[Serious Phil] Rejecting the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information
jpolanik at nc.rr.com
Thu Jun 21 06:49:14 CDT 2012
>Joe P writes:
>JP> ...Lewis characterizes this (alleged) information as 'phenomenal
>information' which means that it is (alleged) information about
>phenomenality, experience or qualia.
>JP> however, while he admits being unable to refute what he calls the
>hypothesis of phenomenal information, he rejects it anyway --- to save
>posting the latter paragraph for the second time this week.
>Joe, I hope you are not insinuating that Lewis simply refused to accept
>the KA on ideological grounds, without bothering to flesh out the
>counter-argument, because he had none.
I wasn't; but, now that you mention it ... Lewis' acceptance of such a
lame counter-argument (phenomenal information seems peculiar to me) is
hard to explain.
>The relevant passage is this one, from the essay What Experience
>"The knowledge argument works. There is no way to grant the hypothesis
>of phenomenal information and still uphold materialism. Therefore I
>deny the hypothesis. I cannot refute it outright. But later I shall
>argue, first, that it is more peculiar, and therefore less tempting,
>that it may at first seem; and, second, that we are not forced to
>accept it, since an alternative hypothesis does justice to the way
>experience best teaches us what it's like."
>A moment of candor such as one rarely finds on the Internet. And one of
>the reasons why Lewis was so widely admired.
>But the structure of the argument is: while Lewis does not see a
>refutation, he does see an at least equally compelling alternative
what is that alternate hypothesis, in your view?
in my view, the alternatives are that there is phenomenal information;
and, that there is no phenomenal information.
unfortunately, basing one's choice between them on which one seems less
peculiar only leads to an impasse.
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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