[Serious Phil] Transient or More Transient Than?

[Peter D]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
>
> 
> 
> > > 
> > > As Lewis distinguished qualia from "properties of objects" I'm pretty sure he'd agree that their exemplifications (they are universals, after all) are shorter-lived than other properties.  
> > 
> > That's some straw-clutching. He didn't think it important enough
> > to consider a definitional criterion. That's the fact.
> > 
> 
> Fine.  Take it out. 

>It's all the same to me.
> 
> 
> 
> > >Presumably, that's pretty much all anybody generally means by "transient." 
> > 
> > Why the heck should I care? Nobody thinks qualia are definitionally
> > transient but you.
> > 
> 
> 
> What's the difference whether they're "definitionally" transient or not?  

>They're all transient, definitionally or not, because if they exist they characterize experiences, and experiences are transient (unless they're experiences of God or something). But I'll tell you what, since this is clearly important to you I absolutely promise not to knock one out of qualialand if you find one that happens not be transient.  
> 
> 
> > > If qualia are properties of experience, they're bound to be on the transient side, just because experiences are.  Again, the resistance to transience mystifies me.  How could a property of experience not be transient? 
> > 
> > It's not that I think qualia are or should be eternal. I just
> > don't think it's an important topic either way.
> > 
> > > I still say that, taking Lewis's concept, if there are qualia, there are ineffable, transient, private properties of experience.  
> > 
> > That's pretty close to weaseling. Are we supposed to be reading
> > "there are" as definitional, or just an observation? 
> > 
> 
> See above.  As you are so resistant (for whatever reason) and Joe is so weird and mysterious about the matter, I'm perfectly happy to remove "transient" from the list of essences.  
> 
> 
> 
> > >That seems pretty uncontroversial 
> > 
> > Huh? But you say there are no qualia. 
> 
> 
> That depends what you mean by the term, and it's irrelevant.  We're talking about whether it's controversial that Lewis would take qualia to be transient.  

No we are not. We are talking about whether the idea of
transcience originated with you, or is just a reflection
of what others have said. If you are reduced to
trying to divine what Lewis would have thought, you might
as well give up.

>I don't think it is, but either way, it has nothing whatever to do with whether I say there are qualia.

You say there are no qualia because nothing fulfills your criteria, which include transience, which you say you include because it
reflects the definitions of others.

> > Either you derived "transient"
> > from some defintional characteristic, like you can say unicorns don't
> > exist, but would have horns if they did, or you managed to
> > observe the transcience of one of your qualia, thereby admitting
> > their existence.
> > 
> 
> Those aren't the only two possibilities.  As indicated, transience could just follow from other characteristics that ARE definitional.  Just like having appendages would follow from having horns (which I take it un-fiddled-with unicorns all have.  Anyhow, I don't know whether I've observed the transience of any of my qualia, because I don't we haven't settled either what transience is or qualia are.
> 
> 
> > >to me--whether he mentions the word "transient" or not.  OTOH, as properties/universals, I guess one might hold that, in another sense, they are eternal--just more transiently exemplified than properties like redness (which can be had by barns for years and years).
> > > 
> > 
> > That' definitely weaseling, since I carefully distinguished between
> > what are known as Real Universals, which might rightly be said to be eternal, and the kind of thing Lewis is *explicitly* talking about,
> > namely some kind of re-occurence or likeness or multiple instantiation. 
> 
> Wow, and you say I'M weaseling?!  Stuff that can be re-instantiated are universals. That's just what that word means. 

It doesn't have a single acontextual meaning. 

> Sorry.

> 
> > That is just a prima facie fact, 
> 
> If you say so.

Everything you have ever seen has had a completely
unique set of properties? Wow! How do you recognise yourself
in the mirror?


> > and it is wha
> > is labelled by the word "universal" in the The Problem
> > of Universals. 
> 
> Exactly.


> As I said.  If it can be reinstatiated it's a universal.  Period.  No weaseling, please.
> 
> 
> > Real Universals are only one theoretical
> > answer to the Problem of Universals. Others hold solve the problem
> > without reifying universals.
> > 
> 
> You want them a little but not too much. 

I note that the word means different things in different contexts.

Lewis made *his* deflated meaning clear, but you seem determined to
ignore him in order to have a brickbat with which to beat the dreaded qualia.

> I get that.  As the song might have gone though: You can't always get what you want--sometimes you have to take what you need.
> 
> W


While we're on the subject, you can admit there is a Problem of
Mind, without meaning there is detachable Cartesian Mind-stuff.