[Serious Phil] Irreducibility vs Basicality

[Joseph Polanik]

SWM wrote:

 >Peter D wrote:

 >>SWM wrote:

 >>>Peter D wrote:

 >>>>SWM wrote:

 >>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:

 >>>>>>SWM wrote:

 >>>>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:

 >>>>>>>>SWM wrote:

 >>>>>>>>>Here's a clip of Chalmers talking about his understanding of
 >>>>>>>>>this and, as you suggest, linking his position with property
 >>>>>>>>>dualism. However, note that he is also acknowledging that the
 >>>>>>>>>issue with property dualism lies in whether we are talking
 >>>>>>>>>about what is reducible or what isn't:

 >>>>>>>>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LRrnAXgxS2U

 >>>>>>>>an interesting clip; and, while he mentions 'dualism of
 >>>>>>>>properties', I didn't notice him saying anything that would
 >>>>>>>>support your attempt to conflate the two senses of
 >>>>>>>>irreducibility/basicality involved here.

 >>>>>>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:

 >>>>>>>>>>SWM wrote:

 >>>>>>>>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:

 >>>>>>>>>>>>as a philosophy of consciousness, property dualism is easily
 >>>>>>>>>>>>understood as the intuition/claim that at least some
 >>>>>>>>>>>>physical objects have mental properties; although,
 >>>>>>>>>>>>obviously, any number of difficulties might arise when
 >>>>>>>>>>>>applying this intuitive notion to classify particular
 >>>>>>>>>>>>philosophers.

 >>>>>>>>>>>The issue is what do "mental properties" amount to?

 >>>>>>>>>>specifically, in the case of properties that are properties of
 >>>>>>>>>>objects, one issue is whether the properties or the objects
 >>>>>>>>>>are the ontological basicalities to be inventoried for
 >>>>>>>>>>purposes of discriminating between monism and dualism of
 >>>>>>>>>>ontological basicalities.

 >>>>>>>>>... the issue, as always, is whether one is speaking of
 >>>>>>>>>properties as in something irreducible (an ontological basic)
 >>>>>>>>>or as a feature of something else (to which it can be reduced).

 >>>>>>>>in the case of property dualism, the mental properties are not
 >>>>>>>>reducible to the physical properties; but, both sets of
 >>>>>>>>properties are reducible to the object (e.g. the brain) of which
 >>>>>>>>they are features.

 >>>>>>>>there is still only one basicality, the brain; consequently, you
 >>>>>>>>have not shown a dualism of ontological basicalities.

 >>>>>>>>Chalmers is a monist of ontological basicalities; or, in more
 >>>>>>>>traditional jargon, a substance monist.

 >>>>>>>Chalmers is a self-acknowledged dualist no matter how much you
 >>>>>>>want to save him from his own words.

 >>>>>>are you new here; or, just slow on the uptake?

 >>>>>>[1] Chalmers is a self-acknowledged *PROPERTY* dualist.

 >>>>>>[2] I have no desire to 'save' him from [1]; because, IMO, he is
 >>>>>>accurately describing himself as a property dualist.

 >>>>>>[3] I *am* defending him against YOUR words; specifically, against
 >>>>>>your unsupported (and blatherously inane) claim that Chalmers'
 >>>>>>property dualism constitutes something indistinguishable from
 >>>>>>substance dualism.

 >>>>>"Extra Ingredient"

 >>>>Explain why non physical properties aren't extra ingredients.

 >>>They can be constured as such (as Chalmers does, albeit not very
 >>>clearly). That's the point.

 >>And the claim that he is really a substance dualist?

 >Which claim is that?

 >I have claimed Chalmers is an ontological dualist and that, IN THE
 >RELEVANT SENSE, being an ontological dualist amounts to the same thing
 >as being a substance dualist because BOTH positions involve presuming
 >the need for an "extra ingredient" in the universe to account for
 >consciousness. The only difference is what we think of as the "extra
 >ingredient", what kind of thing we think it must be.

that's a big difference. it explains why Chalmers' PROPERTY Dualism is
consistent with physicalsim while Descartes' SUBSTANCE Dualism is not.


 >To the extent anyone means by "substance dualism" a belief in two
 >substances underlying existence (which you don't if you just mean what
 >I mean by "ontological dualism" as you have recently indicated), that
 >appellation would not apply to Chalmers nor have I suggested otherwise.

pop quiz, Stuart.

Chalmers is NOT a substance dualist.

true or false, Stuart?


 >But to the extent that all that's meant is a belief that we need to
 >posit an "extra ingredient" in the universe to explain the presence of
 >consciousness, along with everything else, in the universe, (which is
 >Chalmers' explicit position) it does.

if you altered the meaning of 'substance' sufficiently, you could
classify a two-scoop ice cream cone as substance dualism merely because
each scoop was a different flavor.


 >The point of using the formulation "ontological dualism" instead of
 >"substance dualism" is that it's more generic, i.e.,

less precise.

 >it allows properties to be understood as ontological basics, too,
 >while invoking "substance" implies they stand apart from, but dependent
 >on, substances.


unless you can you that Chalmers supports your notion of disembodied
properties floating around 'un-had' by any object, such speculations are
irrelevant to Chalmers' placement on the Axis of Dualism.

 >In fact, on examination, we find that "substance" does no real work in
 >our modern understanding of the world at all since it belongs to an
 >earlier, less sophisticated intellectual era.

you just mentioned the very real work done by substance qua property
bearer.

it prevents disembodied properties; allows us to distinguish Chalmers
from Descartes; and, justifies the conclusion that not all forms of
dualism are as serious as some forms of dualism.

Joe


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Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

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