[Serious Phil] Transience and Qualia--what philosophers have generally held about them

[larry_tapper]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
>
> 
> 
> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> >
> > 
> > And now write something to show that transcience is philosophically significant.
> > 
> 
> Oh God.  Talk about weaseling.  
> 
> Let me recap.  NOBODY said it was "philosophically significant."  I claimed it was traditionally part of the batch of properties philosophers took qualia to have.  YOU and your buddy Shecky said that nobody applied this property to qualia except me.


> What the hell do you want exactly?  Egg in your beer?
> 
> W

W,

An old guy in my chess club used to say that.

We are arguing about transience only because Joe thought it was significant that it might not be a true property. Otherwise I should think it would be a relatively uninteresting and uncontroversial feature of qualia or qualitative aspects of experience or whatever. Would the discovery of a lifelong quale change anything much?

On the other hand, Joe's been asking about transience, privacy and mind-dependence, referring to an old quote in which you mentioned those three. But I wouldn't guess you deliberately left out ineffability and incorrigibility, which I think *are* controversial features.

The former seems to be PDJ's favorite, while the latter is highly relevant if we're doing C.I. Lewis exegesis, as you've already pointed out. In Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry, she reported that she had to go all the way back to Lewis to find a good example of a modern epistemic infallibilist.

Off to the airport now, y'all have the usual delightful week.

LT

  
> 
> 
> 
> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > >
> > > From "Lectures on Logical Atomism":
> > > 
> > > "Phantoms and hallucinations, considered in themselves, are, as I explained in the preceding lectures, on exactly the same level as ordinary sense-data. They differ from ordinary sense-data only in the fact that they do not have the usual correlations with other things. In themselves they have the same reality as ordinary sense-data. They have the most complete and absolute and perfect reality that anything can have. They are part of the ultimate constituents of the world, just as the fleeting sense-data are. Speaking of the fleeting sense-data, I think it is very important to remove out of one's instincts any disposition to believe that the real is the permanent. There has been a metaphysical prejudice always that if a thing is really real, it has to last either forever or for a fairly decent length of time. That is to my mind an entire mistake. The things that are really real last a very short time."
> > > 
> > > 
> > > From _Problems of Philosophy_:
> > > 
> > > "The world of existence is fleeting, vague, without sharp boundaries, without any clear plan or arrangement, but it contains all thoughts and feelings, all the data of sense, and all physical objects, everything that can do either good or harm, everything that makes any difference to the value of life and the world." 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > And here, for good measure, is G.E. Moore ("Sense-Data" in _Some Main Problems of Philosophy_ who indicates that the overwhelming majority of philosophers have held this view:
> > > 
> > > "...an overwhelming majority of philosophers have adopted the
> > > following views. Reasons of the sort which I have given are not the
> > > only ones which have been alleged as reasons for holding these views,
> > > but they are, I think, the ones which have really had most influence in getting them adopted, and they are, it seems to me, by far the strongest reasons for adopting them. However that may be, whatever the reasons, an overwhelming majority of philosophers have, I think, adopted the following views; and I wish you to realise these views as clearly as possible.
> > > 
> > > "They have held with regard to absolutely all the sense-data1 and
> > > every part of any sense-datum, which we ever apprehend by any of our
> > > senses, the following things. They have held (i) that absolutely no part of the sense-data, which I ever apprehend, exists at all except at the moment when I am apprehending it. They have held, that is to say, that except at the moment when I am apprehending it, there simply is not in the Universe any particular sense-datum which I ever apprehend. If, for instance, I look at this envelope again and now turn away my eyes for a moment, then while I saw that particular patch of whitish colour, there was that particular patch of colour in the Universe: there certainly was, for I saw it. But now that I no longer see it, that particular patch of colour has ceased to exist. It no longer is in the Universe, any more than my seeing of it is. They are both of them, both the colour and my seeing of it, things which were, but which are no longer: both of them equally and in the same se nse have completely ceased to be. These philosophers would not deny, indeed, that there may still be in the Universe a patch of colour exactly like that which I saw. For instance, some one else might at this moment be seeing a patch of colour exactly like it. But this other patch of colour, though exactly like, they would say, is certainly not the same: they may be exactly the same in quality, but they are not numerically the same. The patch of colour which I saw
> > > cannot be now existing even though another exactly like it may be. And
> > > they would say this with regard to absolutely all the sense-data, which any of us ever apprehends. Each of them only is, so long as the person apprehending it is apprehending it. And they would say this not only with regard to sense-data like colours, sounds, hardness, smoothness, heat, cold, aches, which seem to us to occupy space—to be localised. They would say it also with regards to the sense-given spaces which these things seem to occupy. For instance, the sense-given area, occupied by this patch of colour: I see it now, and while I see it, it is: that particular area is one among the contents of the Universe. But now that I turn my head away, it, that particular area I saw, has entirely ceased to exist. With my
> > > seeing of it, it also has ceased to be. I may indeed be still seeing an area exactly like it: this area for instance, which I now see, seems to be exactly like, and only distinguishable by the fact that it is occupied by a different colour. But these two areas, they would say, though perhaps exactly like, are not the same. They are no more the same than is this part of the total area which I now see the same as that part. The particular sense-given area which I just now saw has entirely ceased to be.
> > > 
> > > "This, then, is one view, which an overwhelming majority of philosophers have held with regard to sense-data."
> > > 
> > > W
> > > 
> > > 
> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > larry_tapper_2 wrote:
> > > > > 
> > > > >  >JP: ...my argument is based on the arbitrary nature of selecting one of
> > > > >  >transient-# as to precisify 'transient' when using that predicate as a
> > > > >  >Q-predicate. doing that makes an important philosophical question (the
> > > > >  >existence or non-existence of qualia) a matter of whim.
> > > > > 
> > > > >  >JP: choose transient-3 as to precisify 'transient' and an after image
> > > > >  >is not transient; and, therefore, an afterimage is not a quale or does
> > > > >  >not have qualia.
> > > > > 
> > > > >  >The flaw in this argument is that the selection of the value of '#' in
> > > > >  >'transient-#' is *not* arbitrary.
> > > > > 
> > > > >  >When we say that afterimages are 'transient', we obviously mean that
> > > > >  >the duration of an afterimage is short on a human scale, not a
> > > > >  >geological scale or a microphysical scale. That means that before
> > > > >  >precisification, the value of '#' has upper and lower bounds. It has to
> > > > >  >be large enough to allow afterimages to be perceptible (e.g. more than
> > > > >  >a nanosecond) and small enough so that a 30-year afterimage (say)
> > > > >  >wouldn't count as 'transient'.
> > > > > 
> > > > >  >In other words, there is no reasonable assignment of a value to '#' ---
> > > > >  >that is, a value consistent with the idea of transience on a human
> > > > >  >scale --- according to which afterimages are anything other than
> > > > >  >transient.
> > > > > 
> > > > > okay; so, according to you, afterimages pass the 'transient' criterion
> > > > > of the definition of 'quale' that Walter constructed to represent the
> > > > > views of well known philosopher whom he refuses to cite:
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Please.  If you don't know of any philosophers who have claimed that "the objects of acquaintance" (your qualiotrons) are transient, you have read very few philosophers.  You can start with Russell and go from there.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > W
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Philscimind mailing list
> > > > Philscimind@
> > > >
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Philscimind mailing list
> > > Philscimind@
> > >
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > Philscimind mailing list
> > Philscimind@
> >
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Philscimind mailing list
> Philscimind at ...
>