[Serious Phil] Brain/Experience Identity or Non-Identity

[Joseph Polanik]

SWM wrote:

 >Joseph Polanik  wrote:

 >>SWM wrote:

 >>>larry_tapper wrote:

 >>>My view, which you seem to have taken issue with: The features we
 >>>call, in the aggregate, "mind" or "consciousness" are outcomes of
 >>>those processes performing the requisite functions. The actual
 >>>instantiation of the processes as observable physical phenomena are
 >>>NOT the features that we call, in the aggregate, "consciousness,"
 >>>but, just as a smile requires a face, the features in question
 >>>require physical instantiation. I have offered a functionalist
 >>>account of consciousness which treats the system as the coin.

 >>>>As PDJ has pointed out like 37 times, what you mean by 'referent'
 >>>>seems to be based on some kind of mixture or conflation of Fregean
 >>>>sense and Fregean reference.

 >>>As I have responded at least as many times, that is false. I mean
 >>>nothing more by "referent" than what Frege's use allows as we have
 >>>seen in these discussions and in that SEP article.

 >>>>... you can't really say that "same thing but different referents"
 >>>>makes any sense from a Fregean point of view.

 >>>What I say is that it doesn't contradict Frege's usage, contra your
 >>>claim and PDJ's. Being a referent is a function of being a thing one
 >>>picks out with one's terms. That's it. Nor does Frege suggest
 >>>otherwise. Sometimes, if the question is what is the cause of X, then
 >>>the cause is the referent. But that doesn't mean that only causes can
 >>>be referents. Nor does it mean that an idea like the one I've
 >>>floated, that consciousness and the physical events in the brain can
 >>>be understood as two sides of a common coin, where each side is
 >>>referred to separately (and the coin is seen as a system), implies a
 >>>logical identity between the two sides.

 >>>But you're always free to take another poll.

 >>it would be simpler if you just told us whether you are asserting
 >>brain/experience identity or brain/experience non-identity?

 >>[where 'identity' means true, Leibniz's Law Observing identity]

 >Brain-Experience causation.

and what does 'causation' mean this time?

[NB: I'm not asking for a list of all the meanings that you think can
be conveyed by 'causation', I'm asking for which meaning you are trying
to convey *this time*.]

 >Identity is a function of reference, that is, it's a logical relation
 >between certain kinds of statements (made about things, of course,
 >since all statements are made about things, including, but not limited
 >to, physically observable phenomena in the world).

the identity relations with which we are concerned are all empirical
claims; hence, the term contingent identity.

identity as a logical relation is utterly non-controversial; for
example, an equilateral triangle is an equiangular triangle. quite true
but no controversy.

 >Causation, on the other hand, is not a logical relation since it is not
 >discovered logically, in terms of how language works (although it is,
 >indeed, an imputed relation, assigned by observers, using language, to
 >elements in the world, based on observed occurrences in the world).

 >Causality and identity are thus in different conceptual categories and
 >so are not, in principle, mutually exclusive.

true causality and identity are indeed in different conceptual
categories, doing and being, respectively. that makes them mutually
exclusive. A causes B precludes A is (identical to) B.

constitution (your ersatz causality, most likely) are both in the same
conceptual category, being. that's what makes them hard to distinguish.

 >Of course, some instances of causation (as when X moves Y) do preclude
 >assignment of identity (at least at the level of observation at which
 >we operate). But others (such as X produces Y) do not (as in wetness is
 >caused by the molecular behavior of water's atomic level constituents,
 >the hardness of a rock by the molecular behavior of its atomic level
 >constituents, etc., etc.).

the use of 'produces' here is misleading; and, might even indicate
conflation and equivocation involving the active voice from (true)
causes, an action verb, vs the passive (or perhaps middle) voice from
the stative verb is/constitutes.

remember, according to Searle, in cases like molecular motion and
liquidity, there is an ontological reduction (in this case, of liquidity
to molecular motion); and, therefore, an identity relation is involved.

it is only in the case of the brain/experience relation that, in
Searle's view, there is no ontological reduction of experience to that
from which it emerges.

Joe


-- 

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

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