[Serious Phil] What KA Really Says
jpolanik at nc.rr.com
Sun Jun 17 08:04:14 CDT 2012
>Eray> I'd say she does record a new observation
>LT> And she is recording that observation using an instrument (or more
>>precisely a previously unused capability of an old instrument) for the
>>first time. That is the idea of Lewis' ability hypothesis.
>JP> given an experience, it is reasonable to infer (abductively) that
>the experiencer has the ability to have that experience; consequently,
>that Mary's new experience may result from appropriately stimulating a
>previously unused ability of her nervous system is beside the point.
>JP> at issue is whether Mary can have all the physical information
>without having all the information there is to have.
>The issue is not whether Mary gains new information, period ... but
>whether she gains new information *about the nature of color vision*.
the issue is whether, in experiencing the quale of redness for the first
time, Mary gains information that is not physical information.
for reasons that remain obscure, debate over the KA sometimes revolves
around a phrase substituted for "information that is not physical
Lewis substitutes "phenomenal information". you substitute "new
information about the nature of color vision". my preference would be
"information not entailed by the physical information (that Mary already
has)". however, insofar as we are discussing Lewis' ability hypothesis,
I'll play along with Lewis' substitution, "phenomenal information".
>The proponent of the Ability Hypothesis says, not really
Lewis says that, while he can not refute the hypothesis of phenomenal
information, he rejects it anyway ... to save materialism.
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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