[Serious Phil] On Safari: In Search of Extra Ingredients

[SWM]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "andy_kappa" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
>
> "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> >
> > "andy_kappa" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > >
> > > If you define 'consciousness' to be something that fits in with the physicalist position then of course "consciousness can be accounted for within a de facto physicalist position" and "so there is no need to go further". This rather misses the point of Chalmers' hard problem, though those that don't have his use of the word in their 'suitcase' won't be capable of appreciating that. 
> 
> > Unless, of course, his use is a disguised form of dualism (he does call himself a naturalistic dualist after all) in which case it presumes something about consciousness that may not have to be presumed at all. This, I suspect, is why you may feel more closely akin to Joe's views than my own.
> 
> ---
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> Chalmers is indeed looking to explain consciousness on his use of the word, and his efforts lead him to a kind of dual-aspect theory that he calls naturalistic dualism. The only presumption he makes is that such speculative explanations are anything more than recreational. 
> 
> ==========
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> > > What physicalism fails to account for in its own terms is 'consciousness' on the use of the word that Chalmers identifies.
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> > Of course, Chalmers may just be in error as I have suggested on a number of occasions in which case there would be no reason to account for it!
> 
> ---
> 
> That "may just be in error" view is only possible from one side of the fence. From the other side of the fence there can be no doubt that he is not in error. This is what identifies the camp that an individual falls into when conversing with them on this issue. 
>

And what is the view on the his "side of the fence" that shows there is no error? What is the conception of consciousness that he holds which someone like me misses? Note that I agree that there is subjectivity, that it consists of the subject experiencing experiences, that the experiences include perceiving, understanding, feeling, knowing and so forth. So what part of my view is not consistent with Chalmers' conception of consciousness?

 
> ==========
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> > > Physicalism can only remain fairly uncontentious as a metaphysical position as long as the use identified by Chalmers either remains obscure or is deliberately overlooked, forcing consciousness to be 
> > > regarded in terms other than that identified by Chalmers.
> > > This is what makes the conditions ripe for all sorts of crossed wires in debates about consciousness.
> 
> > I would say the linguistic difficulty in referring to consciousness in a clear and explicit way makes for that problem. 
> 
> ---
> 
> That doesn't help, but it isn't the whole story.
> 

?

Of course my view is that it does help and it is the reason why there are such conditions as you cite, i.e., the occurrence of "crossed wires" in communication about this stuff.


> ==========
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> > > If you define 'mind' to be something that fits in with the physicalist position then of course "it is feasible to account for the occurrence of minds in the universe" without resorting to the non-physical. But if you use the word 'mind' to imply some kind of overlap with consciousness as identified by Chalmers, then this presents a uniquely hard problem for the physicalist position. 
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> > Unless there is no "uniquely hard problem" a la Chalmers but only the usual hardness as in the difficulty of what is very complex and not yet solved.
> 
> ---
> 
> That "unless there is no problem" view is only possible from one side of the fence. From the other side of the fence there can be no 
> doubt that there is a problem. 


Unless "the other side of the fence" of which you speak is simply a mistaken position! And we can't establish whether it is or it isn't, given your view that one simply sees it or not. By the way, I do agree that there are points in a discussion where it just boils down to seeing something or not. Those points represent where argument and debate end. On that I think we agree. But I note that you repeatedly respond to things I write as if there is still something to debate, namely what you see and I, allegedly, don't. So you are still expressing your view in opposition to a view like mine. But if, in fact, debate comes to an end, then there's no opposition, only that we take different forks in the road. As you say, the twain don't meet. But then why keep bringing that up as if it is an answer to some of the issues which my side of the twain is concerned with?




> This is what identifies the camp that an individual falls into when conversing with them on this issue. 
> 
> In my experience there is no mileage in anybody from one camp trying to convert anybody from the other camp, or trying to defend their position to anybody from the other camp. 
> 


I think there is a broader point to be made on this. There is no mileage (or damned little) in trying to convince anyone in most of these discussions. Most of us who come on lists like this to express our opinions about things that interest us already come with heavy duty committment to our own ideas about this. We have spent years formulating our opinions and often there are various personal (perhaps including psychological) factors underlying our reasons for holding them. So it's pretty unlikely we're going to convince anyone here anyway. Even when we find we share perspectives or positions with others on these lists, it's often pretty hard to extract agreement. Over on Analytic there were (believe it or not!) at least two posters whose positions I largely shared (there was a third but he left much earlier, having become fed up with the nonsense and a fourth who joined briefly at my invitation and then threw in the towel). And yet for all our agreements, I still found them on occasion disagreeing with things I was confident were totally consistent with their views. Part of the problem has to do with how we express things, of course, but I think there is also a kind of bias to dispute on lists like this.

But as to those who favor a dualistic explanation of consciousness, even if denying being dualistic in so many words, I agree with you that there is little hope for common ground. If someone thinks that consciousness is a special element in the universe that cannot be explained in physical terms as we explain everything else in the universe, then it seems there can be no convincing them of my view which is that we don't need to go beyond physical terms to explain consciousness. Since I once held a view closer to such thinking I believe I can understand where they're coming from. Nevertheless, in my most extreme dualist/idealist days I never felt as threatened by those who accept a physically based explanation as those I have met on these lists who deny that. There is a certain fury, born perhaps of desperation, to the way they rail at me for pressing a physically based explanation.

I find it strange but I have been trying to understand it.

SWM