[Serious Phil] In Virtue of the Vacuous
jpolanik at nc.rr.com
Wed Jun 6 06:43:31 CDT 2012
Peter D wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>SWM wrote (#1872):
>>>Peter D wrote:
>>>>>Peter D wrote:
>>>>>>>PDJ writes below: "You could build a humanoid AI, and Chalmers
>>>>>>>could look at it and say: 'Yep, I would say that AI has qualia.
>>>>>>>Of course, it has them because n non physical Extra Ingredient
>>>>>>>supervenes on its information processing...' You won't have
>>>>>>>proved a damn thing to him about the falsehood of dualism.
>>>>>>>How-and-why explanation just isn';t the same as recipe following.
>>>>>>>You can bake bread without understanding microbiology."
>>>>>>>This is incredible! How many times have I pointed out that I am
>>>>>>>not tyring to prove the "falsehood of dualism," only that we
>>>>>>>don't need to opt for dualism to account for consciousness in the
>>>>>>How many times do I have to say...same bloody difference! There is
>>>>>>no purported motivation for dualism whatsoever beyond accounting
>>from a traditional perspective, that would be quite true; but, until
>>the von Neumann Interpretation is falsified, there is another
>>motivation: accounting for physics.
>[no comment from PDJ]
>>>Except my dear dualism defender, I am not asserting that dualism IS
>>>false, only that we have no reason to speculate that it's true if we
>>>can adequately explain consciousness without it which, I have
>>>claimed, we can.
>>Stuart's position revolves around a highly questionable conditional
>>if we can adequately explain consciousness without asserting dualism;
>>then, we have no reason to assert dualism.
>That isn';t questionable at all,
are you saying that one may not question the antecedent of that
curiously enough, both you and Stuart are refusing to engage the same
argument: the antecedent of the conditional is false, making the
conditional itself vacuously true.
>>as previously discussed, one must assert phenomenological dualism to
>>make explanation possible.
>>someone, such as Dennett, who ontologically reduces experience qua
>>qualia to brain activity, forfeits the ability to explain experience
>>in terms of brain activity because that would be explaining something
>>in terms of itself.
>since there is no known reason to posit mind-matter dualism other than
>to explain consc.
just repeating your claim is not enough
>># curiously enough, this claim suffers from the same flaw that PDJ
>>overlooked above: it presupposes that the von Neumann Interpretation
>Every unsupported claim should be presumed false.
you are free to adopt such a position; but, that is beside the point.
at issue is whether you admit or deny that your position presupposes
that a certain interpretation of QM is false.
>I have no more reason to believe in Abstract Egos that I have in Magic
this isn't about whether there are reasons to believe in an abstract I.
it's about whether there are facts that falsify a certain interpretation
>>until vNI is falsified, there may be another reason to assert
>>dualism: to explain physics.
>There may be a reason to presume dualism to expalin what it is ususally
>presumed to explain.
possibly true; but, your claim is that there is no other reason to
your claim is false.
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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