[Serious Phil] Dueling Dennettism: The Zombie-Friendly Definition of 'Experience'

[Peter D]

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> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > A good dictionary will provide a start. In this case what's meant is what we have previously called "subjective experience" as in the subjective aspect of an experience, i.e., the condition of being the observer/perceiver/apperceiver with regard to phenomena. In a nutshell it's the state of being aware of something through our senses, intellect, emotions, memories, etc.
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > Well, it's anyones guess what you mean by "phenomenality" then,
> > > > > > > > > > > > when you claim (#388) that being able to build a robot that responds to its environment tells us anything at all about phenomenality.
> > > > > > > > > > > > We think machines are without phenomenality. We don't apologise
> > > > > > > > > > > > to them when we damage them. Shakey has more complex behaviour
> > > > > > > > > > > > than other machines. It is possible shakey has phenomenality..and possible that it doesn.t Shakey doesn;'t PROVE anyhting.
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > UNLESS you have redefined "phenomeality" and "experience" to
> > > > > > > > > > > > MEAN behaviour...then, the argument is valid.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > My view: What we call "awareness" is generally equivalent to what we mean by "consciousness" (in most contexts), and this occurs on a continuum which would include Shakey-like entities, whether organically or inorganically (and naturally or artificially) constructed.
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > I used the terms "phenomenality" and "experience", not "awareness"
> > > > > > > > > > or "consciousness". It is entirely possible that Shakey
> > > > > > > > > > has absolutely no phenomenality whatsoever EVEN IF consciousness
> > > > > > > > > > is a continuum. If that is the case,  Shakey does not represent
> > > > > > > > > > any ability to "get started" on the problem of phenomenality,
> > > > > > > > > > as you mistakenly claimed. My point about phenomenality still stands. 
> > > > > > > > > > Your point about consciousness just isn't relevant.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > Shakey has no phenomenality in the model.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > Why bring it up when I asked about phenom?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > You said no one has any idea where to START and I pointed out that Shakey is a good example of a start.
> > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > > It's a limited version of seeing, but it points up how the mechanism may work if it is constructed on an information processing model. 
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > It may work in the sense of being able to find its way
> > > > > > > > around. But that sort of thing is not what I asked about.
> > > > > > > > Why bring up Shakey?
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > Because the issue is what does seeing amount to. 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > No. I asked about phenomenality.
> > > > > >
> > > > > 
> > > > > Yeah, the phenomenality of seeing.
> > > > 
> > > > No, I didn't mention vision.
> > > > 
> > > > > Or did you have Shakey tasting marshmallows in mind?
> > > > 
> > > > Tastes are a kind of phenomenality.
> > > > 
> > > > > > >A model like Shakey offers a way of understanding what seeing amounts to, if only at a still rudimentary level. The question is whether there is a qualitative gap or only a quantitative one between Shakey and us.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > >The point of noting the continuum and placing Shakey on it is to suggest that what we think of as phenomenality arises with the building blocks of Shake-like mechanics.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > The ORIGINAL point of the exchange was you attempt to
> > > > > > > > demonstrate to me that there is no HP because we CAN
> > > > > > > > Get Started on phenomenality. But you seem to have no
> > > > > > > > confidence that Shakey has ANY PHENOMENALITY AT ALL,
> > > > > > > > so Shakey does  not represent a start.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > Shakey doesn't have to have phenomenality for its mechanisms to be akin to the underlying mechanisms that result in phenomenality in a sufficiently complex version of Shakey to be designed and built at some future date and which will be closer to us.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > We don't know what the mechanisms that result in phenomenality are.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > That's why Shakey is a start as in having an idea where to start.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > We have no idea whether Shakey has phenomenality either. Shakey
> > > > might be a step in the wrong directuion.
> > > > 
> > > > > > > > > On that view, Shakey DOES represent the way we "get started".
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > No it doesn't. Doing things that don't work is not 
> > > > > > > > a start. Failures are not starts. How do we build
> > > > > > > > an AI with real phenomenality. unlike Shakey?
> > > > > > > > WE DON'T KNOW. AT ALL. WE CANNOT GET STARTED.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > Who says Shakey doesn't work?
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > You said Shakey has no phenom.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > But Shakey has the rudiments of vision built in. 
> > > > 
> > > > So? The issue is phenomenality. Nobody thinks video cameras
> > > > have colour qualia.
> > > > 
> > > > >If seeing is about integrating visual information with a broader range of information in a complex system, as Dennett's model supposes, then Shakey's lack of that broader complexity is no more evidence that that isn't how seeing works, 
> > > > 
> > > > What we need evidence of is the non existence of a HP.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > No, we don't need evidence there is not a uniquely "Hard Problem" a la Chalmers. We need a reason to believe there is, and if our only reason is a dualist presumption 
> > 
> > It isn't.
> >
> 
> Give YOUR reason then.

Given. 1-3.

> > 
> > >then that's a lousy reason because the dualist presumption is not justifiable given what we currently think we know. Moreover, it's to assume our conclusion which is a fallacious move.
> > > 
> > >  
> > > > >at bottom, than is the CR's lack of understanding evidence that understanding can't be achieve using the same kind of constituent elements as the CR relies on.
> > > > > 
> > > > > So the point is to START with such rudimentary systems (i.e., someone knows where to start) and build from there.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Of course, if you think there's a qualitative divide, as you do, if you think that seeing is some entirely different sort of thing than what Shakey does, something that can never be achieved in a functional way -- in other words, if your view of seeing qua phenomenality is dualistic, then it follows that you will not accept the model of which Shakey is a part.
> > > > 
> > > > Again, the issue is phenomenality, not seeing. Why do you keep
> > > > changing the subject? Oh yeah: Seeing is easier to explain
> > > > than phenomenality because phenomenality is the Hard Problem.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Seeing is no less a form of phenomenality than tasting as in the taste of salt. Why do you want to pretend otherwise?
> > 
> > Seeing and vision are not just phenomenality.  The fact that
> > you can account for some aspects of vision does not mean
> > you have accounted for visual phenomenality to any extent.
> > 
> 
> The point of a model that includes Shakey is to show how the physical signals that are involved with vision become seeing ("visual phenomenality"). 
> 
> 
> > > 
> > > > > But then you can't argue that this demonstrates that such a model is wrong
> > > > 
> > > > This is about whether there is a HP.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > And you haven't given any evidence that there is
> > 
> > Yes i have:
> > 1) We don't know how to get started on engineering in phenomenality
> 
> 
> We certainly do if it's built up from non-phenomenal physical events as all current evidence suggests and as Dennett's modely theorizes.

We don;t know whether it is built up in that way, so we
don't know how to get started. You can;t base knowledge
on non-knowledge. You can't infer knowledge from a guess.

> > 2) We can;t detect phenomenality
> 
> 
> We can detect its presence in others and do so all the time.

That is not detection , that is inference and guesswork.

> > 3) We don't know how brains do it.
> > 
> > 
> 
> 
> And we don't know a great many other things about the universe. 


Phenomenality presents unique challenges vis a via cosnciousness
and AI, however you look at it.

>Not knowing something is not evidence that knowing it poses a "uniquely Hard Problem".

I didn't say it was merely a case of "not knowing". I said
what I said: 1-3.


> > > beyond the fact that you subscribe to the Chalmersian analysis of this (and Chalmers is a self-avowed dualist though you say you aren't).
> > > 
> > >  
> > > > > because that conclusion stands on the supposition that dualism is true. But you've told us you're not a dualist so I guess you must not be, eh?     
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > > > Shakey is a rudimentary system, a first step, 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Shakey is not a first step at phenom, because
> > > > > > Shakey has no phenom. 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > A first step doesn't imply that the final step has already been taken.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > You think phenom only appears in very complex systems?
> > > > But you have
> > > > no evidence of that, it is just a guess. 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Quite right, 
> > 
> > Fine. Then it doesn't refute the HP.
> >
> 
> The "HP" doesn't need to be refuted. 

The claim that there is no HP needs to be supported, which
is equivalent to refuting the HP.

>The claim that it is what it is needs to be supported by something more than an assumption of dualism 

Done. See 1-3. None assume dualism.

>which the claim of a "Hard Problem" merely expresses. 




> > >it's a theory in a somewhat early stage. So what? I never argued otherwise. I said that a model like Dennett's is a viable candidate for being a true account of consciousness, including the infamous phenomenality. That's my whole position on this. That and the fact that there's no reason at this point to accept a dualist presumption which would contradict a model like Dennett's.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > You cannot say
> > > > that Shakey is a phenom-free step in the direction 
> > > > of phenomenality, because that is not a fact, it is
> > > > just your theory.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > So what? You cannot say nobody knows where to start because some researchers have started and Shakey 
> > 
> > What I am saying is that no one knows where to
> > start on phenomenality, and Shakey does not disprove
> > that because Shakey has none.
> > 
> 
> Shakey is a perfectly valid place to start if we don't assume that vision qua phenomenality has a nature that puts it beyond the pale of physical events.


A system with zero phenomenality does not represent
a start on phenomenality. Do you think not moving
is equilaent to taking a step?

> > 
> > >is part of that start. Will Shakey prove a false trail? That's a possibility.
> > 
> > Then there is no fact of the matter about Shakey being a start.
> > 
> 
> A start does not guarantee an arrival or even a particular locus of arrival.
> 
> > > But a start is only that and need not guarantee its conclusion.   
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > > >and, as such, an example of how to get started which you say no one has any idea of. But the fact that there is a Shakey tells us there is a start which belies your claim that no one has any idea of how to get started.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Shakey is not a first step at phenom. You know that, which
> > > > > > is why you keep switching the subject to vision/seeing.
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Seeing is phenomenal, 
> > > > 
> > > > In humans. We don't know whether it is in insects or robots.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > It's what it is in humans that we're after though learning how it works in other kinds of organisms is certainly of interest and may contribute to finding the answer for humans. So, too, with machines, which is the point of Dennett's model.
> > 
> > Whatever. You can't claim that Shakey demonstrates anything
> > at all about phenomenality.
> > 
> 
> I can and do and have. It shows how vision works at a low level.

You just changed the subject.

> If vision as the awareness of what is seen is like that then what's needed is a more complex system in which the Shakey seeing components are integrated.
> 
> > > > >just as smelling, tasting, feeling and hearing are. I know you'd like to make this into a claim that I have sneakily changed the subject, but that's simply baloney.
> > > > 
> > > > You have blatantly changed the subject.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > Oh for christ's sake. You want to talk about "phenomenality" but when we talk about the particulars of phenomenality as in perception in terms of our senses you proclaim it a change of the subject.  
> > 
> > Seeing is more general, not more particular.
> > 
> 
> More general than what? 

Phemomenality. You can have vision without phenom, as in blindsight.

> The seeing I've been talking about here is the seeing of something, as in seeing red, which is clearly an instance of phenomenality as we've been using that term. 

But Shakey doens;';t have that and you have been talking about
Shakey;s vision.

> > >  
> > > > > > > > > If, however, seeing, having phenomenality of the sight type, is qualitatively different than anything Shakey does, then there would not be the continuum and Shakey wouldn't be a basis for building toward phenomenality. The point of mentioning Shakey is to offer a particular way of understanding phenomenality. 
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > >Obviously, if one rejects that view and holds out for the idea that there is a qualitative difference in type,
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > Phenomenality IS categorically different from behaviour
> > > > > > > > just as a matter of DEFINITION.
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > The issue isn't behavior but the SYSTEM that produces the behavior as well as the signal handling within the system which results in that produced behavior. 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > That's all more behaviour.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > The point of a model like Dennett's, a non-dualistic one, is to reduce phenomenality to what brings it about, its constituent elements. If you want to conflate the idea of the behavior of the entity with the physical events going on inside the entity (behavior of its consitutent phenomena) that constitute the relevant system, you shouldn't pretend I'm the one changing the subject as you do above.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > "Phenomenality" doesn't label inner processing either. That's
> > > > why identifyign it with processing is a substantive claim
> > > > that needs support.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > That's why there's research.
> > 
> > You can't disprove the HP with research that hasn;t been done yet.
> > 
> 
> 
> The "HP" doesn't need to be "disproved". It needs to be justified by something more than just assuming dualism.

Done. See 1-3.

> > > > > > > > Pains are not grimaces.
> > > > > > > > THat has nothing to do with metaphysics. Even if phenom.
> > > > > > > > is physical or even mechanical it isn't the same KIND
> > > > > > > > of physical and mechanical thing as reports, jerks, twitches, dispositions, behavioiur and competencies. We know that because OUR
> > > > > > > > phenomenality is not that kind of thing. 
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > Well first off we don't know what underlies our phenomenality 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Like I said.
> > > > > 
> > > > > You SAID no one knows where to start. I have said that the evidence of experiments like the one with Shakey belies that.
> > > > 
> > > > You said "there is no phenomenality in Shakey in the model". How can
> > > > a system with zero phenomenality prove anything about phenomenality?
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Shakey is not about "proving" 
> > 
> > Yes it is. You quoted as a refuting my argument for an HP.
> > 
> 
> I cited Shakey as evidence that your claim that no one knows where to start is false since people have already started.

On what? Not on phenom, since Shakey has none. You argument
is based on bait and switch.

> That you assume, out of the box, that it's the wrong place to start

I never said that. You siad Shakey lacks phenom. I say that
Shakey does not represent KNOWLEDGE of phenimom, since
the whole approach is theory and speclation.

> is not evidence that it is or that such research will fail. Indeed, given the extensive information we are developing via science about the brain and its systems, there's every reason to think this direction will prove fruitful.



> > >but about developing various models that attempt to replicate what the relevant parts of our neurological systems do and, if we can replicate it, achieving consciousness, including phenomenal consciousness. This is NOT about making a logical argument to prove or disprove a Dennettian model. It's about finding a model that best accounts for the consciousness (including phenomenality) that we find in ourselves and then developing, building and testing it.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > > So we don't know if Shakey has it.
> > > > > 
> > > > > There's no reason to think Shakey has the phenomenality of seeing even if it has vision discrimination capacities. Like understanding in the CR, seeing is more than just reacting to particular signals. It involves an integrated system of a certain type which makes use of the visual inputs in a certain way.  
> > > > 
> > > > That's your theoretical claim. Since it is an untested theory,
> > > > it cannot be used to refute the existence of an HP.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > You cannot assume there is an "HP" just because Chalmers tells us so 
> > 
> > I didn't say that. Stop making things up.
> >
> 
> The reasons you give above for accepting Chalmers' claim of a "Hard Problem" go like this (my responses follow each):

They do, and none of 1-3 is a "CHalmers says so".
Please withdraw that falsehood.

> > 1) We don't know how to get started on engineering in phenomenality
> 
> Me: We certainly do if it's built up from non-phenomenal physical events as all current evidence suggests and as Dennett's modely theorizes.
> 
> > 2) We can;t detect phenomenality
> 
> Me: We can detect its presence in others and do so all the time.
> 
> > 3) We don't know how brains do it.
> 
> Me: We don't know a great many other things about the universe either. Simply not knowing something is not evidence that knowing it poses a "uniquely Hard Problem".
> 
> None of your reasons work to support a claim that there is a "uniquely Hard Problem" when trying to explain consciousness/experience/phenomenality a la Chalmers' claim therefore my conclusion is that your "reasons" are mainly presented to justify your buy-in into Chalmersian dualism.   


Bullshit. Total speculation.

>  
> > >and you happen to share his predilections in this debate. Therefore the issue is not to "refute the existence of an HP" but to provide a credible account for believing that consciousness, unlike any other phenomenon in the universe, is a uniquely "Hard Problem" in the Chalmersian sense.   
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > > There is no
> > > > > > fact of the matter that you could an AI with phenomenality
> > > > > > out of the stuff that Shakey is made of and therfore
> > > > > > no fact of the matter about Shakey being a first
> > > > > > stop towards anything.
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > That Shakey is not the last step is not evidence it's not a first step. 
> > > > 
> > > > I am not talking about "last steps". You are bringing in
> > > > your own theories.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > No, I started with the point that an account like Dennett's is adequate because it provides a credible picture of how the features we call in the aggregate "consciousness" can occur on a physical platform performing information processing functions. You are presuming dualism 
> > 
> > No. Stop lying.
> > 
> 
> Well, you are certainly free to deny it and to accuse me of "lying" but I think your own statements here more than justify

Bullshit. You have no idea what real evidence is. hint:
it is not your imagination.

> my conclusion that you are buying into a dualist presumption, whatever explicit statements you are prepared to make or not.
> 
> > 
> > >in order to reject Dennett's thesis. But you have no grounds to presume dualism at this stage as there's no evidence for it while a non-dualist account, if adequate, would be enough to pre-empt the lurch to dualism. so you can't reject Dennett's thesis based on dualism because that's to assume your conclusion.  
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > > You are surreptitiously
> > > > > > appealing to your theories being correct. But
> > > > > > you cannot say there is no HP just because you
> > > > > > hold a theory.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > I say there is no "Hard Problem" in the Chalmersian sense of that phrase on the grounds that there's no reason to presume dualism at this stage of our knowledge.
> > > > 
> > > > You conflated the problem and one proposed solui
> > > > ion. Again.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Only a presumption of dualism vis a vis explaining consciousness leaves us with a "Hard Problem"
> > 
> > I have disproved that by supplying the non-dulistic
> > arguments 1-3.
> > 
> 
> None of them amount to much. 

You don;t get to call me a dualist because you
don't like my non-dualistic stated reasons.

>See above. But if they allow you to feel as if you are not committed to dualism, what more can be said?  



> > > If consciousness can be explained in purely physical terms, then the only difficulty is the complexity of an as yet unsolved problem.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > 
> > > > > But you want to presume dualism 
> > > > 
> > > > Stop lying.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Your denial is the lie, I'm afraid.
> > 
> > Oh, please.
> > 
> > > > >to prove that a non-dualistic account like Dennett's cannot succeed.
> > > > 
> > > > I want to prove there is a HP by ntoing that we do not know
> > > > know how to get started on phenomenality
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Well we do know how to get started. We study the way our various brain systems work and try to replicate them functionally on other platforms, e.g., Shakey. 
> > 
> > We don't know how out brains do it.
> > 
> 
> So? 


So your start is a start on a start on a start. We
can't start on the replication, and we can;t start
on reverse engineering the brain's phenom. 

Which makes phenomenality unique (since everything else
in consc we can start on), which justifies the claim
that phenom is a uniquely HP.

>That implies that it's a perfectly ordinary level of difficulty, not a "uniquely Hard Problem".
> 
> 
> > > > > > > and that is just the point. But second, this is not about grimaces in lieu of pains but about what kind of system produces the kind of discriminating behaviors that we see in ourselves. 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > If it is "about" that, then we have a HP, because we
> > > > > > don't know what produces phenomenality in ourselves,
> > > > > > we don;t know anything at all about how to
> > > > > > engineer it into an AI, and we don't know
> > > > > > how to test for it either.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > How to fly in a heavier than air contraption was once a hard problem, too.
> > > > 
> > > > And many false starts on it were made.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > That's called science.
> > 
> > And where we have one problem that we don't know how
> > to make a true start on, it is a harder problem than
> > the others and deserves to be called a Hard Problem..
> >
> 
> 
> If all you mean by "Hard Problem" is greater than average level of difficulty, then we would have no dispute. But that isn't what Chalmers means and most of the time here you are defending the Chalmersian formulation. But you can't defend Chalmers' position on the grounds that there are some problems that are harder than others. That isn't even controversial let alone Chalmers' view!


I've said what I mean.

>  
> > > It's the human condition. Do you think there's an approach to scientific inquiry which always guarantees one has taken the right path from the get-go?
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > > Many approaches
> > > > were doomed to failure. They didn't fly and were
> > > > not "steps" on some linear path to flying. How
> > > > do you know that the phenomenality-free Shakey
> > > > paves the way to phenomenality? You don't.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > Right, we don't. But we've got a start 
> > 
> > Oh good grief. THis is pointless. The other areas
> > of AI we can start on in the sense of writing code
> > today. To insist that we can start on phenomenality
> > IN SOME OTHER SENSE OF START is hopeless, because
> > phenomenality then STILL stands apart from the other
> > areas of AI and is therefore STILL a HP in relation
> > to them!
> > 
> >
> 
> You are obsessed with a Chalmersian notion of a "uniquely Hard Problem"
 but when it comes to defending THAT positi


This is nonsense. You can;t say that I have "shifted" from
Chalmers I NEVER ADMITTED TO BEING A FULLY PAID UP CHALMERITE.
That is YOUR imaginary claim.

>on you shift to claiming it's just very, very hard because, of course, it hasn't been solved yet and has resisted solution for so long. But THAT isn't Chalmers' claim. So you're shifting the terms of the discussion here in order to preserve Chalmers' claim. You're right though. This discussion IS pointless if you continue to do that. 

The discussion is pointless if you confuse your own
misrepresnentations with what I have actually said.

> > >and you said no one knows how to start. But THAT claim is just another one that's grounded in a dualist presumption, 
> > 
> > Aaaaaghhh!!!!
> > 
> > 
> > >i.e., that phenomenality is of another type entirely than what makes up the physical universe. If one assumes dualism then one thinks that only a dualist account can work. But what if we don't make that assumption at the outset? What if we start with a genuinely open mind?
> > > 
> > >  
> > > > > So was finding a way to reach the moon. So was splitting the atom. A complex problem that has not yet been solved is hard. But that doesn't make it a uniquely "Hard Problem" of the sort Chalmers wants to give us.
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > then phenomenality is not going to appear to be explainable in a mechanistic way a la Shakey.  
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > > > > At some point, consistent with the increasing complexity of the system, the entity tips over into phenomenality, the condition of being aware of experiences in the way WE are aware of experiences (seeing colors, hearing sounds, etc).
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > Or not. 
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > Of course. That's why it's finally an empirical question.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > Since we don';t have qualiometers, it isn't. It's a hope, and expectation, a promisory note.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > We don't need "qualiometers". 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Without we have to rely on guesswork with other humans,
> > > > > > and we don't even have that with AIs.
> > > > > >
> > > > > 
> > > > > In most cases we don't guess with other humans. 
> > > > 
> > > > What do we do instead? Mind meld?
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Only in your imagination, apparently. Do you think you guess when you meet someone on a street corner whether or not he's really a person like you with a mind and so forth or whether he's just a zombie?
> > 
> > I certainly have to guess how avocados taste to people
> > who have some desire to eat them.
> >
> 
> So?


> We're talking about recognizing when another entity has so-called phenomenality, not how some particular phenomena manifests to that entity.


You may be. I am not.

> > > Do you really think that you have to guess about it? 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > >The same will apply to other kinds of entities, the level of uncertainty increasing by the degree of differences with ourselves. 
> > > > 
> > > > >But where the differences occur matter. If the issue is one of communication, 
> > > > 
> > > > It certainly isn't. You agree that colour qualia can;t be communicated.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > I agree that we can't share our own experiences in the way we have them but we sure can talk about them, express ourselves about them, allude to them, describe them in varying degrees of specificity. And we can talk about seeing red and prove it by making the right discriminations. That's all that's needed because, frankly, that's all we ever have.
> > 
> > 
> > False. We also have constitutional similarity.
> > 
> 
> So what?

So your statement about "all that is needed" is false.

> Do you imagine we would not be able to recognize consciousness in other entities dissimilar to us constitutionally?

"recognise" is misleading, since it is always inference.

THe less data we have to go on, the more dubious the 
inference is.

Lack of constitutional similarity means less data.

> How about the octopus which evidences a great deal of awareness of its environment and even in some cases reasoning ability? But it doesn't look a lot like us.

Awareness-of-environment is not phenom.


> > >other than your acceptance of Chalmers' dualistic analysis, though, of course, you aren't a dualist as you've told us many times. 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > > > As to the alleged "Hard Problem," absent a presumption of dualism (which we don't need at this point), there is no reason to think the problem at issue is harder than any other highly complex problem that science sets itself to solve but has not yet succeeded in solving.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > False. The reason that the HP is harder is that we don't know
> > > > > > how to start on it. You have not been able to refute that
> > > > > > argument. Shakey is not a start.
> > > > > >
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Shakey and many similar efforts are a start. Your claim that nobody knows where to start is thus refuted. 
> > > > 
> > > > False . We don't know that the phenomena-free Shakey is a start,
> > > > because we don't know that if keep building more complex
> > > > versions, they will eventually be phenomenally conscious.
> > > > Shakey might be a step in the wrong direction, like
> > > > gluing feathers to your arms.
> > > > 
> > > >
> > > 
> > > We don't have to know where we will end up to make a start.
> > 
> > Yes we do. A step in the wrong direction is not a start.
> > 
> 
> Sure it is 


Nonsense.

>because all sorts of course corrections may occur. If we start out on a road to a particular city and make the wrong turn and discover that and make a few adjustments to resume the right course, have we not started in the first place?
> 
> 
> > > > > > >Your call for a "qualiometer" is a red herring.
> > > > > > >  
> > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > > > we just don't know whether some complex AI system has phenomenality
> > > > > > > > > > or not. We cannot get started on the problem.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > Wrong. We proceed with what we have which is all we need.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > Wrong. We have NO PROGRESS AT ALL in phenomenality SPECFICALLY.
> > > > > > > > What we have is a bunch of partial solutions to OTHER PROBLEMS.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > If you meet someone on the street under perfectly ordinary circumstances and treat them as an experiencing entity you have already applied the same rules we would use in any testing regimen. 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > The rule I have applied is "same cause, same effect". But silicon is not flesh and blood and so not the same cause.
> > > > > >
> > > > > 
> > > > > Since we don't know what it is in brains that causes consciousness (especially if you deny a model like Dennett's out of the box,) then you don't know you have the "same cause". 
> > > > 
> > > > I don't need to know what specifically causes consc. in a brain when
> > > > all the gross structures and functions are duplicated.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Except that people and animals routinely recognize other conscious entities 
> > 
> > Oh good grief. Will you ever understand the difference between
> > knowing and guessing? I;ve seen a seagull attack it's own
> > reflection. Animals aren't that great.
> > 
> 
> That doesn't mean we or they have only "guesswork" to go on in our interactions with others.   

What means that is the lack of direct access to phenom. WHat
is not direct is inferred. 

> 
> > >without knowing anything about brains, one of the "gross structures". On the other hand, a very lifelike animatronic automaton a la Disney World may seem to have the "gross structures" and even the functions duplicated, and yet there will be differences enough to distinguish given sufficient interaction with the entity. It's the behaviors we look to, not the conformity of the outer shell. Therefore a machine mind need not look like us to behave with conscious drivers.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > >Besides for ages and ages past, humans didn't know about brains and their role at all. They speculated about souls and spirits and the like. Still they managed to recognize other consciousnesses when they encountered them most of the time.
> > > > 
> > > > There's a difference between knowing and lucjy guessing.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > You mean mankind just made millions of lucky guesses in the course of its history?
> > 
> > If you think others have experience because they have souls like
> > your souls, you are coming to the right conclusion on the wrong theory.
> > 
> 
> How do you know? 

Do you is think the soul theory is correct?

>And what has that to do with the question of whether we guess that others are like us and not zombies or not?

You confuse correct conclusions with knowledge. But knowledge
requires correct reasons as well.


> > >For the moment I have no plans to do so again. Suffice it to say that sometimes we can string words together without significance or genuine meaning and your questions about explaining salty partake of that phenomenon.  
> > 
> > > > > > >and your denial only tells us that you reject the answers. But that's obvious already, given a dualistic bias which you manifest but deny.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > At least come up with a different lie.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Your dualism is evident 
> > > > 
> > > > ..to your fevered imagination. You actually don't
> > > > have any black-and-white evidence for it at all.
> > > > Throwing the word "evident" around is no substitute
> > > > for evidence.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Your arguments are my evidence. You argue for Chalmers' position 
> > 
> > 
> > You are conflating the HP and his proposed solutions again.
> > 
> 
> I didn't say you argue for everything Chalmers says. I said "position" which, in this case, refers to the claim that explaining consciousness represents a "uniquely Hard Problem" based on his claim that consciousness is not explicable absent our positing an "extra ingredient". 

I don't "base" the HP on "extra ingredients". Stop lying.

>If you don't agree that we need an "extra ingredient" to explain consciousness, then you don't think that consciousness is inexplicable in physical terms in which case there is no reason to think that Dennett's model cannot work.    


See 1-3 above and everything else I have ever said. I have
put forward one non-dualistic argument after another.

> > (BTW he has recently adopted a more dual-aspect approach, liek
> > your two sides of the coin theory).
> > 
> 
> Good for him. Can you cite the source so we can have a look?

can you google Chalmers and aspect?