[Serious Phil] Irreducibility vs Basicality

[Peter D]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
>
> Peter D wrote:
> 
>  >Joseph Polanik wrote:
> 
>  >>Peter D wrote:
> 
>  >>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
> 
>  >>>>Peter D wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>>SWM wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
> 
>  >>>>>>>>specifically, in the case of properties that are properties of
>  >>>>>>>>objects, one issue is whether the properties or the objects are
>  >>>>>>>>the ontological basicalities to be inventoried for purposes of
>  >>>>>>>>discriminating between monism and dualism of ontological
>  >>>>>>>>basicalities.
> 
>  >>>>>>>... the issue, as always, is whether one is speaking of
>  >>>>>>>properties as in something irreducible (an ontological basic) or
>  >>>>>>>as a feature of something else (to which it can be reduced).
> 
>  >>>>>>in the case of property dualism, the mental properties are not
>  >>>>>>reducible to the physical properties; but, both sets of properties
>  >>>>>>are reducible to the object (e.g. the brain) of which they are
>  >>>>>>features.
> 
>  >>>>>No they are not. There isn;t even any meaning to reducing a complex
>  >>>>>set of properties to a something considered apart from its
>  >>>>>properties.
> 
>  >>>>are you saying there is no meaning in attempting to explain a
>  >>>>phenomenon by attributing a property to a substance/object?
> 
>  >>>>>>there is still only one basicality, the brain; consequently, you
>  >>>>>>have not shown a dualism of ontological basicalities.
> 
>  >>>>>>Chalmers is a monist of ontological basicalities; or, in more
>  >>>>>>traditional jargon, a substance monist.
> 
>  >>>>>You are just as guilty of muddling different senses of "basic" as
>  >>>>>SWM
> 
>  >>>>in the context of explaining a phenomenon by attributing a property
>  >>>>to a substance/object, I'm saying that only the object is an
>  >>>>ontological basicality
> 
>  >>>>which of the different senses of 'basic' do you say I'm muddling by
>  >>>>saying that?
> 
>  >>>The sense in which physical properties are more basic than mental
>  >>>properties, the latter being reducible to the former.
> 
>  >>okay; then, the muddle does not concern the senses of 'basic'. one of
>  >>us simply misunderstands Chalmers.
> 
>  >>in my view, Chalmers attributes two sets of properties to physical
>  >>objects such as the brain because the properties of one set are not
>  >>reducible to properties of the other.
> 
>  >>I take it that you think that Chalmers claims that there are two sets
>  >>of properties *despite* the fact that the properties of one set *are*
>  >>reducible to properties of the other. is that correct?
> 
>  >Not even remotely.
> 
> so where's the muddle you say I'm in (but you're not in)?
> 
> do you agree that, for Chalmers, mental properties are not reducible to
> physical properties?
> 
> do you claim that physical properties are more basic than mental
> properties?
> 
> do you count something other than objects as basics or basicalities for
> purposes of classifying a philosophy as a monism or dualism of
> ontological basicalities?
> 
> Joe
> 
> 
> -- 
> 
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The problem is this passage ,where you talk about a different kind
of basicness to the reducing mental properties to physical kind.

>>>>in the context of explaining a phenomenon by attributing a property
>>>>to a substance/object, I'm saying that only the object is an
>>>>ontological basicality