[Serious Phil] Wittgenstein, Kripke and Names
Peter D
peterdjones at yahoo.com
Tue Jun 12 18:34:35 CDT 2012
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> > > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > There are a couple of things going on here. First there is a kind of conceptual claim--that "meaning is use." By that, I mean that it isn't clear how one would or could confirm or disconfirm that claim. What would it mean, e.g., for meaning NOT to be use?
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > It would mean "meaning is use" is a bad theory. Eg, it vacuou, it iis inconsistent,it is unable to explain all the prima facie phenomena,
> > > > > > > > > > etc. There are lots of ways of judging theories other that
> > > > > > > > > > direct empirical disconfirmation.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > If, e.g., there is some Russellian proper name lying around whose sense is completely determined by its reference--would meaning not be use in that case?
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > A good point.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > Second, there is a bit of speculative evolutionary psychology. Claims about how the brain works, and so on. There are no tests of this claim produced or possible tests offered. I don't say that it's false, but again, it's not even clear what it would mean for it to be true OR false. What would a brain (or "form of life") be like that was not so structured?
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > There are no arguments, no empirical tests, not even any clear explanations. Just edicts, and mostly of only a vaguely meaningful sort. There's no doubt that lots of words have families of meanings and that the way in which members of these families are related may differ from family to family. Nobody would deny (or likely ever has doubted) that claim: it's pretty obvious.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > I dare say Noah Webster and Sam Johnson were familial with familial
> > > > > > > > > > meanings, as they were with exceptions. To say that the exceptions
> > > > > > > > > > don't exist is a novel claim, but not a plausible one.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >But what else? What of interest follows from it?
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > W
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > I would say that the picture that there are always fixed meanings to words (which can be nailed down definitively and which thus implies a realm of concepts that mirror the world)
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > That isn't implied. Sharply defined concepts might be completely
> > > > > > > > > > out of sync with the world.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Mirrors can be distorting, too.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > It still isn't implied.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > What's "implied" is a parallel realm of concepts qua representations of the world. Whether in sync or not is totally irrelevant contra your statement "Sharply defined concepts might be completely
> > > > > > > out of sync with the world".
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > "In sync" means "mirror" as in "a realm of concepts that mirror the world". It remains the case that sharpness of definition has
> > > > > > nothing to do with accuracry, representation, mirroring
> > > > > > etc. We have well defined concepts of vampire and weerewolf
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > But not relevant to my point: "the picture that there are always fixed meanings to words (which can be nailed down definitively and which thus implies a realm of concepts that mirror the world)" is thereby replaced by a different notion of language, as in the idea that words are tool-like (do many different things, like the different tools we find in a toolbox). This latter notion has implications for how we deal with certain sorts of conceptual problems, whether to see them as confusions or as representing some sort of real problem in the world.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > So when you said "Mirror the world" , you didn't mean
> > > > "mirror the world".
> > > >
> > >
> > > As I replied to you initially, some mirrors don't do a very good job such as the funhouse kind.
> > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >is dispensed with and that what we get instead is a different perspective, a different way of seeing the world in which we operate and this has a bearing on how we do philosophy (or think about things in general), i.e., instead of looking for abstractions like truth (or Truth) we look, instead, for what's true.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Ie we, are offerred a different theory.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > A different picture of how language, and thinking about things through language, works. And not a "theory" because it is not formulated in a systematic way
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > You said it. But let its proponents formulate it if they
> > > > > > > > want it to be taken seriously.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > If some, as Boersema suggests Searle does, formulate it as a theory, that isn't a problem for Wittgenstein's remark since he was not proposing a theory about names and naming (I think Boersema has that right). As to taking it seriously, if you mean as a theory, that's irrelevant because it isn't offered as such.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >If you mean taking Wittgenstein's remarks on how language works seeriously, they are not a "theory" either, as already noted since the notion being proposed is not something that can be proved or disproved, nor is it something for which evidence can be collected and examined.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >It's just about offering a way of thinking about certain things.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > if it is so unproveable, why not bin it along with metaphysical
> > > > > > "nonsense"? Or why not allow metaphysical "nonsense" back in
> > > > > > as a way of thinking about things.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > It would be if nonsense if presented as a theory. But then, I never denied we had metaphysical notions or pictures, only that we could successfully argue about them to a definitive conclusion as to what is the case.
> > > >
> > > > Even if we turn them from pictures and notions into theories?
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Theorizing implies being able to formulate and test predictions, if not now then someday (that is to test for predicted results in principle). A picture is less demanding. It's just how we see (or imagine) things. How we conceptualize. Various pictures underlie the different theories we develop and test so there is a relationship. But to have a picture of something in mind is not just the same as to have a theory about it.
> > >
> > >
> > > > Here's an example of how to argue metaphysics: "We do not
> > > > need an Extra Ingredient to account for the existence of
> > > > consciuousness in the world, since we can do so using
> > > > only physical processes and properties". Guess who it
> > > > comes from?
> > > >
> > >
> > > It's not an argument for a metaphysical position but an argument that is consistent with an existing metaphysical position (as in a picture some of us hold re: how things are). Being consistent with X is not the same as being an argument for X.
> > >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >nor does it purport to predict outcomes nor is it provable or disprovable by argument as noted below.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > It's a claim that this is how language works, which any competent language speaker might be brought to see for him or herself but which would seem to be beyond research and testing precisely because it's a matter of each of us examining our own practices.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Nonsense. If we can examined our practice individually, we
> > > > > > > > > > can do it jointly as a research project.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > And then all you have are a compilation of reported opinions about what each speaker thinks he or she is doing when using naming words and that's not science though it may be poll taking (which can be done scientifically but is not, thereby, yielding reports that are more or less true).
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I still need to know why you think introspective data is so
> > > > > > > > important.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Who mentioned "data" besides you? While it's possible, on my view, to explain introspection (all the features that make it up) in terms of underlying data manipulations and it's possible to speak of information we can collect and consider as "data" ("information" and "data" are sometimes used synonymously), neither category captures what we mean by introspective considerations even if the latter does imply experience (in the family resemblance sort of way).
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > That doens't answer the question. Why do you think introspective
> > > > > > thingmuhnigness is so important.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Thinking our way through various problems is always important.
> > > >
> > > > Doesnt' answer the question. Why do speakers need to "see it for
> > > > themselves"? Why is public evidence excluded?
> > > >
> > >
> > > Because there is no public evidence for this.
> > >
> > > The evidence (the fact that there are examples of our using names in certain ways) is consistent with various different pictures, each of which may be used to generate a theory (a set of statements that fit together and seem to lead to certain predicted outcomes -- if it doesn't lead to anything like that then the theory is just an exercise in metaphysical speculation, of course).
> > >
> > >
> > > > >That's the point of philosophy qua philosophy. Sometimes the outcome is to solve a problem such as how do we reach the moon?
> > >
> > >
> > > I was unclear on the above. I should have pointed out that this is an example of a scientific problem.
> > >
> > > > Other times, it may just be to realize there's no problem after all, as in whether it makes sense to think the world is in the mind or the mind is in the world? Or to suppose that nothing is real but what is immediately before our senses -- or our own realization that there is something which apperceives whatever we think is before our senses.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Everyone can be wrong as easily as they can be right so all you get this way are lots of opinions. What makes this approach work is what happens at the individual level, whether some opinion holders conclude that the particular opinion they are holding works as advertised (i.e., that it makes some philosophical problems cease to seem like problems, that it enables them to develop and maintain a picture of the world that seems to present fewer conceptual problems for them, etc.). And then it's entirely individual in its results. Personal.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > And as ever you are assuming, wrongly, that where no
> > > > > > > > > > empirical testing can be done, nothing more can be said.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Is that "empirical" since we must have practices (i.e., have the experience of having and considering practices)?
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Not in the usual sense, I think, because, even while based on experience (as in the experience we have of our own use of language), it's really not a publicly determinable question which is what we usually mean by "empirical". (Duncan Richter made a similar point back on the Wittgenstein-dialognet some years back, I recall, when he pointed out that what's at issue is what any competent language speaker would conclude upon paying due consideration to what he or she was doing when using the words in question and that this feels sort of empirical though it really doesn't seem to fit that category.)
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > But two competent language speakers might examine their own practices and formulate different descriptions of what they see going on when they use language, of course. How are we to decide between them? Their descriptions would just be competing claims with neither commanding the logical heights so to speak. Neither claimant could invoke any more evidence than his own conclusions from his own experience using language which is no better, in principle at least, than his antagonist's.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > I have no idea why you have decided that use can only be decided
> > > > > > > > > > by introspection. The idea is every un-Wittgensteinian.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Wittgenstein never engaged in scientific research to address philosophical problems
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > How is that relevant? You have decided that use/meaning is not susceptible to science. So Witt does not even have the option
> > > > > > > > to research it.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > His work had nothing to do with doing research about it unless one counts as research his own musings in the course of his various experiences as a hermit in Norway, a teacher of young children in Austria, etc. But then that is not any sort of scientific research (however, I will readily grant that "research" has certain family resemblance meanings that are different from the meaning in a scientific context, too).
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > That doesn;'t answer my question in the least:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > why have YOU decided that use can only be decided
> > > > > > by introspection? The idea is every un-Wittgensteinian.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Is it? Wittgenstein was constantly engaged in introspection.
> > > >
> > > > Irrelevant. Wittgenstein did not think meaning was a private
> > > > essence in the head.
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Nor have I said otherwise so your response to my response is "irrelevant".
> >
> >
> >
> > .(He certainly did speak of mental pictures though!)
>
>
> So? I still didn't say he thought "meaning was a private essence in the head".
Sighh...YOU think that.
> > > > > Just look at what his concerns were, what he paid attention to. What he denied was that we could, through introspection, learn things about the world. But he did not deny that we could learn about how we think about the world. His point was not to deny that there is introspection but that introspection is a means to learning more than the world has to tell us through its appearances.
> > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >(though he did participate in various research projects in his career in the interest of aiding or experiencing science first hand). Wittgenstein's approach was, as he used to say, to give us reminders, while leaving everything as it is. He characterized his writings in his later period as remarks. They were never arguments. (Indeed, he famously eschewed arguments even as a younger man when he was developing and later writing the Tractatus.) From where did his "reminders" come? From his own musings about the things he found of interest. Most of us would call that "introspection".
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > From the point of view of an outsider, someone listening to the argument, I guess the way to choose between them would be to ask which makes more sense, which better matches the listener's own experience?
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps, too, a decision for one claim instead of another would hinge on which version provides a better basis for going forward, as in applying the explanation to things they are concerned with such as philosophy (as in which works better in dealing with particular philosophical problems).
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > But that is still finally subjective, isn't it?
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > it;s neither solipstitically subjective not scientifically
> > > > > > > > > > objective. Welcome to philosophy.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > You and I have very different notions of philosophy, I suspect. You think it's all about endlessly arguing and I think it's about getting clear on difficult concepts.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Which is why when I tell you that you are being "too vague"
> > > > > > > > you immediately get to work on making yourself clear,
> > > > > > > > and never whine or complain.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > You use "too vague" as one of your catch-all complaints whenever you run out of other objections.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > How do you know?
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Observation.
> > > >
> > > > Observation tells *me* that you are frequently too vague,
> > > > and have *no* interest in making yourself clear!
> > > >
> > >
> > > Therefore we each believe ourselves in possession of different observations. Okay, now what?
> > >
> > > > > > > I merely note that.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > And then it's back to the old "prove it" business and claims like 'this doesn't accord with MY understanding', etc.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Both perfectly reasonable things to say.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Reasonable but to miss the point.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > What point? That you have an inchoate, nascent "picture" before
> > > > > > > > which the world must bow down?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > That you have some kind of chip on your shoulder vis a vis Wittgenstein and anyone who purports to share some of his views (as in your oft repeated "aaaagh").
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Yes, it does annoy me when people try to use vague notions
> > > > > > to override genuine facts and arguments as you do. I;d also be annoyed
> > > > > > if you tried to maintain that a pair of twos beats a full house.
> > > > > > It's all cheating.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > What's "vague" is often in the eyes of the beholder.
> > > >
> > > > Doesn't work. You are offering pictures and *you* have *defined*
> > > > "pictures" as vague compared to theories.
> > > >
> > >
> > > So? Pictures are less precise than theories. It's not "vague" to state that
> >
> > It is vague to offer pictures instead of theories.
> >
>
>
> So? It's still not about the relative merits of having pictures vs. having theories. It's about what pictures are vs. what theories are.
Same difference. Pictures ARE things with less merit than theories
BECAUSE of what pictures ARE. Insamuch as a picture is a neither-true-nor-false thingie, , as you have said, it can;t "solve problems",
as you have said.
>
> > >even if, by being less precise, we can also say that pictures are vaguer than theories!
> > >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > > As to overriding genuine facts, there is no evidence I've ever done anything of the sort.
> > > >
> > > > It's a fact that we don't have a widely satisfactory explanation
> > > > of qualia. (Where "widely satisfactory" means "widely satisfactory", not satisfactory to you). Yet you say:-
> > > >
> > >
> > > I have never disputed that, for those who believe in "qualia" as non-physical phenomena (or qualities or properties or whatever), an explanation of experience like Dennett's doesn't satisfy.
> >
> > Stop twisting things. Plenty of qualiaphiles don't regard
> > qualia as definitionally non physical.
> >
>
>
> Here's exactly what I wrote: "I have never disputed that, FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE IN 'QUALIA' AS NON-PHYSICAL PHENOMENA (or qualities or properties or whatever), an explanation of experience like Dennett's doesn't satisfy." (The relevant phrase is in caps.
I know. I didn't misread it. You didn't specifically exclude
qualiaphiles who are physicalists or non commital, but you didn't
include them either. You just created the misleading impression
that qualiaphilia=dualism.
> > >However what is "wide" is relative. Being widely satisfying to believers is not necessarily to be "wide" in more general terms.
> >
> > >Nor is the fact that an explanation like Dennett's doesn't satisfy you and a whole host of people who think like you anything I've "denied".
> > >
> > >
> > > > "Once we get rid of the primacy of your notion of "qualia" and
> > > > accept a picture whereby experience is seen as a function of physical phenomena,
> > > > the whole problem goes away".
> > > >
> > > > according to you, a picture is something too inchoate to even be
> > > > tested. So why should anyone accpet it? As an act of faith.
> > > >
> > >
> > > We have all kinds of pictures of how things are.
> >
> > Irrelevant. Why should any picture be able to sole a problem
> > when pictures are untestable neither-true-nor-false entities.
> >
>
> Depends on the sort of problem we're wrestling with, doesn't it?
I don't see why, but feel free to explain why it would
work in this particular case.
>And what kind of solution is relevant.
>
>
> > > Some are fairly explicit while others are so implicit in our thinking as to be barely discernible. No one asks you or anyone to accept any picture on faith.
> >
> > Why should I accpet your picture? How can a picture solve
> > problems? Why call it a picture if it can?
> >
>
> I'm unaware that I have asked you to "accept" my picture.
It was JP, but otherwise:
"Once we get rid of the primacy of your notion of "qualia" and
accept a picture whereby experience is seen as a function of physical phenomena,
the whole problem goes away".
>I have told you my view and, in response to your queries, I've explained it. I'm certainly not arguing for it though, only laying it out. Take it or leave it as you please. As to how a picture can solve problems it can do so by changing the terms in which we see the problem, at times leading to the dissolution of the problem in question. We call it a "picture" for want of a better choice of terms.
I know better terms.
>
> > >You either find it congenial (in the context of everything else you think) or you don't.
> >
> > You can't say that there is no need for dualism becsause
> > you find something congenial.
> >
>
>
> I wasn't aware we were back to debating dualism here. However, since you bring it up, the issue vis a vis dualism and Dennett's model is that, if his model is right, then there is no need to rush to embrace a more complex picture of the universe like dualism.
And apparently his model depends on a "picture", and apparently
pictures are not true, not false. not testable, and not
explicable. What was that about a house builded on sand?
> Of course, I have argued that I think it IS right and given my reasons for THAT which consist of claims that his physically based model accounts for everything that would need to be accounted for in explaining consciousness including experience (which is sometimes all you say you mean by "qualia") -- and we've gone over how it does, too.
Were you explainign a picture, and showing how it could be true?
>
> > >Sometimes a picture, when brought to our attention, may be so compelling as to prompt (some of) us to change other things we had previously thought in order to accommodate ourselves to it.
> >
> >
> > If it's compelling why not call it a theory?
> >
>
> Because the measure of a theory is not whether it's "compelling."
What is it then?
>
> > > That's how it works with Wittgenstein. Some of us find his remarks quite compelling, presumably because things we had troubled over before in our thoughts suddenly cease to trouble. That is, after taking in some insight or other of his, we find ourselves rethinking what we had previously thought in a new way that seems to work better for us. When that happens we are convinced (as in won over).
> >
> >
> > Whatever. If it's all a matter of individual judgement,
> > then why complain about the obstinacy of dualists?
> >
>
> You mean about the obstinacy of CERTAIN individuals who claim not to be dualist but who argue forever and anon for that position? Hey, you can be a dualist if you like. Nothing wrong with that (other than it's being an unwarranted position on my view).
Unwarrented because you have a different picture...?
> Indeed, this list would be relatively boring if there were not some controversies to debate, so having dualists on board (whether self-avowed or otherwise) at least keeps things entertaining.
>
>
> > > But there is no guarantee that that will always occur or that everyone who is ever exposed to Wittgenstein will experience his ideas in that way. That's why it's not about who has a better argument but about whether his insight seems to clear up what had previously confused. If you're waiting for the knock down/drag out argument to "prove" Wittgenstein then you might as well file that concern with the other one (waiting for an explanation that will reduce subjectivity to objectivity without departing from the terms in which subjectivity is discussed).
> > >
> > >
> > > > >And as to cheating at cards, well that's a different issue entirely.
> > > >
> > > > Cheating *isn't* cheating?
> > > >
> > >
> > > Who said anything like that?
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > That's why, in the end, I think Wittgenstein's thinking is mainly about getting it, as in seeing things his way. But there is no standard to be brought to bear as to whether his way is the better one! Of course, Wittgenstein didn't claim to be asserting truths but only giving his thoughts on these sorts of questions. If one finds those thoughts helpful then presumably one enrolls in his way of thinking. If one doesn't, for whatever reason, one does not.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > And yet philosophy professionals have generally shown a great deal of respect for Wittgenstein,
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > If you want immortality, be obscure.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Being obscure is not necessarily to fail to have an interesting notion to convey, or many of them.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >suggesting that there is something there since others who ought to be able to see his points, often do see or, when they don't, think there is something to be seen.
> > >
>
>
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