[Serious Phil] What KA really says

[larry_tapper]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "truthhunter55" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
>
> >.... seeing is always seeing as, therefore "what it is like" is a will-o-the-wisp if it isn't a representation.
> 
> If "seeing" is always "seeing as" then what are we to make of the distinction between "seeing" and "seeing as"? How is it you even know about "seeing" and not just about "seeing as".

Hello Truthhunter,

This question strikes me as a bit sophistical, because "What are you doing? I'm just seeing." is more than a little deviant in ordinary contexts...

> 
> For me "seeing" is not always "seeing as". If you look at Husserl's epoche (in Ideas) he describes the result of ceasing "seeing as". It is accomplished by means of an act of will, or more precisely, it is the cessation of a action, something you stop doing. You stop "seeing as" and just look. BTW without actually trying it you cannot see what he means.

...but let's say Husserlian epoche works the way you claim, so that in that special context, "I'm just seeing" acquires a sense. 

Even in that case, the main *question* about qualia is still framed in terms of "seeing as" --- whether your red is the same as mine, etc. If you're seeing as red, you're ipso facto not just looking.

You are free to put that conventional dialogue about qualia behind you and ask a different question. But then I would like to know what that question is,

 
> 
> > LT> That is, the reason why it's a nearly imponderable question whether Eray's red is the same as mine is that very elaborate theories specific to Eray and me would be required to fully capture "what it is like" considerations.
> 
> I think that a principle something like Ocham's razor could be used. Ocham's razor is a principle that does not rely on the evidence for the evidence supports more than one theory equally. I think that if you find that and aspect of your brain structure and motion causes you to see red and then you examine another brain, not yours but doing the same thing, that you may use something like Ocham's razor to put the burden of proof on the others side should the claim be made that the colors seen are different. You cannot show that the red's are the same, but it would require the other side to show some reason that we shouldn't consider them the same.
> 
> I think the need for this principle, however, says something about experience. This is not the straight up Ocham. We can use that to eliminate angels from the brain. But what are we using this other principle here to decide? The fact that we need it is much more significant that the principle itself. 

Seems to me the relevant principle is Ockham-like but not classic Ockham: Assume that function follows form in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
 
> 
> >....prohibitively low probability to the same-physics-but-different-phenomenality possibility.  
> 
> You cannot use probability in this way. Probability requires you to come up with a ratio of some measure of the quantity of one set of events with a measure of the quantity of another. If you try to use probability you can get the opposite (in my opinion wrong) conclusion. 

That depends on how you interpret probability. If you identify probability with subjective credence, then any event can be assigned a probability. The discipline then enters the picture when we test one's whole system of subjective probabilities for coherence, e.g. Dutch Book copnsiderations.

But if you're a frequentist, for example, you will be less tolerant of the idea of theories having probabilities.

That's OK, I don't have a heavy investment in speaking in probabilistic language here. It's sufficient to make the point that we're assuming function follows form unless we have reason to think otherwise. 

Larry


  > 
> Given the number of color experiences that could be associated with a given physical biological event the probability that a particular one would always be repeated in all the instances of biology would then be like flipping a million coins and finding them all to be heads. I think you have to end up with a kind of determinism instead. Whenever a biology flips a coin in a certain way it comes up heads. The idea of "equally likely outcomes" is replaced by determinism. You can have evidence for the determinism in one organism by experimenting on your own biology. Shake a bunch of cylinders in a box with half of each cylinder painted red and they will align red to not red at about 50/50 unless they are magnets and you have painted one pole red. The causality can determine the outcome defeating the probability that is based on an assumptions that the outcomes are equally likely, or, if you prefer, a probability is a kind of assumption of likely hood  that can be wrong if determinism is present- it calculates one from another but only based on an initial assignment and an assumption of causality determines the assignment. 
> 
> 
> The time may come when we may be able to physically link ourselves in a way that our identities merge and we can then see as one for a time then separate. If you make some assumptions about memory that are not obvious then you have another way to decide.
> 
> 
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