[Serious Phil] Rejecting the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information

[Peter D]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
>
> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind@> wrote:
>  
> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > >
> > > 
> > > 
> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "truthhunter55" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > ...there is phenomenal information;
> > > > > and, that there is no phenomenal information.
> > > > > unfortunately, basing one's choice between them on which one seems less peculiar only leads to an impasse.
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > All that is necessary for Mary to establish that there is phenomenal information in color qualia is for her to first see a red light and then see a green light and then set up a random triggering in which she sees either a red or green light and in which a zero or one is recorded somewhere based on the random selection. If Mary can distinguish between them and predict whether there will be a zero or one written at better than random chances then there is information in the quale. 
> > > 
> > > But she could get the same (?) information by looking at
> > > a ticker-tape with "the light has turned green...the light has turned red" printed on it in black-and-white.
> > > 
> > > >If she can tell exactly she in fact has one bit. She need not report out that distinction only know it and check to verify the health of the channel. 
> > > > 
> > > > This is in accordance with Claude Shannon's definition of information which is the usual engineering definition. If all she sees on the third view is the quale, and she knows which color she saw, then there is phenomenal information.
> > > > 
> > > > Note that it is irrelevant whether a viewer of Mary's brain could also tell on the third view what Mary saw, even while the viewer himself was not seeing the color of the light. Its just completely irrelevant whether the information in quale is in addition to the brain information. Any set of coupled states will have the same information. This is independent of whether either of the states is phenomenal (i.e. a quale). Its just a property of coupled states. Whether channel A has certain information is not dependent on whether it is identical to what information channel B has.
> > > > 
> > > > It is true that if Mary has the knowledge of what her brain state will be and then goes out and sees a green light that she will learn no new information carried by the quale. But that is because she already possessed the information carried by the quale from the brain state. That does not mean that the information is not in the quale. Just that she already has received it. Indeed you could reverse the experiment and she could use the quale first and then see a record of her brain state. Then she would learn nothing by knowing her brain state because she would have already known that she had seen green. You would not then say that her brain state did not have information would you?
> > > 
> > > But then the question is what is "extra" about the quale if it
> > > is not extra information. 
> > > 
> > > > You can see this simply by showing Mary a model of her brain states when she sees red and when she sees green and not showing her the color at either time. If she steps out and you show her green and then ask which brain state did you have she will not know. But if you first show her green and then show her her brain state while seeing green and then show her red and show her her brain state on seeing red, and we assume that the phenomenal states are locked, then she will now be able to tell her brain state solely by looking at color.
> > > > 
> > > > To show that there is NO phenomenal information you must show that Mary on stepping out of the room and seeing a green light WILL be able to select which of the brain states she has (red or green) solely from first viewing of the light i.e. without having previously been showed the correlation, OR you must show that she WILL NOT be able to do so if you prep her with a single green and red experience.
> > > > 
> > > > It seems to me that it is obvious that Mary WILL NOT know which brain state she is having solely based on a one time experience of the quale AND that once showed her brain state when seeing red, and then showed her brain state while seeing green, that she then WILL be able to tell which state she has had just by seeing the color given, of course an assumption of correlation.
> > > > 
> > > > Therefore quale have information. I think this is simple information theory. I don't think there is a way out. Quale have information. That red is different from green and different from a brain state can thus be established by experiment.
> > > > 
> > > > The only thing that you can say is that an observer of Mary who is not Mary will gain no information from the quale Mary sees. But that is not necessary to establish that there is information in quale.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > I think we need to distinguish between two claims of phenomenal
> > > information:
> > > 1) Qualia carry information
> > > 2) Phenomenal informaton is a special kind of information, even if
> > > you can get equivalent information in other ways.
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > Yes, it definitely helps when people take the trouble to provide even a hint of an idea of what the hell they are talking about.
> > 
> > W
> > 
> 
> 
> But not too much more than a "hint" or they might be denounced for being, you know, like longwinded or verbose 

I can't recall an occasion when a long but clear post has been
object to.