[Serious Phil] Challenge to SWM

[larry_tapper]

EO>This varies from individual to individual so
> your red
> is very different from mine.

PDJ> So how does that tell me *what* Eray-red is like,
beyond the fact that it is not Peter-red?

On this issue I actually tend to agree with Eray.

I think much of the difficulty of the Hard Problem could stem from the possibility that a scientific description of Eray-red might entail a total theory of Eray. That is, it seems to me that what it is like for Eray to see red cannot be split off from what it is like to be Eray, with all his associative memories, cognitive quirks, etc.

A total theory of Eray (at a level of description that distinguishes Eray from Peter) may indeed be practically infeasible because of its computational complexity. That would make the Hard Problem unavoidably hard. But of course that's a very different tack from the notion that there is no known or even conceptually possible scientific model for what-it-is-like considerations. 

LT   



--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
>
> 
> 
> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <Philscimind@> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 11:43 AM, Peter D <Philscimind@>wrote:
> > 
> > >
> > >
> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Eray Ozkural <Philscimind@>
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Logic emerged from empirical facts. We have observed how our brains work
> > > > and have abstracted from those laws of thought.
> > >
> > >
> > > Logic is not just description of de facto thinking. Most
> > > people get certain logic problems wrong, which shows
> > > that logic is normative.
> > >
> > >
> > No, it means that they have learnt wrongly, and thus think wrongly. Not
> > because logic is "normative".
> 
> To say something is normative is to say that it defines standards
> of right and wrong. It also means that it is not merely descriptive.
> In this case Right Logic is not merely a description of
> how the majority think , since the majority think wrong
> is some cases. Therefore the Laws of Thought are not merely
> descriptions of typical thought, analogously to the laws
> of nature. Rather, they are normative, like legal laws.
> 
> > If they think rightly, they use logic rightly, and they will predict the
> > world better. The proof of successful thinking is always empirical.
> > 
> > 
> > > > Logical axioms actually correspond to just abstract physics. Principle of
> > > > non-contradiction means one thing cannot be two things at the same time,
> > > > and so forth.
> > >
> > > PNC is necessary to aoid quodlibet. It doens't need empirical
> > > justification.
> > >
> > 
> > Wrong. It is true because it abstracts a physical fact (of macro scale
> > physics).
> 
> 
> 
> > That it is necessary to avoid quodlibet is a consequence of that. If you
> > modeled the world wrongly, all your predictions (inferences) would come out
> > wrongly. 
> 
> That's completely back to front. You would still get quodlibet on 
> subjects other than physics. The problem in physics is a reflection 
> of the logic problem.
> 
> >People see that the inferences would be wrong, 
> 
> Quodlibet acually means that all propositions come out
> true.
> 
> >and rightly they
> > understand that PNC must be accepted.... That is very much an empirical
> > discovery.
> > 
> > 
> > >That's empirical knowledge.
> > >
> > >
> > Indeed, I have spoken rightly. :)
> > 
> > 
> > > > Experience is in the domain of neuroscience. Philosophers might make
> > > > pre-scientific, ignorant statements about it, that doesn't change that
> > > it's
> > > > a subject of science.
> > >
> > >
> > > Can I measure how red seems to someone else?
> > >
> > >
> > Yes. First one of the experience hypotheses would have to be verified, and
> > then
> > we can precisely measure. Currently the best measurement would be how
> > similar
> > your spike train patterns are. 
> 
> >This varies from individual to individual so
> > your red
> > is very different from mine. 
> 
> So how does that tell me *what* Eray-red is like,
> beyond the fact that it is not Peter-red?
> 
> >There are some other hypotheses, this is just
> > the "neural
> > coding hypothesis".
> 
> it doesn't go far enough.
> 
> > > > Mathematics is wholly derived from useful thinking in science. So it's
> > > just
> > > > as empirical as anything else. The fact that it's theoretical doesn't
> > > make
> > > > any difference, we then understand it computationally, because that's
> > > what
> > > > mathematics really is: useful computations (like a proof). So, it's
> > > > ultimately to be understood by computer scientists.
> > >
> > > Are computer scientists going to be able to tell
> > > us whether numbers exist?
> > 
> > 
> > Yes, I can. They don't exist.
> 
> Many scientists disagree.
>  
> > > That is not something
> > > you can measure in the laboratory, nor is it
> > > something you can prove.
> > 
> > 
> > Precisely why they don't exist. They exist only as marks.
> 
> You can;'t disprove it, or measure their non existence. This
> is silly, You have mistaken your own prejudices for science.
> Scientists don't dispute the exisence of numbers in
> the way the existence of dark matter or someting
> is disputed. Nobody says "I hae made an observation
> of the number 27 orbiting saturn".
> 
> > You can prove the
> > > (non) existence of individual numbers, but
> > > what does "existence" mean?
> > 
> > 
> > See constructivism.
> 
> What makes constructivism science?
> 
> 
> > > Platonists
> > > and formalists disagree.
> > >
> > 
> > They are both wrong.
> > 
> > I love my philosophy because it is coherent.
> > 
> > Regards,
> > 
> > -- 
> > Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
> > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
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