[Serious Phil] Irreducibility vs Basicality

[SWM]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:
> 
>  >Peter D wrote:
> 
>  >>SWM wrote:
> 
>  >>>Peter D wrote:
> 
>  >>>>SWM wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>>SWM wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>>>>SWM wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>>>>>Here's a clip of Chalmers talking about his understanding of
>  >>>>>>>>>this and, as you suggest, linking his position with property
>  >>>>>>>>>dualism. However, note that he is also acknowledging that the
>  >>>>>>>>>issue with property dualism lies in whether we are talking
>  >>>>>>>>>about what is reducible or what isn't:
> 
>  >>>>>>>>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LRrnAXgxS2U
> 
>  >>>>>>>>an interesting clip; and, while he mentions 'dualism of
>  >>>>>>>>properties', I didn't notice him saying anything that would
>  >>>>>>>>support your attempt to conflate the two senses of
>  >>>>>>>>irreducibility/basicality involved here.
> 
>  >>>>>>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>>>>>>SWM wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>>>>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>>>>>>>>as a philosophy of consciousness, property dualism is easily
>  >>>>>>>>>>>>understood as the intuition/claim that at least some
>  >>>>>>>>>>>>physical objects have mental properties; although,
>  >>>>>>>>>>>>obviously, any number of difficulties might arise when
>  >>>>>>>>>>>>applying this intuitive notion to classify particular
>  >>>>>>>>>>>>philosophers.
> 
>  >>>>>>>>>>>The issue is what do "mental properties" amount to?
> 
>  >>>>>>>>>>specifically, in the case of properties that are properties of
>  >>>>>>>>>>objects, one issue is whether the properties or the objects
>  >>>>>>>>>>are the ontological basicalities to be inventoried for
>  >>>>>>>>>>purposes of discriminating between monism and dualism of
>  >>>>>>>>>>ontological basicalities.
> 
>  >>>>>>>>>... the issue, as always, is whether one is speaking of
>  >>>>>>>>>properties as in something irreducible (an ontological basic)
>  >>>>>>>>>or as a feature of something else (to which it can be reduced).
> 
>  >>>>>>>>in the case of property dualism, the mental properties are not
>  >>>>>>>>reducible to the physical properties; but, both sets of
>  >>>>>>>>properties are reducible to the object (e.g. the brain) of which
>  >>>>>>>>they are features.
> 
>  >>>>>>>>there is still only one basicality, the brain; consequently, you
>  >>>>>>>>have not shown a dualism of ontological basicalities.
> 
>  >>>>>>>>Chalmers is a monist of ontological basicalities; or, in more
>  >>>>>>>>traditional jargon, a substance monist.
> 
>  >>>>>>>Chalmers is a self-acknowledged dualist no matter how much you
>  >>>>>>>want to save him from his own words.
> 
>  >>>>>>are you new here; or, just slow on the uptake?
> 
>  >>>>>>[1] Chalmers is a self-acknowledged *PROPERTY* dualist.
> 
>  >>>>>>[2] I have no desire to 'save' him from [1]; because, IMO, he is
>  >>>>>>accurately describing himself as a property dualist.
> 
>  >>>>>>[3] I *am* defending him against YOUR words; specifically, against
>  >>>>>>your unsupported (and blatherously inane) claim that Chalmers'
>  >>>>>>property dualism constitutes something indistinguishable from
>  >>>>>>substance dualism.
> 
>  >>>>>"Extra Ingredient"
> 
>  >>>>Explain why non physical properties aren't extra ingredients.
> 
>  >>>They can be constured as such (as Chalmers does, albeit not very
>  >>>clearly). That's the point.
> 
>  >>And the claim that he is really a substance dualist?
> 
>  >Which claim is that?
> 
>  >I have claimed Chalmers is an ontological dualist and that, IN THE
>  >RELEVANT SENSE, being an ontological dualist amounts to the same thing
>  >as being a substance dualist because BOTH positions involve presuming
>  >the need for an "extra ingredient" in the universe to account for
>  >consciousness. The only difference is what we think of as the "extra
>  >ingredient", what kind of thing we think it must be.
> 
> that's a big difference. it explains why Chalmers' PROPERTY Dualism is
> consistent with physicalsim while Descartes' SUBSTANCE Dualism is not.
> 
> 
>  >To the extent anyone means by "substance dualism" a belief in two
>  >substances underlying existence (which you don't if you just mean what
>  >I mean by "ontological dualism" as you have recently indicated), that
>  >appellation would not apply to Chalmers nor have I suggested otherwise.
> 
> pop quiz, Stuart.
> 
> Chalmers is NOT a substance dualist.
> 
> true or false, Stuart?
> 
> 
>  >But to the extent that all that's meant is a belief that we need to
>  >posit an "extra ingredient" in the universe to explain the presence of
>  >consciousness, along with everything else, in the universe, (which is
>  >Chalmers' explicit position) it does.
> 
> if you altered the meaning of 'substance' sufficiently, you could
> classify a two-scoop ice cream cone as substance dualism merely because
> each scoop was a different flavor.
> 
> 
>  >The point of using the formulation "ontological dualism" instead of
>  >"substance dualism" is that it's more generic, i.e.,
> 
> less precise.
> 
>  >it allows properties to be understood as ontological basics, too,
>  >while invoking "substance" implies they stand apart from, but dependent
>  >on, substances.
> 
> 
> unless you can you that Chalmers supports your notion of disembodied
> properties floating around 'un-had' by any object, such speculations are
> irrelevant to Chalmers' placement on the Axis of Dualism.
> 
>  >In fact, on examination, we find that "substance" does no real work in
>  >our modern understanding of the world at all since it belongs to an
>  >earlier, less sophisticated intellectual era.
> 
> you just mentioned the very real work done by substance qua property
> bearer.
> 
> it prevents disembodied properties; allows us to distinguish Chalmers
> from Descartes; and, justifies the conclusion that not all forms of
> dualism are as serious as some forms of dualism.
> 
> Joe
> 
>

The only dualism that matters is the kind that involves positing more than one ontological basic and Chalmers does, hence he is THAT kind of dualist (and so are substance dualists). Nevertheless, I don't claim that Chalmers is talking about substances and never did. But I'm not going to waste my time denying something I never said. The fact that I never said any such thing and you have been unable to show that I am mistaken and that I did say it, ought to be enough for you. But you are so desperate to salvage dualism, it seems, that you can't give this up. (I do note though that you seem to have dropped your old Cartesian sign-off "Nothing unreal is self-aware". Progress perhaps?)