[Serious Phil] Irreducibility vs Basicality
jpolanik at nc.rr.com
Wed May 9 02:45:05 CDT 2012
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>I have claimed Chalmers is an ontological dualist and that, IN THE
>>>RELEVANT SENSE, being an ontological dualist amounts to the same
>>>thing as being a substance dualist because BOTH positions involve
>>>presuming the need for an "extra ingredient" in the universe to
>>>account for consciousness. The only difference is what we think of as
>>>the "extra ingredient", what kind of thing we think it must be.
>>that's a big difference. it explains why Chalmers' PROPERTY Dualism is
>>consistent with physicalism while Descartes' SUBSTANCE Dualism is not.
>>>The point of using the formulation "ontological dualism" instead of
>>>"substance dualism" is that it's more generic, i.e.,
>>>it allows properties to be understood as ontological basics, too,
>>>while invoking "substance" implies they stand apart from, but
>>>dependent on, substances.
>>unless you can you that Chalmers supports your notion of disembodied
>>properties floating around 'un-had' by any object, such speculations
>>are irrelevant to Chalmers' placement on the Axis of Dualism.
>The only dualism that matters is the kind that involves positing more
>than one ontological basic and Chalmers does, hence he is THAT kind of
>dualist (and so are substance dualists).
that raises a question you have previously evaded: how does a property
of a substance/object qualify as an ontological basicality?
in your own jargon, a property is reducible to the the substance/object
of which it is a feature; so, I'm wondering how it can be both
ontologically basic and reducible at the same time.
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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