[Serious Phil] What Do Physicalists Want?

[Peter D]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
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> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "walto" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > walto wrote:
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > >  >I take physicalism to be the theory that every object/event in the
> > > > > > >  >universe is identical to some physical object/event. Thus, if Mary's
> > > > > > >  >"knowing" that-P is an event in the world (and who knows?), if
> > > > > > >  >physicalism is true, it is identical to a neurological event. So, as
> > > > > > >  >Eray would say, "What's the problem?"
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > one problem is that your version of 'physicalism' is as vulnerable to
> > > > > > > arguments from qualia as Jackson's.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > of course, you could always circle your wagons tightly enough to exclude
> > > > > > > from the category of 'true physicalist' non identity theorists,
> > > > > > > extra-steppers and anyone wanting something your version of physicalism
> > > > > > > can not supply. of course, that looks like a no true Scotsman ploy.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > >  >Whatever it is it that physicalists want in addition to physical monism
> > > > > > >  >seems to me some sort of exotic gravy that, like the taste of real
> > > > > > >  >gravy can't be explained very well.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > some want an explanation of qualia; and, some want a justification for
> > > > > > > explaining it away.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > >  >"We want all information to be physical, too!" OK, to the extent it's
> > > > > > >  >an object/event in the world, it's physical. "But then are you saying
> > > > > > >  >that there are items in the world that aren't objects/events?"
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > for the nth time, the issue is that a quale of experience, the redness
> > > > > > > of an afterimage, for example, is arguably not 'in' the physical
> > > > > > > universe (as you have defined it above) because it doesn't have a
> > > > > > > measurable location even when under observation. hence, physicalism (as
> > > > > > > you have defined it above) leaves something out --- unless, of course,
> > > > > > > you beg the question by simply assuming that a definition of 'quale'
> > > > > > > must result in an empty set.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > oh wait, that's precisely what you do.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > For the nth+1 time, you have no idea what you are talking about.  I make no definition of "quale" that "must result in an empty set."  I just deny that one must have qualia to explain experience--that is, it's being empty doesn't prevent experience from being just what it has always been.  Annoying it is, that you can't understand this simple point.  Yet, unsurprising is it also.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > W
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> > > > > 
> > > > > Well, you don't seem to have grasped the oft-repeated point that
> > > > > qualia are explananda, not explanation.
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > possible, it's not to grasp both what is false and what is not there.
> > > > 
> > > > W
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > What's wanted is an explanation of experience--we can agree on that. 
> > 
> > Which of course involves a specification of the explanandum.
> > 
> > >Whether experience involves qualia 
> > 
> > "involves" is  ambiguous between being needed for
> >  explanation or being part of the explanandum.
> > 
> > 
> > >is dependent on the manner of parsing it.  The requirement of qualia requires a view of experience that I don't buy. 
> > 
> > Which is what? In any case, I have got you to admit that
> > there are aspects of experience that fulfil *your* (not
> > very authentic IMO) definition of "qualia". Where
> > we got stuck was getting you to admit that qualia exist
> > even though all the boxes had been ticked.
> > 
> 
> What is an "authentic" definition of "qualia" in your view?
> 
> I have to say, in spite of my admiration of your prowess, that I have some doubt that you "got me to admit" both that there are entities in the world that meet some criteria or other and that there are no entities in the world that meet those criteria.  (In my fairly traditional world, there's no difference between saying that there are Xs and in saying that Xs exist.)
> 
> What I don't deny is that there are ways in which things look or sound or smell to people, and if that's all you mean

It is.

> when you say there are qualia, I have no problem with it.


>  I don't think that's all that philosophers have generally meant by it, 

Well, there's been a lot of straw manning from the qualiaphobes.

>so I've resisted when Shecky has said that "there are qualies" (I think that's what he likes to call them now) without explaining what he means by "qualies".
> 
> So, again, nobody would deny that things look, smell, etc. various ways.  (Probably not even Dennett, but I leave Dennett studies to you, Stuart and Shecky).  It's my view that these ways that things look, etc. are, generally, properties of those things, i.e., properties of the physical world. 

Well, I think it;s amazing how I can make everything in my
environment acquire the property "fuzzy" just by taking my
eyeglasses off.

> That is, they may look red, or smell fishy.  Redness and fishiness are properties of things in my environment that I attend to.  Sometimes things look red or smell fishy that aren't red or fishy, but that's because, unlike some others here (Eray, e.g.,)  I'm not omniscient.
> 
> OTOH, as I don't really know what physical information is, I guess I'm not an all-things-must-have-physical-explanation physicalist, in the exotic, extremely narrow sense that you're interested in criticizing.  I'm just an old-fashioned everything-in-the-universe is physical physicalist.  I don't believe there are any mental events that aren't also physical events, and I don't believe that there are any mental properties (including qualies) that aren't properties of physical objects.  Are these properties themselves "physical properties"? That depends on the indentity criteria for properties: if two predicates have to mean the same thing in order to refer to the same property, then No.
> 
> W
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> W
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> 
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