[Serious Phil] An Implicit Admission that the KA Succeeds?

[Joseph Polanik]

SWM wrote:

 >Joseph Polanik  wrote:

 >>SWM wrote:

 >>>Joseph Polanik  wrote:

 >>>>SWM wrote:

 >>>>>Joseph Polanik  wrote:

 >>>>>>for the nth time, no one expects a description of brain activity
 >>>>>>to instantiate experience.

 >>>>>But some expect a description of experience in terms of the
 >>>>>physical phenomena associated with it (brain activity) to provide
 >>>>>the same information an experiencer experiencing experiences has
 >>>>>about the experiences experienced! And it it doesn't, they
 >>>>>challenge the sufficiency of the explanation.

 >>>>do we agree, then, that a description of the brain activity
 >>>>associated with qualia does not produce all the information that
 >>>>experiencing qualia produces?

 >>>No description of anything produces all that is what is being
 >>>described!

 >>>>>>no one expects a description of brain activity to provide
 >>>>>>knowledge of what it is like to see red. that means that there is
 >>>>>>knowledge that physical sciences can not acquire thru scientific
 >>>>>>research. whether that's a problem for your views depends on what
 >>>>>>those views are.

 >>>>>You know what they are because I haven't been coy here about them

 >>>>coy? no. you've merely been evasive.

 >>>Nonsense. I have been explicit, detailed and even repetitive about
 >>>what I have said.

 >>>>the question is whether you can even admit recognizing the problem.

 >>>Or whether you can?

 >>>>when Mary gets out into the real world and sees a tomato, she'll
 >>>>know for the first time what it is like to see red.

 >>>>she'll be able to report at least two facts: 'I now know what seeing
 >>>>red is like' and 'I now know what quale is associated with the
 >>>>brainstate associated with reports of seeing red'.

 >>>Assuming by "quale" you just mean experience, then you have simply
 >>>had Mary repeat the same claim in different words.

 >>perhaps; but, until you show that a description of brain activity is
 >>going to supply this information (despite not instantiating qualia),
 >>the KA succeeds.

 >It doesn't. See Eray's point if you aren't convinced by mine.

I'm not even convinced that Eray has a relevant point to make.

the challenge remains: if Mary acquires information about qualia that a
scientific description of brain activity does not supply, the KA
succeeds.

if you are admitting (as you seem to be admitting in recent posts) that
a scientific description of brain activity will not supply the
information that can only be obtained by instantiating experience, then
you've admitted that the KA succeeds.

Joe


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