[Serious Phil] Rejecting the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information

[walto]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
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> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > Say the anti-physicalist pronounces "If Mary knows that-P and that-P is not expressible in terms of physics, we have shown that there are propositions in the universe that are not expressible in terms of physics."  So what?  An adequate response would seem to me to be akin to things you have regularly pointed out about banking.  I take physicalism to be the theory that every object/event in the universe is identical to some physical object/event.  Thus, if Mary's "knowing" that-P is an event in the world (and who knows?), if physicalism is true, it is identical to a neurological event.  So, as Eray would say, "What's the problem?"  
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> The problem is that some physicalists believe in an explanatory
> thesis. Eray and SWM are among them. And without the ability to explain, what makes physicalism true?
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I don't understand this post.  Would you mind expanding on it a bit?  Thanks.

W