[Serious Phil] The Viability of the Substance/Property Distinction

[Peter D]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
>
> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > 
> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > >
> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > >  
> > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > SWM wrote (in #1271):
> > > > > > 
> > > > > >  >Joseph Polanik wrote:
> > > > > > 
> > > > > >  >>SWM wrote:
> > > > > > 
> > > > > >  >>>I make the point that, if one stops worrying about the archaic term
> > > > > >  >>>"substance," and substitutes a less loaded term ("ontological
> > > > > >  >>>basic"), then ... we no longer have the distraction of an artificial
> > > > > >  >>>distinction between properties and their putative "substances" which
> > > > > >  >>>is pointless in modern physics!
> > > > > > 
> > > > > >  >>as I wrote in #1038, a post you have not even attempted to rebut:
> > > > > > 
> > > > > >  >>"problematic for your claim is that physicists seem convinced that
> > > > > >  >>there *are* objects that have properties; for example, electrons
> > > > > >  >>having the property of electric charge."
> > > > > > 
> > > > > >  >Why should I "rebut" it? I have no problem with such a use of
> > > > > >  >"properties". In fact it helps butress my case.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > how?
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > in #1378, I pointed out the position you are currently defending
> > > > > > ('property' and 'substance' do not have distinct referents), follows
> > > > > > from the two assumptions you've made:
> > > > > >
> > > > > 
> > > > > My point is that they don't have fixed referents but varying ones, depending on context. Within a context the reference is fixed, of course, but the fixing is context dependent. Therefore, it's a mistake to look for some kind of ultimate substance beyond any possible properties. When you peel away any and all possible properties there's nothing left standing as it were. In other words, the idea of substance is a moving target, a function of the role any particular set of properties is assigned in the referencing game, e.g., "that substance over there is the gooey, shiny stuff I mean". 
> > > > > 
> > > > >  
> > > > > > [1] the essential claim of computational functionalism: whatever
> > > > > > performs the functions that brains perform is conscious. [C]
> > > > > >
> > > > > 
> > > > > The functions are performed on the platform so is the platform conscious? I suppose in the sense that we might say, looking at an injured man, that his brain is still conscious. But that seems a bit of a stretch in terms of how we actually speak. We might be referring to various occurrences in the brain which we have learned happen only in conscious brains. So we could say something like that and be understood.
> > > > > 
> > > > > What about the processes the brain is performing that, in toto, constitute the system? I'd say it makes no sense to say that the particular processes are each, themselves, conscious. But spoken of as part of a larger system (whether the entire system or significant parts of it) I think it would make sense. And that's how I would say it.  
> > > > > 
> > > > > > [2] the threat assessment: 'property' and 'substance' have distinct
> > > > > > referents; therefore, it is not the case that whatever performs the
> > > > > > functions that brains perform is conscious. [P -> -C]
> > > > > >
> > > > > 
> > > > > "threat assessment"?
> > > > > 
> > > > > So where is the property and where the substance in the operating brain which we would recognize as being conscious? This whole way of speaking is odd. As you may recall, I would say that consciousness is a system level feature of certain kinds of systems, i.e., that it occurs when certain kinds of systems do certain things and that it is what they are doing that are the features we call, in the aggregate, consciousness.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Being system level features we might also call them system level properties (using "properties" and "features" interchangeably here). So here we have certain properties of certain kinds of systems running on certain kinds of physical platforms. Now where is the substance of which these properties are said to belong?
> > > > > 
> > > > > Since they are system level features/properties, does that mean the system is the "substance"?  That's a strange designation for a system! But elsewhere PDJ recently suggested that "mass/energy" is rightly designated as substance on his view. Frankly, I think that equally strange with speaking of systems as substances. But if one allows PDJ's usage, then one could call the system that has the features we call consciousness a substance, too.
> > > > > 
> > > > > But then the notion of substance becomes so diluted as to be pretty nothing more than an arbitrary substitute for the terms we usually use. Can we do that? Yeah. Should we? I would not, myself, though with appropriate caveats and stipulations I would speak that way with you.
> > > > > 
> > > > > The problem, of course, is that you don't seem to want to agree to such caveats and stipulations.     
> > > > > 
> > > > >  
> > > > > > consequently, Stuart,
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > it is up to you to explain how the fact that physicists distinguish
> > > > > > between an object (the electron) and its properties (eg. electric
> > > > > > charge) buttresses your case that 'property' and 'substance' do not have
> > > > > > distinct referents.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Joe
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > As I said, it's not so much that they don't have "distinct referents" but that they don't have "fixed referents" outside of particular contexts. That physicists speak of the properties of electrons (as well as mass/energy by the way) isn't evidence that there is a bottom line distinction to be made between properties and substance the denial of which, of course, is my main point. 
> > > > 
> > > > Maybe you could try making the disproof of that your main point. We cant carry out the property-stripping experiment in practice, so the
> > > > question of whether anything would be left after properties are stripped comes down to theory. However, above, you offer no theory
> > > > to support your claim that nothing is left.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > It's a conceptual point, not a matter of competing theories.
> > 
> > 
> > Oh right. You conceive of everything as a substanceless bundle of properties, and you don't care to support that with a theoretical
> > justification.
> > 
> 
> The support lies in the conceptual point itself, i.e., once you take every and any possible property away what have you got left to point to? 

>You can say you still have the "substance" but you can't show us what or where it is 

So fucking what? You can't seprate the mass of an electron
from its charge, but you regard them a separate proeprties.

>other than to say the word which seems to name something but fails to do so absent a referent that can be picked out.
> 
> On the other hand, the answer you've sometimes given, which proclaimed "mass/energy" to be the substance you have in mind, doesn't fit the bill because "mass/energy" isn't "propertyless".  

it is per se. You are confusing it with specific instances.

> > > > >It is generally the case that one man's substance (that pile of goo on the sidewalk, for instance) is another man's properties (as in being all those features which make the pile of goo what it is). Take away the properties and there is no there there, no substance remaining of which the properties are an expression. 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Is this enough to answer your question? I expect not because, truly, I don't think you want any kind of answer that doesn't lead to the conclusions you are trying to force here. But be that as it may . . .
> > > > > 
> > > > > SWM  
> 
> 
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