[Serious Phil] Seeing the Bat in the Inkblot
jpolanik at nc.rr.com
Fri Jun 15 06:08:30 CDT 2012
>Peter D wrote:
>>>Peter D wrote:
>>>>>Peter D wrote:
>>>>>>>The issue of "insight" here comes into play vis a vis seeing
>>>>>>>consciousness in one way rather than another.
>>>>>>That says nothing. You are replacing one one visual term
>>>>>>with another. The issue is to do with how lieterally these
>>>>>>terms are to be taken, what epistemological upshot they
>>>>>We've discussed all that many times already. The issue is whether
>>>>>we can think of consciousness as reducible to what isn't, itself,
>>>>>conscious or whether we are bound by the picture of consciousness
>>>>>that presents itself to us on introspection as being an irreducible
>>>>>basic in the universe.
>>>>No, this isn't about consc specifically.
>>>That WAS the subject under discussion and under dispute!
>>No, the subject under discussion was the Wittgensteinian use of
>I wasn't talking about Wittgenstein and metaphor. I was talking about
>Wittgenstein and the range of uses found in linguistic practices and
>THAT was to do with how we talk about consciousness. As you often say,
>"stop trying to change the subject".
you started this exchange with a comment about 'insight' and ended by
denying that you were talking about Wittgenstein and metaphor. if anyone
changed the subject it was you.
>>>>>This just points to the fact that different levels of discussion
>>>>>are in play, levels you apparently confuse. If every instance of an
>>>>>argument or a reason involves an instance of seeing
>>>>I dispute that it does: your don't get to assume that.
>>>I claim that. I don't assume it. In fact, I would defy you to produce
>>>an instance of any argument or reason (part of an argument) where
>>>understanding what is said plays no part.
>>What I dispute is that there is a 1) special, sui generis of 2
>>incommunicable, just-have-to-get it understanding involved in every
>Dispute away. And yet there is. You yourself note that we can't explain
>what it is like to see red or taste saltiness to another (it is
>subjective). ... Similarly getting what a word means or seeing the
>implications of an argument are not shareable although they are
>conveyable (as anything is) to the extent that we have some common
>basis between us.
visual metaphors usually suggest 'seeing' as in sensing or perceiving;
but, we need to be alert to the possibility that 'seeing' is projecting
--- as when someone sees a bat or a cat in an inkblot.
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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