[Serious Phil] What Do Physicalists Want?

[Peter D]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
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> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > walto wrote:
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> > > > >  >I take physicalism to be the theory that every object/event in the
> > > > >  >universe is identical to some physical object/event. Thus, if Mary's
> > > > >  >"knowing" that-P is an event in the world (and who knows?), if
> > > > >  >physicalism is true, it is identical to a neurological event. So, as
> > > > >  >Eray would say, "What's the problem?"
> > > > > 
> > > > > one problem is that your version of 'physicalism' is as vulnerable to
> > > > > arguments from qualia as Jackson's.
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> > > > > of course, you could always circle your wagons tightly enough to exclude
> > > > > from the category of 'true physicalist' non identity theorists,
> > > > > extra-steppers and anyone wanting something your version of physicalism
> > > > > can not supply. of course, that looks like a no true Scotsman ploy.
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> > > > >  >Whatever it is it that physicalists want in addition to physical monism
> > > > >  >seems to me some sort of exotic gravy that, like the taste of real
> > > > >  >gravy can't be explained very well.
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> > > > > some want an explanation of qualia; and, some want a justification for
> > > > > explaining it away.
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> > > > >  >"We want all information to be physical, too!" OK, to the extent it's
> > > > >  >an object/event in the world, it's physical. "But then are you saying
> > > > >  >that there are items in the world that aren't objects/events?"
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> > > > > for the nth time, the issue is that a quale of experience, the redness
> > > > > of an afterimage, for example, is arguably not 'in' the physical
> > > > > universe (as you have defined it above) because it doesn't have a
> > > > > measurable location even when under observation. hence, physicalism (as
> > > > > you have defined it above) leaves something out --- unless, of course,
> > > > > you beg the question by simply assuming that a definition of 'quale'
> > > > > must result in an empty set.
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> > > > > oh wait, that's precisely what you do.
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> > > > For the nth+1 time, you have no idea what you are talking about.  I make no definition of "quale" that "must result in an empty set."  I just deny that one must have qualia to explain experience--that is, it's being empty doesn't prevent experience from being just what it has always been.  Annoying it is, that you can't understand this simple point.  Yet, unsurprising is it also.
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> > > > W
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> > > Well, you don't seem to have grasped the oft-repeated point that
> > > qualia are explananda, not explanation.
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> > possible, it's not to grasp both what is false and what is not there.
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> > W
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> What's wanted is an explanation of experience--we can agree on that. 

Which of course involves a specification of the explanandum.

>Whether experience involves qualia 

"involves" is  ambiguous between being needed for
 explanation or being part of the explanandum.


>is dependent on the manner of parsing it.  The requirement of qualia requires a view of experience that I don't buy. 

Which is what? In any case, I have got you to admit that
there are aspects of experience that fulfil *your* (not
very authentic IMO) definition of "qualia". Where
we got stuck was getting you to admit that qualia exist
even though all the boxes had been ticked.

> Your mileage may be different, but it's not a matter of defining qualia out of existence--it's a matter of preferring categories that don't require them.  Now, of course, it may be that my theory is insufficient to describe experience. But again, that's simply a matter of philosophical controversy.  The fact that you and Joe prefer a different manner of parsing these matter is nice for you.  I hope you're both happy.
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