[Serious Phil] Irreducibility vs Basicality

[Joseph Polanik]

SWM wrote:

 >Joseph Polanik wrote:

 >>SWM wrote:

 >>>I have claimed Chalmers is an ontological dualist and that, IN THE
 >>>RELEVANT SENSE, being an ontological dualist amounts to the same
 >>>thing as being a substance dualist because BOTH positions involve
 >>>presuming the need for an "extra ingredient" in the universe to
 >>>account for consciousness. The only difference is what we think of as
 >>>the "extra ingredient", what kind of thing we think it must be.

 >>that's a big difference. it explains why Chalmers' PROPERTY Dualism is
 >>consistent with physicalism while Descartes' SUBSTANCE Dualism is not.

 >>>The point of using the formulation "ontological dualism" instead of
 >>>"substance dualism" is that it's more generic, i.e.,

 >>less precise.

 >>>it allows properties to be understood as ontological basics, too,
 >>>while invoking "substance" implies they stand apart from, but
 >>>dependent on, substances.

 >>unless you can you that Chalmers supports your notion of disembodied
 >>properties floating around 'un-had' by any object, such speculations
 >>are irrelevant to Chalmers' placement on the Axis of Dualism.

 >The only dualism that matters is the kind that involves positing more
 >than one ontological basic and Chalmers does, hence he is THAT kind of
 >dualist (and so are substance dualists).

that raises a question you have previously evaded: how does a property
of a substance/object qualify as an ontological basicality?

in your own jargon, a property is reducible to the the substance/object
of which it is a feature; so, I'm wondering how it can be both
ontologically basic and reducible at the same time.

Joe


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Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

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