[Serious Phil] Dueling Dennettism: Computational Bupkis
peterdjones at yahoo.com
Tue Mar 27 11:39:58 CDT 2012
--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <Philscimind@> wrote:
> I don't have to show specifics because Dennett's model is a general theory.
The claim that scientists understand matter is based on their beign able to produce a series of explanations of specific material phenomena. That's what gives it it's plausabiity.
Any claim to be able to explain phenomelaity must likewise
be based on specific examples to have plausibility.
> Except I never said there is a code for it, only that it is feasible (given Dennett's model for accounting for consciousness) that a synthetic consciousness can be build on a computational platform.
The claim in question was that it was possible to
"get started" on phenomenality.
> Besides, that model isn't premised on a one-to-one relation between this or that bit of experience and a particular code. Since the point is that the features of consciousness occur at the system level, the production of a bit of experience would require the workings of a full system which would include lots of different coded instructions doing lots of different things.
If you can't point to the qualia subroutines, why
should anyone believe that the system as qualia
at all? It's not as if qualia are some kind
of externally measurable capacity, like being able
to speak English.
> It's a straw man (one of PDJ's favorite accusations!) to say that I have argued that there are "quale" codes
It all depends on what "getting started on phenomenality" means. Which is nothing,
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