[Serious Phil] What KA Really Says
examachine at gmail.com
Sun Jun 17 10:06:33 CDT 2012
On Sun, Jun 17, 2012 at 4:04 PM, Joseph Polanik <
Philscimind at undergroundwiki.org> wrote:
> larry_tapper wrote:
> >Eray> I'd say she does record a new observation
> >LT> And she is recording that observation using an instrument (or more
> >>precisely a previously unused capability of an old instrument) for the
> >>first time. That is the idea of Lewis' ability hypothesis.
> >JP> given an experience, it is reasonable to infer (abductively) that
> >the experiencer has the ability to have that experience; consequently,
> >that Mary's new experience may result from appropriately stimulating a
> >previously unused ability of her nervous system is beside the point.
> >JP> at issue is whether Mary can have all the physical information
> >without having all the information there is to have.
> >The issue is not whether Mary gains new information, period ... but
> >whether she gains new information *about the nature of color vision*.
> the issue is whether, in experiencing the quale of redness for the first
> time, Mary gains information that is not physical information.
Mary gains new information, however that information is physical and
Jackson also would agree with that. It's you creationists who try to read
it other way. Disappointing.
Why? Because all information is physical. There is no such thing as
nonphysical information, that's a very dumb idea.
> for reasons that remain obscure, debate over the KA sometimes revolves
> around a phrase substituted for "information that is not physical
That's paradoxical. Information requires coding, coding is always physical,
information is always physical. People who don't know information theory
can speak such nonsense.
> Lewis substitutes "phenomenal information". you substitute "new
> information about the nature of color vision". my preference would be
> "information not entailed by the physical information (that Mary already
> has)". however, insofar as we are discussing Lewis' ability hypothesis,
> I'll play along with Lewis' substitution, "phenomenal information".
Phenomenal information is physical, the challenge is to explain physically
> >The proponent of the Ability Hypothesis says, not really
> Lewis says that, while he can not refute the hypothesis of phenomenal
> information, he rejects it anyway ... to save materialism.
Phenomenal information exists, and it is physical.
Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
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