[Serious Phil] Rejecting the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information

[SWM]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
 
> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> >
> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> >  
> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > 
> > > > Say the anti-physicalist pronounces "If Mary knows that-P and that-P is not expressible in terms of physics, we have shown that there are propositions in the universe that are not expressible in terms of physics."  So what?  An adequate response would seem to me to be akin to things you have regularly pointed out about banking.  I take physicalism to be the theory that every object/event in the universe is identical to some physical object/event.  Thus, if Mary's "knowing" that-P is an event in the world (and who knows?), if physicalism is true, it is identical to a neurological event.  So, as Eray would say, "What's the problem?"  
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > The problem is that some physicalists believe in an explanatory
> > > thesis. Eray and SWM are among them. And without the ability to explain, what makes physicalism true?
> > > 
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > SWM believes that what we call consciousness is causally explainable, as in describing what certain kinds of physical platforms (like brains) have to do to produce it (as in to bring it into existence). 
> 
> If you can't show how and why physical platforms do what they
> do to bring about consciousness, you cannot show that dualism 
> is unnecessary. 
>

If consciousness is explainable as information processing, then an information processing model of some type is the right way to go. I have argued that Dennett's explanation shows why consciousness can be understood on an information processing model.  

 
> > That it involves a point of view (as in subjectivity, i.e., being a subject), which consists of instances of what it is like to be this or this or this, in no way prevents it from being causally explained in physical terms.
> 
> Subjectivty qua ineffability is a barrier to its being how-and-why
> explained. That is: it is a barrier to explanation. Since what
> you call causal explanation is just a recipe at best.
> 

If all that's to be explained is how X causes Y then an explanation that shows how is sufficient. After all, no explanation is, by dint of being an explanation, the thing it explains. The key is to determine if an information processing model fully accommodates the stuff of subjectivity. If nothing is left out (as I have argued is the case with Dennett's model), then there is no gap, even if we cannot translate descriptions of instances of having an experience into descriptions of the physical phenomena which constitute those instances. 

> > Supposing that the fact that it has an inherently subjective ontology (a description of what it is) 
> 
> How can you describe the subjective? 
> 
> 


As information processing, i.e., certain physical phenomena performing certain tasks in a certain way(specifics already provided).  

How do I describe MY subjectivity? By reference and analogy, for starters.

But describing one's personal subjectivity (one's particular experiences) is NOT what's at issue in answering the question that we explain what subjectivity is and how it works.


    
> >precludes causal explanation is simply to confuse the recognition of X with the explanation(s) of X. 
> 
> Whatever you mean by "explanation".
> 

See above.


> 
> >In fact, they are entirely different things. No one here, to my knowledge, denies that there are subjective and objective phenomena in the universe so supposing that to grant that is to side with dualism is also a mistake. 
> 
> The key term, which you keep ignoring , IRREDUCBLE.
> 

Causal reducibility is possible if an information processing model does the trick and I've argued it does. Referential reducibility is irrelevant since this isn't about translating subjective claims to claims about physical phenomena. 


> >In fact, this whole debate is about how we are to explain (as in describe the cause of)
> 
> "Explain" does not mean "describe the cause of".
> 

"Explain", like most other words, has a range of meanings, depending on context. In this case that is all "explain" does mean, as in explain how the brain produces consciousness (answer: it runs a complex information processing system which does this and this and this, etc.). This is about whether we can explain the occurrence of consciousness as a function of some physical things brains do. It's not about translating subject talk to object talk.


> > subjectiveness in a universe of objective phenomena.
> > 
> > For the rest, I am rather enjoying reading along here in the recent threads concerning Jackson's knowledge argument. I'm inclined to side with those who think that the problem lies in what we mean by "knowledge" in the relevant cases . . . and, perhaps, also "information." It seems to me that these words very much require careful analysis and that that is too often overlooked by those in this debate who remain partisans of the so-called knowledge argument.
> >