[Serious Phil] Irreducibility vs Basicality

[SWM]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:

> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> >
> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > >
> > > SWM wrote:
> > > 
> > >  >Joseph Polanik wrote:
> > > 
> > >  >>SWM wrote:
> > > 
> > >  >>>Here's a clip of Chalmers talking about his understanding of this
> > >  >>>and, as you suggest, linking his position with property dualism.
> > >  >>>However, note that he is also acknowledging that the issue with
> > >  >>>property dualism lies in whether we are talking about what is
> > >  >>>reducible or what isn't:
> > > 
> > >  >>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LRrnAXgxS2U
> > > 
> > >  >>an interesting clip; and, while he mentions 'dualism of properties', I
> > >  >>didn't notice him saying anything that would support your attempt to
> > >  >>conflate the two senses of irreducibility/basicality involved here.
> > > 
> > >  >>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
> > > 
> > >  >>>>SWM wrote:
> > > 
> > >  >>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
> > > 
> > >  >>>>>>as a philosophy of consciousness, property dualism is easily
> > >  >>>>>>understood as the intuition/claim that at least some physical
> > >  >>>>>>objects have mental properties; although, obviously, any number of
> > >  >>>>>>difficulties might arise when applying this intuitive notion to
> > >  >>>>>>classify particular philosophers.
> > > 
> > >  >>>>>The issue is what do "mental properties" amount to?
> > > 
> > >  >>>>specifically, in the case of properties that are properties of
> > >  >>>>objects, one issue is whether the properties or the objects are the
> > >  >>>>ontological basicalities to be inventoried for purposes of
> > >  >>>>discriminating between monism and dualism of ontological
> > >  >>>>basicalities.
> > > 
> > >  >>>... the issue, as always, is whether one is speaking of properties as
> > >  >>>in something irreducible (an ontological basic) or as a feature of
> > >  >>>something else (to which it can be reduced).
> > > 
> > >  >>in the case of property dualism, the mental properties are not
> > >  >>reducible to the physical properties; but, both sets of properties are
> > >  >>reducible to the object (e.g. the brain) of which they are features.
> > > 
> > >  >>there is still only one basicality, the brain; consequently, you have
> > >  >>not shown a dualism of ontological basicalities.
> > > 
> > >  >>Chalmers is a monist of ontological basicalities; or, in more
> > >  >>traditional jargon, a substance monist.
> > > 
> > >  >Chalmers is a self-acknowledged dualist no matter how much you want to
> > >  >save him from his own words.
> > > 
> > > are you new here; or, just slow on the uptake?
> > > 
> > > [1] Chalmers is a self-acknowledged *PROPERTY* dualist.
> > > 
> > > [2] I have no desire to 'save' him from [1]; because, IMO, he is
> > > accurately describing himself as a property dualist.
> > > 
> > > [3] I *am* defending him against YOUR words; specifically, against your
> > > unsupported (and blatherously inane) claim that Chalmers' property
> > > dualism constitutes something indistinguishable from substance dualism.
> > > 
> > > Joe
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > "Extra Ingredient"
> > 
> 
> Explain why non physical properties aren't extra ingredients.
> 
> 

They can be constured as such (as Chalmers does, albeit not very clearly). That's the point.