[Serious Phil] Rejecting the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information

[Peter D]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
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> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > >  
> > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > >  
> > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > > > > > I can and I have: Because consciousness or subjectivity or whatever we are calling it in this iteration of the argument just IS a certain kind of information processing system (the kind having already been described and the reasons for the description having already been provided).
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > That's an appeal to brute fact, not an explanation.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > It's an explanation via conceptualization, i.e., if all consciousness is is X, then there's nothing more to be discovered (no need to keep looking for 
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > But you can't assume that consciousness is (a certain kind of
> > > > > > > > IP, and therefore no explanation is necessary, because that, the claim consciousness is (a certain kind of)
> > > > > > > > IP, is the very claim you need to justify...by explaining it.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > It's not an assumption. It's an hypothesis based on analysis of what consciousness seems to consist of. on introspection, and a comparison with what information processing might be able to do in order to approximate it.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > > In essence it's a proposal for scientific research, not an assertion of a truth so there is no justification required.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > So you are no longer asserting the truth of "I can explain consciousness"?
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > I'm saying what I have always said about this: that Dennett's model is viable as an explanation of consciousness, contra the claims of people like Searle (via the CRA which seeks to prove, by syllogism, that brains don't do what they do computationally). In other words, I am claiming that an explanation like Dennett's suffices as an explanation BECAUSE it covers all the bases that need to be covered in providing such an explanation. However, that is not the whole of it since the empirical issue is paramount (as I have always maintaned).
> > > > > 
> > > > > Perhaps it's just now hitting you that this is my position? If so, then perhaps you can now see that you have been arguing all this time against some strawman of your own devising?  
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > You don't have  a coherent position. Sometimes you say you have an consciousness so good it can render
> > > > dualism unncessary, sometimes you backpedal and say the model is merely "viable" and needs further
> > > > testing. Well, dualism is viable too. You don't obviate one merely viable theory with another
> > > >
> > > 
> > > 
> > > That misses the point entirely. I have always said dualism might be true. It's just that there is no reason to opt for it if there are more parsimonious possibilities, which do the work, on offer.
> > 
> > Whether they do they work is the key issue.
> >
> 
> 
> My argument only involves making the case for not choosing dualism at this juncture since my point is that a model like Dennett's works (reasons already given). 

Reasons like "it seems to me to work"? Oh please.

>     
> > > > > > > Only a judgment that this model seems to account for all the elements we associate with consciousness without lapsing into contradiction or incoherence.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Seems to whom?
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > To those of us who see it, obviously. Just like any instance of understanding.
> > > > 
> > > > Nope. You can't build things like science and maths on subjective will-o-the-wisp understanding and
> > > > you don't. A scientific explanation works for evrybody with a scientific training.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Scientists have been known to disagree, even with the same training. 
> > 
> > This is about understanding not agreement.
> > The training is a training in understanding things. Scientists
> > are taught to understand, it is not left to chance or subjective
> > whim.
> > 
> 
> 
> Understanding often drives agreement and in cases like this it is especially important and all understanding is subjective, in the end.

No, that is misleading. There are objective criteria as to
whether somethig hangs together concpetually or not.
That understanding is done *by* subjects does not
make it subjective in the relevant sense.

> > >Moreover, science, itself, has been shown to be wrong over the years. Sharing a common training is no guarantee against controversy.
> > > 
> 
> Sharing a common training is not proof against controversy.

This is about undestanding, not agreement.

> > > > > 
> > > > > > > Based on THAT, 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Hold your horses. It doens't seem to me to account for
> > > > > > all the elements we associate with consciousness.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Yes, that has long been your argument. The problem with it, though, is that your argument for your not seeing it hinges on your insistence that Dennett's model doesn't explain experience because experience is "ineffable" 
> > > > 
> > > > You agree that it is ineffable.
> > > > 
> > > > And I hae multiple arguments, including the arguemnt that *you* are unable to give *any*
> > > > reply to the question "why should Interactive and Layered processes give rise to subjectivity".
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Agreeing that there is something about subjectivity that doesn't lend itself to conveyance by description does not imply the existence of ineffable properties or qualities or whatever.
> > 
> > > The question is what does being "ineffable" amount to? My view is that it amounts to certain limits intrinsic to language usage, nothing more.
> > 
> > That doesn't work. If X is ineffable in laguage L, and Y
> > is effable in language L, then there must be some difference --
> > a property, quality or whatever--between X and Y that explains
> > the difference, since the language L is teh same in both 
> > cases. So it is not "Just language", it is language AND
> > what it is attemopting to communicate.
> > 
> 
> 

> What are you talking about? This isn't about two natural languages 

I didnt say it was. "the language L is the same in both cases".

>or two different jargons within a natural language, each of which is relevant to some specialized field of inquiry. It's about the capacity of language itself, as a human behavioral phenomenon.

It is about the applicability of language to different classes
of topic. If X in ineffable in L, and Y is not, then there
is some difference between X and Y that explains that. Which
means it is not about L alone. It is about how L, X and Y relate.

> My point was that language, in THAT sense, is not equipped to handle certain aspects of our experience, e.g., the purely private aspect(s).

That L is not equpped to handle certain aspects of our experience
is about the nature of experienc AND the nature of language, not
the nature or language alone.

> > > Anyway, I HAVE given a reply to your question of "why should Interactive and Layered processes give rise to subjectivity"! The answer is because, on analysis, it turns out that that is ALL that subjectivity is. 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > >and so, by definition, is unexplainable in physically based terms. You deny the model CAN explain experience because you ASSUME experience is inexplicable because it is another type of thing in the universe 
> > > > -- a non-physical thing. 
> > > > 
> > > > I never said anything of the kind. Stop lying.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Oh crap, why do I bother with you? 
> > 
> > You're the liar.
> > 
> > 
> 
> Ah, I see now why I initially ignored this post of yours while on my tablet. I should have remembered now that typing is easy again on my own computer! It's always a waste of time to deal with people who say things like you just have.

Like the other stuff you come out with isn't a waste of time.