[Serious Phil] computationalism

Tue Jun 5 16:34:12 CDT 2012

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:

> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> >
> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "larry_tapper" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > >
> > > SWM> Yes there's no question that a lot of this is very technical and sophisticated and sometimes some involved in the field (PDJ? Larry?) think there's evidence from computer theory that militates against a computational account of consciousness. 
> > > 
> > > SWM,
> > > 
> > > Not me --- I'm not aware of any evidence from computer theory that militates against the computational account. Indeed it would be surprising to me if any such evidence ever came *from computer theory* --- it would be more likely to come from neuroscience or behavioral science, no?
> > >
> > 
> > Glad to hear it. I would agree that neuroscience (though less so with regards to behavioral science) would be the likely place where we should expect to discover evidence contrary to a computational account. Of course that would be an empirical matter which is where this is all likely to be worked out in any event.
> > 
> >   
> > > I do, however, think it's easier to argue that the brain is a computer than it is to argue that some given computational design is > conscious or has understanding.
> > 
> > 
> > Also true. It isn't easy, at all, in my view to argue that any computational design is conscious or has understanding precisely because of the intrinsic ambiguity in those terms (how we use them). 
> 
> Why can;t we just stipulate less ambiguous meanings, as we do
> in many other areas? 

It would be great but with some people, like you, there are always arguments about the stipulations, too.

> And why disregard the empirical issues?
>

Who's doing that do you think?

> >In fact, this wouldn't be an issue to be settled by argument at all I should think.
> > 
> > Rather I would look to results in the world and how these fit with our ongoing usages and thinking about these things. For instance, a successful AI of the sort under discussion (one that we would be inclined to call "conscious" in the way we use THAT term with regard to ourselves) would be one which operates in the world in ways that match our own and that would be discovered by interaction with it,
> 
> Would it? But if the way we use "conscious" doens't directly
> mean a form of behaviour, why would behaviour resolve the question?

Behavior is what determines our use of mental words in a large number of cases and, in fact, those are precisely the cases that are relevant to testing for the presence of consciousness since they're what we use (because they're all we ever have) with regard to other entities like ourselves. 

> And why would we solve a difficult scientific/philoosphical
>  problem by an appeal to Loose an popular language anyway?
> 

Ordinary language comes first. Scientific language is built on it just as science is built on the experiences we have (as in sensory data, etc.).

> > not by examining its blueprints or logical reasoning applied to the meanings of terms like "consciousness" alone.
> > 
> > The conceptual arguments (such as how the entity should be treated under the law, socially, morally, etc.) 
> 
> Those are not particularly conceptual issues anyway.
> 

I guess you just feel you have to have something to say, eh?

> >would be mostly at the margins, a function of our experience of interacting with such entities. It would be less a debate about what consciousness is in some abstract sense 
> 
> The debate about what consc. is is the debate about what consc.
> is.
> 

Is this an insight?

> 
> >(i.e., some generalizable use of the term that fits every situation) than whether this or that entity qualifies in this or that circumstance. I think, in this sense at least, I am more in accord with Sean than with some of my usual interlocutors in these discussions.
> > 
> > 
> > > And please, this has nothing to do with covert dualist assumptions or anything of the sort. I do not  agree with Searle that strong computational AI is *conceptually* impossible; I just think there's a lot we don't know and no exemplars of strong AI exist just yet.
> > >
> > 
> > 
> > I don't believe I've said that your arguments suggest covert dualism, have I? I generally reserve judgment on that sort of thing though, after enough discussion, I do draw certain conclusions, e.g., I've concluded from the arguments advanced by PDJ and Joe that both ARE covertly dualistic. I have not yet formed an opinion as to your own underlying motivations, nor do I think one MUST be a dualist (covert or otherwise) to oppose a view like Dennett's. However I DO think Searle is covertly dualist for all his protestations to the contrary.
> > 
> > It's very much a case-by-case judgment as far as I'm concerned.
> >  
> > 
> > > That said, I wish Eray good luck and it would not surprise me very much if 20 years hence he were thought of as the Turkish Minsky. In the present, part of Eray's argumentative strategy is to lower the bar for mental attributions. I find that interesting and not so easily refutable; but I think you're right to express caution about his grand pronouncements.
> > > 
> > > Larry
> > >
> > 
> > Eray is given to grand pronouncements, as are many of us I suppose -- not always to our own good. What I have read of his paper thus far (about half) does not suggest to me that he is arguing FOR what he calls pan-experientialism in any logico-philosophical way, contra what Walter seemed to take from it. Rather, I read him as putting forth some speculations he takes to be interesting about consciousness, given his conclusion that it can be shown to be physically based (a conclusion I share).
> > 
> > If it can be, we naturally want to know how and what sort of "thing" that makes consciousness (understanding and so forth). As a presentation of some ways to go in understanding this phenomenon, his paper has clear value. But I think it's a mistake to attack it, as Walter has done, on the grounds that it doesn't prove its speculations. Hypotheses in science are meant to be explored and tested not proved or disproved, and I think that's all Eray is presenting (at least, based on what I've read so far -- perhaps I will have more time to read further today).
> > 
> > SWM 
> >  
> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > To be more precise, the human brain *is* a computer, 
> > > > 
> > > > Well I don't think we know that for a fact, at least that it is only a computer and does its work of producing consciousness computationally.
> > > > 
> > > > Still, I agree that it is quite reasonable to think about it this way and that it provides a sound working hypothesis for further study.
> > > > 
> > > > Certainly I have argued that we CAN explain the elements we call "mental" (including experience) computationally (though I'm not sure you and I agree about the computational basis of experience). But the fact that this looks to be conceptually sound (making such a model viable for further research and study), is not evidence that it is true, however strongly you or anyone else (including me) may believe it is likely to be. 
> > > > 
> > > >  
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > > and it does execute
> > > > > (possibly multiple) machine learning programs. The general theory of
> > > > > computation encompasses all such computers including electronic computers,
> > > > > biological nervous systems, quantum computers and so forth. So we define
> > > > > mathematically what a computer is, and it turns out those neural networks
> > > > > are a kind of general purpose computer, we have proven all this stuff.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > I think Searle would say we can explain anything in terms of computation but that that's just a picture (as Sean might put it) while what's really at issue is(are) the particular mechanism(s) involved in the brain in producing mental phenomena (understanding, awareness, intentionality, experience and so on).  
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > > Why
> > > > > is that confusing? There isn't much room for confusion in that area that I
> > > > > can see, but I understand that theory of computation is hard to understand
> > > > > for many, even for computer science graduates apparently. I hear silly
> > > > > claims like "turing machines cannot be instantiated in the real world",
> > > > > blah blah, all the time.
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Yes there's no question that a lot of this is very technical and sophisticated and sometimes some involved in the field (PDJ? Larry?) think there's evidence from computer theory that militates against a computational account of consciousness. There is certainly a range of opinion, even among those who spend their working lives with programming and such. Josh Stern on Analytic held a view very much akin to yours (and mine) on the subject, before he left the group. Bill Modlin who started on your group also thinks computation is the key (understanding is just an algorithm). My old correspondent Bill Hibbard, a computer programming researcher involved in the AI field, similarly thinks as you and I do (allowing for our differences, of which there certainly are some). So there's a range of opinion even among those who can certainly boast expertise in the field (which I cannot as Larry persistently reminds me).     
> > > > 
> > > > That there are such differences in the field is at least evidence that no one in the debate can claim his or her own expertise as definitive in this dispute.
> > > > 
> > > > SWM
> > > > > Best,
> > > > > 
> > > > > -- 
> > > > > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
> > > > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
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