[Serious Phil] Brain/Experience Identity or Non-Identity
examachine at gmail.com
Sat Aug 11 10:47:38 CDT 2012
On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 5:56 PM, Peter D <Philscimind at undergroundwiki.org>wrote:
> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <Philscimind at ...>
> > Very well explained, as I said before they demand an unreasonably high
> > standard from the theory of experience. That would be like saying that
> > I say "F=ma" I can conjure up a force and acceleration, just as stupid.
> Would it? Maybe you could quote "them" demanding an instantiation.
> I have never read -- or written-- such a passage. This is always
> based on a Mirskyan Mangling, not actual citation.
Not a quote, but a logical substitution. One of the best ways to show how
ridiculous an absurd argument is,
> > What matters in the theory of experience, is that it can explain aspects
> > experience that *can* be explained.
> What matters for physicalism is stating the reason why experience can't be
> physically explained if it isn't for the reason dualists say it can't. Care
> to have a go?
That's very perverted thinking, physicalists don't think that experience
can't be explained.
> > The problem with those stupid dualist theories of experience is that they
> > explain NONE of them.
> Where as physicalist theories also don't explain, because, apparently
> the Can't Be Explained.
No, they can.
> > For instance, they don't, and they cannot explain how it is that the
> > experience of red is different from the experience of blue, and how
> > different (can they quantify it?). OTOH, scientific theory WILL explain
> > such sensible questions.
> There's not fact of the matter about that, so I guess its faith.
No, it's not a matter of faith, for instance the neural spike theory of
experience explains the above. And so would CEMI theory of experience. As
well as Tononi's information theoretic explanation and my AIT based
explanation.... But property dualism or predicate dualism cannot, why?
> > For a kind of question that DOES matter very much: "is there any part of
> > experience that does not correspond to an informational distinction?". it
> > seems that there isn't, that is why I think they are just RAM states
> > (neural activation states).
> What they correspond to doens't tell us what they are.
It tels us what they can be physically, and what they CANNOT be.
Information is an ABSTRACT PHYSICAL CONCEPT. That's what you don't
It's not some metaphysical ghostly stuff like that Chalmers idiot thinks!
> > It's because the anti-scientific people here (most notably PDJ) do not
> > understand this, is why they are sounding so ridiculous to me.
> Pro-scientific people like PDJ recognise that science is based
> on explanation and evidence, not dogma and excuses.
Nonsense, you are simply ignorant of the scientific work in this area.
If you had studied any neuroscience, you would think differently (at least
you'd know how much you were lying).
Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
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