[Serious Phil] Eray's Essay on Brain Simulation

[Peter D]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 AM, SWM <Philscimind at ...>wrote:
> 
> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <Philscimind@>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > A long belated answer about SWM's comments on the paper.
> > >
> > >
> > > I try to put this as one possible explanation. A physicalist
> > interpretation
> > > of pan-protoexperientialism, really. I don't want to put mental as an
> > extra
> > > dimension, but rather the idea that *experience* is physical and it's a
> > > basic property, i.e. subjectivity. Since nothing can be measured
> > > objectively, this makes a lot of physical sense.
> > >
> > > However, the evil alien thought argument is not an argument for
> > > panpsychism, it is an argument for the separation of raw subjective
> > > experience from consciousness, instead. For consciousness you need
> > > intelligence, however, if some EM field has "proto-experience", it
> > doesn't
> > > need intelligence to have that.
> > >
> >
> > I see your point, Eray, about recognizing that if consciousness is just
> > something physical then it is not anything extra in a physical universe but
> > merely one more aspect of that universe's physics. In that sense I agree
> > that one can make the case for THAT kind of "panpsychism", i.e., it's
> > really panphysicalism with a particular dimension given certain
> > configurations.
> >
> > But I find I cannot agree with the notiion that for experience we need
> > intelligence, if by "intelligence" you mean a high degree of capability.
> > After all, my late cat certain had experience though she lacked the kind of
> > intelligence we have. But if, on the other hand, by "intelligence" you mean
> > something more basic as in a certain minimal capacity to relate inputs
> > within a broader system, then we could grant that my cat had intelligence,
> > too, though perhaps the slug in my garden lacks it. And yet the slug is
> > more intelligent than the rock. Where do we draw the line then?
> >
> >
> I don't say that, though, I say that *consciousness* requires intelligence,
> raw subjective experience might be unintelligent, that's the
> "proto-experience" theory.
> 
> 
> > >
> > > > I don't see that this position differs much from Chalmers' view except
> > in
> > > > terminology although it may finally just boil down to a descriptive or
> > > > conceptual issue re: what we mean by "experience." After all,
> > experience
> > > > that is simply not recognizable to us as what we mean by "experience"
> > can
> > > > hardly BE experience, can it? Is it just that what you want to call
> > > > "experience" wouldn't be called that applying the usual usages?
> > > >
> > >
> > > It differs in that I posit no extra-physical ingredient.
> > >
> > > No, it cannot be just experience, but the raw
> > > material/stuff/proto-experience, perhaps, the difference must be better
> > > illustrated. What *we* mean by our experience is usually conscious
> > > experience, though when we are sleeping we are possibly having experience
> > > but we have not much recollection of that experience, do we? Do you
> > > remember what it is like to be in deep sleep?
> > >
> >
> > Don't know or even if, in deep sleep, we dream at all. Surely though we
> > have experiences of dreaming, too. Are we then conscious in the dream but
> > in a kind of dream state consciousness? Or are we unconscious while
> > dreaming? Perhaps the term "consciousness" is just being used in different
> > ways in these examples?
> >
> >
> The suggestion is not the REM sleep where we dream, but the period where we
> do not dream at all. Do you have any recollection of what happens then?
>  You don't, so  you don't know what that "experience" is like. You can't
> even say if experience is non-existent, I think.
> 
> 
> > > If so, isn't this more like a Dennettian view? Like you, Dennett thinks
> > > > that experience is physically explainable, in his case I would say
> > that it
> > > > would be the events in operation that underlie it (or at least that's
> > MY
> > > > view of his view). Whether Dennett means a one to one correlation with
> > > > particular physical events at a very fine grained level of detail or
> > just a
> > > > general correlation with system operations is another question
> > (interesting
> > > > but not, I think, critical to the issue of whether experience is
> > intrinsic
> > > > to physicality in the universe).
> > > >
> > >
> > > My view is similar to Dennett's, if we're going to have any explanation
> > of
> > > *any* aspect of experience, it should be physical.
> > >
> >
> > I'm inclined to agree, absent a reason to think there is something
> > extra-physical involved. Of course, there are partisans on the other side
> > who think differently and believe we must incorporate something that isn't
> > physical in order to complete the account!
> >
> >
> That's true, but they have not specified what that is.

It's the Other Side of the Coin. That what SWM says, and he's Precise
Enough, according to you. BTW, if you can figure this out, feel free to tell the rest of us.

> >
> > > The psychophysical identity thesis deals with the latter part of your
> > > query, I'd assume Dennett to be committed to it.
> > >
> >
> > I think you're probably right, given how you've expressed this. As you
> > know, I shy away from an explicit commitment to identity theory because I
> > think that raises more questions than it answers and my way of doing that
> > is to revert to the point about different uses of "identity" including one
> > that addresses the recognition that two sides of a coin are both aspects of
> > the same thing, the coin. I think that analogy avoids the pitfalls that
> > arise when a claim of identity kicks up reference confusion issues.
> >
> 
> Rather the identity thesis  

There ins;t a single identity thesis.

>/ causal closure theses, were formulated in
> response to advances in neuroscience, i.e. they are a better understanding
> of neuroscience evidence.
> 
> 
> > > > One issue that really jumps out here though is one that has been
> > raised on
> > > > and off by people like Joe who have suggested that there is little
> > daylight
> > > > between the view of someone like Chalmers and someone like Dennett.
> > Both
> > > > apparently agree that experience is natural to the universe. But
> > Chalmers
> > > > thinks that it is an irreducible attribute (property) of physical
> > > > phenomena. Given his emphasis on the information principle as the
> > "extra
> > > > ingredient" he presumably believes that it is whenever information
> > happens
> > > > between physical phenomena that experience happens, a corollary
> > (perhaps?)
> > > > of the information's occurrence.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Chalmers doesn't only think it is "irreducible", but it is a genuinely
> > > non-physical property.
> > >
> >
> > Yes, but I think that amounts to the same thing, i.e., it is irreducible
> > (to anything physical) BECAUSE it is a non-physical property.
> >
> >
> If he just said "irreducible" it would mean only predicate dualism, but as
> you admit here, predicate and property dualism is precisely the same
> position.

Nothing SWM said makes them the same. THat someone happens
to believe in property dualism and irreducibility does
 not make them the same.

> > > The "information dualism", I denounce it just as well. There is nothing
> > > more to information to whatever the encoding is, and the computation.
> > There
> > > is nothing else there to it. It's just ordinary physics.
> > >
> > >
> >
> > Yes, I think that's a fair way to put this. Do we need to presume a
> > fundamental principle of information in order to recognize that information
> > is a part of the way the world works?
> >
> >
> I don't think so, either. But a dualist interpretation of panpsychism
> would. 

>A physicalist interpretation would say that the subjective
> experience of an info. processing system would depend on its *physical*
> properties, a wholly different conclusion, so a simulation of something
> usually ends up with different subjective experience according to that
> theory.
> 
> > > On the other hand it seems reasonable to say that Dennett thinks that
> > what
> > > > we know as "experience" is just one of the things some physical
> > systems do.
> > > > On this view, it's not that experience is found everywhere that
> > physical
> > > > phenomena or information processing physical events occur but only
> > where a
> > > > certain kind of information physical events occur.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Not quiet sure what you mean here. How can he avoid panpsychism when he
> > > says it's just information processing? It's either any information
> > > processing event, or some of them. Why the latter? What evidence is there
> > > for that?
> > >
> >
> > The absence of conscious behaviors in some information processing systems!
> > Of course, if what we call "consciousness" is just a way of referring to a
> > certain range of information processing systems within a broader range of
> > these along a continuum, then it would not be surprising to treat
> > consciousness or experience as just one particular manifestation of
> > physical phenomena, inherently present everywhere but only becoming
> > recognizable as what we call "consciousness" when it crosses a certain
> > threshold.
> >
> 
> 
> But again, consciousness is not the same thing as experience, so if any
> computer has experience, they need not be conscious!
> 
> 
> >
> > >
> > > > It seems to me that distinction essentially draws the line between a
> > kind
> > > > of panpsychism (Chalmers has called his view, at least in some of his
> > > > writings, a kind of "proto-panpsychism". But I expect Dennett would
> > have a
> > > > problem with that nomenclature if applied to him.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I think he could still make his position clear.
> > >
> >
> > I think he would be concerned about the misleading nature of that manner
> > of speaking. One thing I've seen in him is a strong concern for how we put
> > things, a healthy respect for the way language shapes our ideas (no doubt
> > one of his debts to Wittgenstein).
> >
> >
> It's easy, if he thinks any AI can have experience, he's a panpsychist.
> 
> 
> > > > So, given your position that experience is a ubiquitous aspect of the
> > > > physical, where would you come down in this dispute? On Chalmers' side
> > with
> > > > a view that experience, being ubiquitous, is also basic (and thus
> > > > inexplicable in any terms but itself) or Dennett's view that it is
> > > > explainable as a system level phenomenon?
> > > > (Still reading the rest of your paper but I thought I'd start things
> > off
> > > > with this!)
> > > >
> > >
> > > That's not my view, it's just one of several hypotheses that might be
> > true.
> > > Regardless of that being true, it seems that the brain sim's experience
> > > will change considerably relative to human experience.
> >
> >
> > I would expect so, too. There's no reason to think that a machine
> > consciousness must be just like our own. The only issue is to discern what
> > makes consciousness in us and to see if it can do the same in a synthetic
> > mechanism.
> >
> 
> Right, so far the best theory seems the EM field theories of consciousness,

Oh great, another "seeming". Is that a seems-to-you, or is
there anything remotely scientific or objective about it.

> but there have been some strange tones in their presentation, which the
> scientific community didn't like, and even preferred Penrose's theory.
> 
> It's well possible that the mind could also be a quantum computer, and
> experience is superposition states, that's possible as well. We just need
> neuroscientists to find if there are any special physical conditions. Then
> we can replicate experience as we like, or make another kind of experience.
> 
> 
> > > In some cases, it
> > > vanishes, but there is no evidence for those. In some cases, it's almost
> > > too easy to regenerate it perfectly.
> > >
> >
> >
> > I think I understand where you're headed with this and perhaps the
> > panpsychism terminology misleads here and should be accompanied by more
> > robust caveats!
> >
> >
> Imagine if it's EM field, then a Babbage analytical engine would not have
> experience.

There's your Computational Zombies.

> But a brain prosthesis device that yields a similar EM field
> would.
> 
> I was thinking about that, if it's an EM field, then it would automatically
> follow that our experience can be augmented and amplified. Amazing! It
> might be possible to make more "room" in our minds by attaching implant
> devices.
> 
> 
> > > I think I've avoided writing a clear conclusion. But it's what you should
> > > have extracted from the paper. The idea was that after reading, the
> > > reader's mind is filled with "a-ha! so if the EM field theory is correct,
> > > then it's possible to perfectly replicate human experience on a machine!"
> > >
> > > Best,
> > >
> >
> > Sorry that I ended up not going back to complete my reading of it. I got
> > distracted with lots of other stuff (including Sean's manuscript) but I
> > will attempt to rectify that omission this week.
> >
> 
> 
> It's actually very poor writing compared to the earlier papers on
> physicalism, not a lot of very new ideas. But there are some, for instance
> if someone thinks that any simulation of a brain will have the same
> experience, then that's a form of dualism.
> 
> Best,
> 
> 
> -- 
> Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
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