[Serious Phil] An Implicit Admission that the KA Succeeds?
jpolanik at nc.rr.com
Tue Aug 14 05:54:21 CDT 2012
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>>>>for the nth time, no one expects a description of brain activity
>>>>>>to instantiate experience.
>>>>>But some expect a description of experience in terms of the
>>>>>physical phenomena associated with it (brain activity) to provide
>>>>>the same information an experiencer experiencing experiences has
>>>>>about the experiences experienced! And it it doesn't, they
>>>>>challenge the sufficiency of the explanation.
>>>>do we agree, then, that a description of the brain activity
>>>>associated with qualia does not produce all the information that
>>>>experiencing qualia produces?
>>>No description of anything produces all that is what is being
>>>>>>no one expects a description of brain activity to provide
>>>>>>knowledge of what it is like to see red. that means that there is
>>>>>>knowledge that physical sciences can not acquire thru scientific
>>>>>>research. whether that's a problem for your views depends on what
>>>>>>those views are.
>>>>>You know what they are because I haven't been coy here about them
>>>>coy? no. you've merely been evasive.
>>>Nonsense. I have been explicit, detailed and even repetitive about
>>>what I have said.
>>>>the question is whether you can even admit recognizing the problem.
>>>Or whether you can?
>>>>when Mary gets out into the real world and sees a tomato, she'll
>>>>know for the first time what it is like to see red.
>>>>she'll be able to report at least two facts: 'I now know what seeing
>>>>red is like' and 'I now know what quale is associated with the
>>>>brainstate associated with reports of seeing red'.
>>>Assuming by "quale" you just mean experience, then you have simply
>>>had Mary repeat the same claim in different words.
>>perhaps; but, until you show that a description of brain activity is
>>going to supply this information (despite not instantiating qualia),
>>the KA succeeds.
>It doesn't. See Eray's point if you aren't convinced by mine.
I'm not even convinced that Eray has a relevant point to make.
the challenge remains: if Mary acquires information about qualia that a
scientific description of brain activity does not supply, the KA
if you are admitting (as you seem to be admitting in recent posts) that
a scientific description of brain activity will not supply the
information that can only be obtained by instantiating experience, then
you've admitted that the KA succeeds.
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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