[Serious Phil] Rejecting the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information

[SWM]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
 
> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> >
> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> >  
> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> 
> > > > I can and I have: Because consciousness or subjectivity or whatever we are calling it in this iteration of the argument just IS a certain kind of information processing system (the kind having already been described and the reasons for the description having already been provided).
> > > 
> > > That's an appeal to brute fact, not an explanation.
> > >
> > 
> > 
> > It's an explanation via conceptualization, i.e., if all consciousness is is X, then there's nothing more to be discovered (no need to keep looking for 
> 
> But you can't assume that consciousness is (a certain kind of
> IP, and therefore no explanation is necessary, because that, the claim consciousness is (a certain kind of)
> IP, is the very claim you need to justify...by explaining it.
>

It's not an assumption. It's an hypothesis based on analysis of what consciousness seems to consist of. on introspection, and a comparison with what information processing might be able to do in order to approximate it.

In essence it's a proposal for scientific research, not an assertion of a truth so there is no justification required. Only a judgment that this model seems to account for all the elements we associate with consciousness without lapsing into contradiction or incoherence.

Based on THAT, the next question is whether this hypothesis could be true in light of what we know about things. If the answer is yes to that, then we move on to actual research and testing.

My argument is only that the pre-empirical tests have been successfully met.
 

> You're saying: assume my theory is true...then I don;t need
> to explain it , because it is Just True.
>
> It's circular and question begging.
>


Nope, see above. Note that I am NOT claiming "my theory is true" but only that it could be. There is a world of difference. 

 
> 
> >something extra) and producing it just involves making X happen, et. Nothing brute about that. It hinges on an argument about what it takes to be consciousness.
> 
> So your theoretical claim is based on  a theoretical claim...
> in fact the very same claim.
> 


Nope, it's an hypothesis leading to a theory leading to testing and results. My only argument is that it is not foreclosed because of arguments like Searle's CRA or claims of dualism, i.e., it is a viable option and possibly true.


> > > > > >and I've already given the explanation part numerous times.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > If that's all it is, you don't need to go any further in the search for an answer.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > The question is WHETHER that is all it is.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > If a physically grounded explanation fully explains it, the onus is on the denier to say why there is something more that has been left out.
> > > > > 
> > > > > The question is WHETHER it fully explains. You don;t get
> > > > > to cash the cheque before you have written it.
> > > > >
> > > > 
> > > > It's been written and cashed a while ago. You're just hanging on to the wrong currency. Maybe you should finally sell those euros of yours and sign onto the gold standard?
> > > > 
> > > >  
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > No need to posit "extra ingredients", souls, co-existing non-physical realities, etc. That is, there's no need, in such a case to posit dualism.    
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > You can't start from the basis that brains are
> > > > > > > > > the sole cause of cosnc because that is what you
> > > > > > > > > are seekig  to prove. You are arguing in circles.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > No, I am NOT seeking to prove that brains are the sole cause of consciousness because I AM NOT SEEKING TO DISPROVE DUALISM. That is simply your fantasy which you can't seem to shake.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > I am only seeking to demonstrate that consciousness CAN be accounted for in purely physical terms which, if it can be, leaves no need to opt for dualism.  
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > SAME BLOODY DIFFERENCE.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Nope. An argument FOR or AGAINST dualism aims to establish whether dualism is a true account or not but I am only arguing that we don't NEED dualism to give a satisfactory (i.e., because possibly true, pending empirical work) account of consciousness.
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Still the same differnce. We don't need phlogiston, so phloton
> > > > > theory is false
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Only in an empirical sense (which means contingently and always subject to change with the discovery of new information).
> > > 
> > > So?
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > See what immediately follows:
> > 
> > 
> > > > But the argument about dualism vs. something else here is not an empirical one  since it's a dispute over the best way to interpret the same set of facts rather than an argument over some new facts. 
> > > 
> > > All data is theory laden, all theory is data laden.
> > >
> > 
> > 
> > That's just a pronouncement, not an argument. It has no obvious relevance to the question of what kind of question the dispute between dualism and non-dualism is. 
> 
> The relevance is that you are trying to make a black and 
> white distinction between science and metaphsycis that isn based on
> a black-and-white distinction between data and conceptualisation,
> and *that* distinction does not exist, so the first distinction
> founders too.
> 

I am making a distinction between the metaphysical question of whether dualism is true (a pointless question, actually) and the empirical one which could be the case, IF certain facts were discovered about the world. I am making no argument against metaphysical dualism at all. As to the empirical question, I AM saying there is no reason, at this juncture, to even entertain the possibility though it is not foreclosed.


> 
> > > >So, while the net result of my argument may mean that those who agree with it will be less inclined to opt for dualism, it does not in any sense demonstrate that dualism is false.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Still a difference without a difference.
> > >
> > 
> > Nope. (Already argued.)
> > 
> >  
> > > > > > > > > > Is it one part of the physical universe or is it an "extra ingredient" that co-exists with the rest of the universe?
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > You can't resolve that with a description.
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > Sure you can. Depends what's being described, the level of descriptive information, etc.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > No. Pure descriptions are never explanations.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Who said anything about "pure descriptions," whatever THAT means? I've said that explaining involves (as in includes) describing in a great many cases including the present one.
> > > > > 
> > > > > You have said that you need to describe, and you have not
> > > > > said that you need to do anything else.
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Describing what subjectivity amounts to is sufficient as an explanation of what subjectivity is in this case.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > What else could possibly be needed?
> > > 
> > > Answers to how and why questions.
> > 
> > 
> > Already included, to the extent they're relevant
> 
> You don't get to declare questions you can;t answer irrelevant.
> 

I get to call them irrelevant if they are though (and to give reasons, if pressed, for why I think them so).


> >, and certainly not precluded by an account of subjectivity as X.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > > Describing the battle of Waterloo does nothing to explain its significance, why it occurred, what
> > > it was all about.
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > Different things being explained: What do you mean by the phrase "Battle of Waterloo" vs. what was the significance of the Battle of Waterloo, etc. different questions call for different explanations. Nothing surprising about that. 
> 
> 
> A description is never any kind of explanation.
> 
> 


An explanation is often a description. 

> 
> > Explains what it is and how it comes about, yes.
> > 
> > 
> > > Here you are saying it isn't:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > >A demand that the category of the subjective be described in objective terms automatically forecloses the possibility of explanation because the categories are not interchangeable. But the fact that there are these two distinct categories in the universe (along with innumerable others) doesn't imply that interchangeability is needed to account for either.
> > > 
> > > ------------------------------------------------------
> > >  
> > 
> > We do not, need not and cannot explain something in terms of itself (see Dennett on that).
> 
> It is not the case that explaining-in-terms-of-itself and not explaining at allare the only alternatives.  See me on that.
> 

You haven't provided any back up in the form of an explication of your point so what's to see? 


> > So there's no reason to think we should be able to explain experience (the instances of subjectivity that constitute our mental lives) in terms of subjective terminology (linguistic usages expressing that subjectivity).
> > 
> > This goes to the question of interchangeability of the different ways we speak. That we CAN explain what subjectivity is by a description of certain kinds of physical processes is no reason to think we should be able to explain what subjectivity subjectively (in the language of subjective claims).
> > 
> > So you are mixing two different issues (I presume intentionally) and trading on the limited facility of language to make these distinctions with perfect clarity. 
> > 
> > 
> 
> > > > > > Much as it galls me to say so, I think Larry makes an interesting point about this. Since you declare saltiness "ineffable" you have effectively stipulated its unanswerability. 
> > > > > 
> > > > > You can still prove me wrong by effing it.
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > I don't have to since that's a phony move. If X is ineffable by definition (whatever that means), then there's nothing to eff and not effing it doesn't imply failure. 
> > > 
> > > OK. So you agree saltiness is ineffable, as required.
> > > 
> > 
> > I agree that subjectivity is not objectivity. Never said otherwise. And I agree that the universe includes both subjectively experiencing entities and those that don't seem to be.
> > 
> > However, while your desire to see "saltiness explained" can be met in a variety of ways, 
> 
> It can't be,  because you can;t expalin  what you cant describe.
> 

But I can describe experiencing tastes by referencing presumed commonalities in our experiences. I can certainly describe the difference between tasting and hearing or touching, say, though that depends on shared experiences, but so what? It's still to describe and everything is like that since everything we know is experienced in one way or another.


> >you dismiss all such ways except for the one that demands an explanation in terms of itself 
> 
> 
> >which is nonsense. More, as has been noted, your claim of ineffability, whatever that is, is a claim of indescribability so you are, in effect, stipulating that your X can't be described while bemoaning the failure to describe it. That turns out to be a faux demand.
> 
> You think salt tastes salty, and you can;t describe it. You're
> on the same page as me. So you are as "faux" as I am.
> 


The difference is I recognize that subjectivity does not involve recreating the experience(s) via description alone (aside from the work we do with literary art, like poetry, to evoke experiences in others). So since subjectivity doesn't involve recreating by description, there is nothing lost when we discover that we can't recreate by description. 


> > Do I think that experience at some level IS indescribable? I do. And I might even agree to saying that makes it ineffable. However, I would ascribe that to the failure of language at this level to get a purchase at all. So such "ineffability" says NOTHING about whether we can explain what consciousness is by a description of some physical phenomena. 
> 
> You can't explain wha you can;t  describe. 
> 

Depends on the kind of explanation needed.


> >There is no requirement that a description qua explanation of X also conjure X into existence.     
> > 
> >
> 
> > > > See prior posts for the background on the Dennettian model.
> > > 
> > > You never offered any coherent motivation.
> > 
> > 
> > False. I have gone through why I think consciousness can be accounted in the Dennettian way many times on this and prior lists.
> 
> You have offered nothing to expalin why your physical basis is better
> than microtubules or 40h.
> 


I don't have to. That Dennett's model may be true (which is all I argue) doesn't mean no other option could possibly be.  


> > > You said
> > > it was the way the brain seems to work, overlooking
> > > that it ha a lot of others processes and featues your
> > > are leaving out.
> > 
> > 
> > Not overlooking at all. Merely focusing on the ones that seem to matter. 
> 
> 
> "Seems to matter" is absolutely not an scientific, reasoned , principled explanation. Can't you see how absurd it is to
> base a supposedly hard-headed scientific theory on a subjective opinion
> like that.
>

I am not presenting a "supposedly hard-headed scientific theory". I am merely supporting an hypothesis worthy of further investigating (a picture or particular conceptualization). The theory part comes later as data accumulate.  

 
> >No one says the brain is a unitary organ with unitary functions. Indeed, the fact that its functions are so diverse and complex likely holds the answer to how brains do it.  
> > 
> > 
> > > You need to motivate why you are including
> > > what you are including and excluding what you are excluding.
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > I've already discussed the Dennettian model at great length.
> 
> If the whole edifice rests on "seems to me", you might as well give up. 


I think you completely misconstrue this whole thing. You thought this is about an argument for truth. It isn't. Truth isn't established in that way. And now you think it's about a "hard-headed scientific theory". No. It's about leaving empirical questions about how the world works to science, yes. But it's not about the hard-headedness of the Dennettian model qua theory at this point. At best he has limned an approach which others, like Dehaene, are building on as they move toward a well fleshed out theory.  

> > > Research does not turn non explanations into explanations.
> > > 
> > 
> > But new information (as obtained through research) enriches and alters explanations in important practical ways.
> 
> 
> So you don't have an all-base covering explanation now?
> 

You have a problem with "all the bases covered", huh? Look, I am only arguing that Dennett's model is possible, not that it is certain, not that it is true. The bases his model covers are all the elements that would need to be accounted for if we are to explain consciousness. That his model remains conceptual until there is reliable empirical data from the actual research is a different question. 

> 
> > > There are an infinite number of theories
> > > that are merely consistent with what we know about the world.
> > > Most of them fail as explanations of subjectivity, most
> > > of them fail to explain.
> > > 
> > > 
> > 
> > At the level of theories and conceptualizations all we have is competition. It takes real world implementation and testing to winnow them down to the most reliable. 
> 
> Testing STILL isn't a substitute for explanatoriness.
> 

No one says it is. It's part of the process though.