity of mind and brain, which in turn implies shared reference by "mind" and "brain". But you reject that
> > > > > account, calling it "reference confusion". That makes your
> > > > > position an incoherent one of explicit physicalism combined
> > > > > with implied dualism.
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > You misstate what dualism is, confusing it with dualities. 
> > > 
> > > Your dual account is dualistic BY YOUR OWN CRITERIA. See above.
> > > 
> > >
> > 
> > My standard for dualism matches the classical usage of the term (see Descartes, for starters) although I have updated some of the terms for consistency with a more modern perspective (to the chagrin of certain lovers of the archaic here).
> 
> Irrelevant. The point is not that your usage is right or wrong, it is that you are hoist by your own petard.
> 
>

The petard is yours as is what's being hoisted.