[Serious Phil] Brain/Experience Identity or Non-Identity

Tue Aug 14 11:03:54 CDT 2012

And if you don't believe my description is better, you can use Tononi's
somewhat convoluted definitions using classical information theory.
According to him, it seems, any information processing system has qualia.
So that's another published position, which you people should be
criticizing. But there are likely some flaws with his work, why I didn't
like it so much, I suppose you people would like his work a lot if and only
if he got trapped in a Cartesian fallacy like property dualism. :)))))

On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 6:22 PM, larry_tapper_2 <
Philscimind at undergroundwiki.org> wrote:

> Eray,
>
> I see, you're using conditional entropy to quantify the difference.
>
> Still of course questions will arise such as: how does one characterize
> the information content of (say) a belief? I hope you do not think that the
> answer to this question is obvious!
>
> LT
>
>
>
> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <Philscimind at ...>
> wrote:
> >
> > The difference between two bodies of experience X and Y. The ultimate
> limit
> > of any difference is the conditional information content H(Y|X). Thus,
> > experiential differences are contained in that amount, it should in fact
> > precisely quantify whatever physical difference if X and Y define just
> > experiential events. X and Y are event descriptions in relevant physical
> > language.
> >
> > There should be a boundary to X and Y, otherwise they don't make sense,
> > experiences should be thought of as contained within space-time regions.
> >
> > Similar stuff to Tononi, but I think much clearer.
> >
> > http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/tononi.htm
> >
> > On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 4:00 AM, larry_tapper <
> > Philscimind at ...> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <Philscimind@>
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > We've already quantified that information, in my work I say it is
> just
> > > conditional information / information distance. Your pet argument is so
> > > dead now :)
> > > >
> > > > Eray Ozkural
> > >
> > > Eray,
> > >
> > > I couldn't figure out what you were responding to here.
> > >
> > > But I'm curious --- what is it that you say is conditional information
> /
> > > information distance, and why?
> > >
> > > LT
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On 13 AÃ„Å¸u 2012, at 15:36, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > >>
> > > > >> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@>
> wrote:
> > > > >>
> > > > >>> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@>
> wrote:
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik
> <Philscimind@>
> > > wrote:
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> SWM wrote:
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> larry_tapper wrote:
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> SWM: I think it's a conceptual error to suppose that science
> must
> > > > >>>>>>> result in a theory (whether done in equations or language)
> which
> > > > >>>>>>> instantiates what is being explained....
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>>>> Has anyone in the entire history of science or philosophy
> ever
> > > made
> > > > >>>>>>> this conceptual error? Just wondering.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>>> Yes, every time someone argues that a complete explanation of
> > > > >>>>>> consciousness MUST include the information that being
> conscious
> > > > >>>>>> produces for the one who is conscious -- or else the
> explanation
> > > must
> > > > >>>>>> be deemed incomplete.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> who here assumes that disjunction as a premise?
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> Anyone who thinks it is telling against the idea that brains
> cause
> > > (are the necessary and sufficient agent for the occurrence of) minds to
> > > assert that a failure of such an explanation to tell a non-red- seeing
> > > agent what-it-is-like-to-see-red.
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> But assuming that "a complete explanation of consciousness MUST
> > > include the information that being conscious
> > > > >>> produces for the one who is conscious" is reasonable. What
> > > > >>> is unreasonable is makign the non-equivalent assumption
> > > > >>> that an instantiation is required. This debate goes in endless
> > > > >>> circles because you don't distinguish the two.
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> It goes in circles because you insist on trying to salvage an
> > > unsalvageable position by denial, repetition and a general refusal to
> > > acknowledge implications.
> > > > >
> > > > > Vacuous ad hom. My point stands.
> > > > >
> > > > >>>>> you claim that a description of brain activity is sufficient to
> > > > >>>>> constitute an explanation of any phenomenality correlated with
> that
> > > > >>>>> brain activity.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>> others argue that a description of brain activity is
> incomplete;
> > > not,
> > > > >>>>> because they expect a description of brain activity to
> instantiate
> > > > >>>>> qualia as you foolishly allege;
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> Then they shouldn't be surprised that an explanatory
> description of
> > > consciousness as a feature of what some brains do some of the time
> doesn't
> > > also produce the condition of what some brains do some of the time.
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> We're not surprised. We just note that since you alleged
> explanations
> > > > >>> don't deliver "the information that being conscious
> > > > >>> produces for the one who is conscious", they are
> indistinguishable
> > > from failed explanations.
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> No explanation delivers the equivalent of being what it explains
> > > > >
> > > > > "the information that being conscious
> > > > > produces for the one who is conscious" does NOT mean
> > > > > an instantiation of cosnciousness. Can you do anything
> > > > > but repeat that error?
> > > > >
> > > > >> and that is as true for explanations of seeing things like red as
> it
> > > is for explanations of games we play, how cells work, why there is
> gravity,
> > > why milke is good for the body (or not), etc., etc., etc. You still
> claim
> > > that to be a complete explanation of seeing red the explanation must
> > > "deliver" to the person reading or hearing it knowledge equivalent to
> what
> > > seeing red entails
> > > > >
> > > > > Yes I do claim that, and as stated is reasonable, and as stated
> > > > > it is NOT a demand for instantiation. Can you do anything
> > > > > but repeat that error?
> > > > >
> > > > >> but that is simply absurd. Nor does it become less absurd the more
> > > you insist on it or reject the point that no explanation is ever the
> > > equivalent of what it explains.
> > > > >
> > > > > I have never rejected that point. I have pointed that it
> > > > > doens't arise, apart from assumptions YOU are making and *I*
> > > > > am not.
> > > > >
> > > > >>> But half the time you say you don't really have an explanation of
> > > consc., just a blueprint for an AI.
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> All of the time you play fast and loose with meanings and the
> issues
> > > at hand.
> > > > >
> > > > > I don't think so. Give examples.
> > > > >
> > > > >> I've told you what an explanation of consciousness would need to
> do
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > You have given multiple incompatible accounts.
> > > > > 1 "Full and Complete".
> > > > > 2 In Princple.
> > > > > 3 Omitting Subjectivity.
> > > > > 4 Practical but not theoretical
> > > > > 5. No one can do it: "The mystery lies in the as-yet unexplained
> > > account of how physical phenomena produce a
> > > > > feeling, thinking mind""
> > > > >
> > > > >> in my estimation and what it would not need to do and why. You
> > > already have that information so there's no point in my repeating it
> yet
> > > again.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>>> Eray puts it quite well. Understanding seeing red is one brain
> > > state or states, on this view, while seeing red is another brain state
> or
> > > states. So why expect the explanation which constitutes an instance of
> > > understanding (one brain state) to be the other which constitutes an
> > > instance of seeing?
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> No one does. You keep confsuign the requirement for " the
> > > information that being conscious >produces for the one who is
> conscious",
> > > evne though
> > > > >>> the distinction has been pointed out to you endlessly.
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> An explanation of water's wetness describes the nature and
> behavior
> > > of of water's constituents at an atomic level. It is not, itself, wet.
> > > > >
> > > > > You're doing it again. No one demanded an instantiation. The
> request
> > > > > was for "the information that being conscious
> > > > > produces for the one who is conscious". You think the two
> > > > > are the same, we do not.
> > > > >
> > > > >> An explanation of seeing red would describe the process that
> > > underlies instances of seeing the color in question but would not,
> itself,
> > > be or provide the reader with such instances of seeing red, itself.
> Hence,
> > > whatever the experience of seeing red is like, it would not be
> conveyed by
> > > the explanation of that experience.
> > > > >
> > > > > It's only "hence" given YOUR assumption.
> > > > >
> > > > >> There is absolutely NO difference, in this sense, between an
> > > explanation of a baseball game or why the ball goes where it goes when
> hit
> > > by the batter and an explanation of consciousness or seeing red, etc.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>>>> but, because a description of brain
> > > > >>>>> activity does not describe qualia, does not explain HOW qualia
> > > arises
> > > > >>>>> from brain activity, does not explain WHY there is any qualia
> at
> > > all,
> > > > >>>>> etc.
> > > > >>>>>
> > > > >>>>
> > > > >>>> Except this model does do all of that
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> You sometimes say that.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> I always say that. What I also say is that not every question
> makes
> > > sense and if a question doesn't, then not answering it is not a
> failure of
> > > the explanation in question.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>> You sometimes say it is only explanation-in-principle.
> > > > >>
> > > > >> I also say that whenever you attempt to confuse such a general,
> > > conceptual explanation with a finished explanation that is entitled to
> be
> > > taken as true.
> > > > >
> > > > > If you;re explanation isn't "finished", it isn't "full and
> complete",
> > > > > as you have claimed, and it does have uncovered bases.
> > > > >
> > > > >> Since I am not arguing that Dennett's model is true, only that it
> is
> > > a viable option (which cannot be excluded from being true), there is no
> > > basis for pretending that the fact that there are still incomplete
> elements
> > > in the theory at the more granular level undermines a model like
> Dennett's.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>> You sometimes say it is a practical blueprint,
> > > > >>> not  a conceptual explanation. You sometimes say there is no
> > > > >>> such explanation. You're all over the place.
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Every explanation, if it's any good, forms the basis for
> > > implementation
> > > > >
> > > > > Then why point that out? Aren;t you trying to get off the
> > > > > hook of providing hows and whys.
> > > > >
> > > > >> (a blueprint of a model that can be built and tested in the real
> > > world. That is part of why Dennett's model is viable (could be true),
> i.e.,
> > > it can be designed for implementation and testing.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>>> (where, by "qualia," all that is meant are the bits of
> experience
> > > that make up any given experience we have_. It is just obduracy (or a
> > > certain inability to see it) that prompts you, and some others, to
> continue
> > > to deny that experience is not explained by such a physically based
> theory
> > > and the argument often adduced in defense of that denial, that Mary
> doesn't
> > > know what it is like to see red despite having all the knowledge about
> the
> > > physical requirements for seeing red to occur, falters precisely
> because
> > > there is no reason a possessor of all the physical knowledge would be
> > > expected to also see red
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>>> (or know-what-it-is-like-to-see-red, which, of course, is a
> > > function of seeing red).
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> You blandly say "of course", but that is just what is under
> dispute.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> There is no instance anywhere in the world that we are aware of
> where
> > > knowing-what-it-is-like-to-see-red comes about in any other way than
> seeing
> > > red.
> > > > >
> > > > > There's no instance of a human like AI (etc etc). You certainly
> > > > > wouldn't let me argue that strong AI si immpossible because
> > > > > it doesn't exist today. Dennett believes that
> > > knowing-what-it-is-like-to-see-red can come about without seeing red
> once
> > > we have a complete
> > > > > and full explanation that we don;t have. Unlike you, I am open
> > > > > minded enough not to rule that out.
> > > > >
> > > > >> You say it's a flaw in an explanation not to be able to convey the
> > > same information as seeing red conveys. But why would that be if there
> is
> > > no such instance anywhere AND NO EXPLANATION EVER IS WHAT IT EXPLAINS?
> You
> > > are simply confused on multiple counts.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>> It's just incompetent
> > > > >>> to keep missing the central point that way. But  at least you
> have
> > > stated the assumption,
> > > > >>> even if you haven;t stated it *as* an assumption. Eray doens't
> even
> > > realise he is making
> > > > >>> and assumption. If either of you attempted to argue in a formal,
> > > rigorous way, you would
> > > > >>> realise the need fot the knowing=seeing assumption. But neither
> of
> > > you will, so the ball
> > > > >>> keeps rolling.
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> There is no reason to think that an explanation of seeing red
> should
> > > also be the equivalent of seeing red. That is just your very deep
> confusion.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >>>> Seeing red is not the same as understanding the occurrences of
> red
> > > sightings. The underlying brain activity (as Eray correctly points out)
> > > would not be expected to be the same. And, as I have said before, an
> > > explanation of seeing red (which EXPRESSES the knowledge of seeing
> red) can
> > > never be expected to be what it explains BECAUSE NO EXPLANATION IS
> THAT.
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> And that continues to be something no one is expecting or
> demanding.
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> And yet you fail repeatedly to recognize that THAT just is what
> you
> > > are demanding when you fault an explanation of consciousness that
> doesn't
> > > replace the experience of seeing red or tasting salt with the
> explanation
> > > of doing so.
> > > > >
> > > > > No. I succeed in recognising that I am not demanding that. They
> > > > > are equivalent under your assumptions, not mine.
> > > > >
> > > > >>>> There is a serious category confusion which seems to be
> occurring
> > > in the case of explaining experiences which doesn't happen in any other
> > > example of explanatory descriptions. I think that, too, is a function
> of
> > > someone's obstinacy!
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> Oh well. That was the boast: here's the climb down:
> > > > >>> "The mystery lies in the as-yet unexplained account of how
> physical
> > > phenomena produce a feeling, thinking mind"
> > > > >>> Now I guess you can zag back to boasting. And then climbing down.
> > > And then boasting again. Ad infinitum.
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Unlike you, I don't "boast"
> > > > >
> > > > > "A Dennettian model can do all that"
> > > > >
> > > > >> though it's not surprising you think others are doing what you are
> > > obviously doing yourself. You are the one who likes to "boast" about
> > > winning arguments, your points "standing", being a "trained scientist",
> > > having "refuted" others. Look more closely at your own ways of
> speaking if
> > > you want to figure out who is "boasting" around here.
> > > > >>
> > > > >>
> > > > >> _______________________________________________
> > > > >> Philscimind mailing list
> > > > >> Philscimind@
> > > > >>
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
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> > > > > Philscimind@
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> >
> > --
> > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University,
> Ankara
> > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
> > http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
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-- 
Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
http://myspace.com/arizanesil http://myspace.com/malfunct
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