[Serious Phil] The Viability of the Substance/Property Distinction

[Peter D]

--- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind at ...> wrote:
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> Briefly:
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> --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
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> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "Peter D" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --- In Phil-Sci-Mind at yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <Philscimind@> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Oh my, that sentence PDJ had trouble "parsing" did have a problem but not because I left a section out as I briefly thought when looking at it earlier today. Here it is as I wrote it:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "In the case of 'substance' used as Joe and PDJ like to use it, metaphysically, and described as a 'bearer of properties' (Joe) or a 'propertyless bearer of properties' (PDJ) but cannot point to what you have in mind you have no referent."
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > And here it is as it should be read:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "In the case of 'substance' used as Joe and PDJ like to use it, metaphysically, and described as a 'bearer of properties' (Joe) or [as] a 'propertyless bearer of properties' (PDJ) but [where you] cannot point to what you have in mind, you have no referent."
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That doens't help. Is the "pointing" supposed to be literal or metaphorical? (Try to answer yes or no).
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Not exclusively a matter of using one's finger if that's what you mean.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > good grief...What else would "literally" mean?
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But it includes that, too.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Your reply was useless.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Whatever . . .
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Surely our ancestors were not in much of  a position
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > to literally point at the Dark Side of the Moon, but  surely the phrase always
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > had a referent.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > See above.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I did it. It was useless.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > OTOH, what are the constraints on metaphorical pointing? Can I metaphorically point to unicorns and kings of france?
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To use one's words to point something out is not to act metaphorically, as if all pointing is done with a finger. That is merely one paradigm of pointing. We frequently point things out using words alone.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But not "substance". Or so yo said. But why can;t I point to substance metaphrically, with words?
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I said you could. Many times.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So what's the argument against substance then? You say it doesn't
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > exist because it can't be pointed to. You say it CAN be pointed to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > metaphorically. So it doesn't exist because it can't be pointed to
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > literally? But lots of things can;'t be pointed to literally, like the
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > dark side of the moon. That criterion is too broad.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You can neither pick it out empirically 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > Lets see you pick out an "ontological basic" empirically.
> > > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > All right, one more for the morning. I don't have to pick it out because the term is meant to be generic, to apply to a range of possibilities.
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > Ditto for substance. It is a highly generic term. For substance
> > > > > > > > > > > > theorists, everything has a substantial component.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > I know I shouldn't be doing this but your response strikes me as substantive and serious so . . .
> > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > That's why I have suggested that "ontological basic" is a better term than "substance", given that it lacks the physical stuff connotations of the latter while being no different, in your sense, from "substance" as I've said from the start. 
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > It is different because OBs can be properties and substances can;t.
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > >That is, it's a less misleading term. Moreover, because it lacks the property-substance dichotomy inherent in the usage of "substance" in this sense, it allows for the possibility that "properties" can be seen as ontologically basic themselves which is consistent with Chalmers' usage.
> > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > So insofar as what you mean by "substance" is what I mean by "ontological basic" we only have an argument about word choice with my recommendation hinging on the elimination of certain misleading connotations and of a conceptual limitation that seems to accompany the more archaic usage ("substance").
> > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > But this is not to say that a claim of substance dualism is just the same as what I have called ontological dualism since the latter is a less limiting way of saying this where the limits impose various other difficulties.     
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > This is all beside the point. THe problem remains that you have
> > > > > > > > > > offered that OB doens't need to refer because it is generic, yet
> > > > > > > > > > you won;t accept the same excuse for substance.
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > That's why it's better, as a word choice, than "substance" which carries the sense of being something definite, even when you can't specify what it is (or, when you do, you end up using a definition that cannot be filled or you apply the word to something that doesn't fit the definition as in "mass/energy" had properties and so cannot be the so-called "propertyless property bearer" you say "substance" is.     
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > Substance is more definite that an ontological basic, because
> > > > > > > > > > > > ontological basic is more generic than substance..as you said.
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > Which is why "substance" is a poorer term for this purpose. It implies certain things including the notion that properties are, by definition, excluded from being ontological basics. 
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > No. That is not an implication in sense that I intend it to be, nor is it in any way a logical implication of the definition I have offered.
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > >I have argued elsewhere that "properties" is a relative term and that it is used to designate many different kinds of things, therefore it does not preclude being, itself, an irreducible (ontological basic) even if we would not call it a "substance", given the dichotomy between it and the latter word. 
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > That is all a  non issue.
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > >or explain it conceptually except by resorting to circularity ('it is what I have said it is') 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > THat isn't circularity. Is Dennett being circular when he stipulates
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > the definition of Heterphenomenology?
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Why change the subject? 
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > I am not. I am giving an example that shows the difference
> > > > > > > > > > > > between circular 
> > > > > > > > > > > > argument and stipulative definition.
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > >How does anyone else's circularity (even if true) 
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > ok. you missed the point. Dennett wasn;t being circular, and I
> > > > > > > > > > > > wasn;t tgrying to allege that.
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > >bear on whether you are being circular? You want to stipulate a meaning here but in so doing you are just informing us that yours is a private meaning, proposed by you.
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > Nonsense. If I wanted it to be private, why wold I tell you? I  am giving you a definition in order to communicate clearly, something
> > > > > > > > > > > > philosophers and others do frequently and legitimately.
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > You make it "private" by denying that being unable to pick out a referent in order to define its meaning is irrelevant to its having meaning.
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > The are are many words that have that problem, if it is a problem.
> > > > > > > > > > It looks like dictionaries are quite problematic too , since
> > > > > > > > > > they tend offer definitions, not referents. 
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > But are you quite sure that reference is so vital to meaning? After
> > > > > > > > > > all, we know that "unicorn" doesn't refere because we know, ITFP,
> > > > > > > > > > what "unicorn" means.
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > You are simply confusing notions of "private" here!
> > > > > > > > > >  
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > I am struggling to iamgine why you think reference-picking is
> > > > > > > > > > relevant to privacy. It as if you think that pointing at a dog
> > > > > > > > > > and saying Doggie is the *only* basis of semantics.
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > But that doesn't solve your problem because, when pressed, you still cannot say what you mean
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > > ...except to say what I mean, ie offer a definition of my words. But what else can one do? One might occasionally be able to literally
> > > > > > > > > > > > point at something. But that doesn't work with my Subntance any more
> > > > > > > > > > > > than with your Ontological BAsic.
> > > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > > In the case of a referring term, pick out the referent. 
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > >I have done so with regard to "ontological basic" by noting that it is anything that fits such and such a bill. 
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > You seem to be looking for examples. But of course "an example
> > > > > > > > > > of X is anything that fits the definition of X", as you do
> > > > > > > > > > above is completely uninformative. If the questioner could figure
> > > > > > > > > > out their own examples, they would not be asking for them.
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > And of course, I don't have to give multiple examples, since
> > > > > > > > > > "universe", "space", etc all refer, and refer to unique entities.
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > And of course it is not the case that one must always have examples
> > > > > > > > > > in order to understand a word. Maybe it is your problem that you cannot understand the definition.
> > > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > > OTOH, if your talk of "picking out" is about whether there are
> > > > > > > > > > substances, and not about what "substance" means, then
> > > > > > > > > > I have argued for it in just the way you have argued against it.
> > > > > > > > > > I say mass/energy is Substance. Does that count as picking
> > > > > > > > > > out? Why not? Becuase you don't believe it? Well, disbelief
> > > > > > > > > > on your part is not incoherence on mine.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > > You said "substance is a propertyless bearer of properties" and offered "mass/energy" as an example of what you meant, to which I responded that "mass/energy," on your own description of it, has properties,
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > No it doens't, on my own description. Any more than paper has
> > > > > > > > some inherent words written on it.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > You yourself said that "mass/energy" is transformative and that's a property.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Not all predicates are properties. To be endlessly transformative, something has to lack fixed, inherent properties of its own.
> > > > > > "Propertyless" is a predicate,  but not a property!
> > > > > >
> > > > > 
> > > > > Predicates are parts of sentences that represent or denote things ascribed to the subject of the sentences.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > They denote when they have something to denote. "propertyless"
> > > > has no corrsepondng property to denote (as does the noun "nothing"); 
> > > >
> > > 
> > > "Nothing" denotes the state of absence, in various contexts, absence being an understandable concept.
> > 
> > "Propertyless" cannot be less understandable.
> >
> 
> Except nothing is conceivable without some property since it is in terms of having properties that things are known and are said to exist. Supposing otherwise, supposing that there can be something underneath what is that is, itself, without properties implies a different meaning for "properties" than we rely on in everyday language. After all, if "properties" is used as those dictionary citations I provided a while back, then even having the ability to manifest as things having properties is ALSO a property!
> 
> Of course there is the view that underneath everything we know (all possible properties) must lie something that is ultimately unknowable. On such a view, we might suppose an absence of properties at that level of "knowing" but then it wouldn't be knowing, would it? 
> 
> Now you have told us that "mass/energy," in the parlance of modern physics, can fill the  non-property bearer bill because it lacks properties. But my argument is that it doesn't in any ordinary way that we use the term "property." But apparently you have in mind a special sense of "property", i.e., only what is knowable on our level of operation. I think THAT is too narrow a use, and therefore artificial, since it eliminates the possibility of ascribing properties to atomic particles and that would make it impossible to speak of them at all. But we do speak of them. Now you can see THOSE are not what I mean by "properties". But then that is again a redefinition that doesn't track actual usage.
> 
> Does actual usage matter? Well if it doesn't we can't usefully communicate about anything!
> 
>  
> > > I have nothing to say. There is nothing in the box. There is nothing more to be done. Each usage has its criteria and so is intelligible because there are ways in which it might not be the case (as in 'there is actually something in that box, take a look'). We can act in relation to it because there are ways to ascertain when there is nothing and when there isn't. 
> > > 
> > > But "propertyless property bearer" purports to pick out something in the universe (either something real or some concept that is comprehensible) but, on examination, we can find nothing real
> > 
> > Metaphorcially find or literally find?
> >
> 
> Conceptually.
> 
>  
> > > to be picked out and nothing comprehensible in the usage since it can only be defined in terms of itself. How would we know if there were no "propertyless property bearers" after all? The very notion has no connection to anything we actually do or might do though it looks like it does to the unwary.
> > > 
> > >   
> > >  
> > > > > That is, they denote properties or groups of properties ascribed to some thing that we are speaking about.
> > > > 
> > > > No. You can only denote what is , not what is merely ascribed.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > False. You can denote what you ascribe. That apple is red and by "red" I am picking out (denoting) a particular color on the spectrum and, indeed, the particular color image I have of the apple. 
> > 
> > 
> > You cannot denote what is ascribed incorrectly.
> > 
> 
> You can. The current king of France doesn't exist, of course, so that referring term is empty of a referent and so without much meaning. But since it denotes a possible state of affairs, e.g., that there is a "current king of France", it is not empty of meaning. It is somewhat comprehensible and its referent is a fictional notion. You want to speak of that as its sense in keeping with Frege's terminology. Well, that doesn't change anything except for the terms we're using. On that view your "substance" is empty of even a fictional referent BECAUSE what it purports to name (a "propertyless bearer of properties") is inconceivable since nothing is knowable (and can therefore be said to exist) without some properties that attach to it. But if you want to redefine "properties" to mean ONLY certain kinds of features that we encounter in the world at our experiential level of operation you end up excluding the possibility that atoms and their parts also have properties! 
> 
> 
> > > > > Being "endlessly transformative," as you put it, is therefore a property ascribed to "mass/energy". 
> > > > 
> > > > No, that doens;t follow. It isn;t true that every predicate
> > > > must denote a property.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > 
> > > I didn't say "every". I said that predicates are parts of speech not elements in the world and that the part they play in language is that they denote certain elements in the world.
> > 
> > 
> > Unless they happen not to, in some individual case. If you think
> > they always do, you effectively said "every".
> > 
> 
> 
> Sometimes we use predicates in other ways: "He ran away." Running away, the predicate of the sentence, is a description of an action but it is not denoting a property as in he has the property of running away!
> 
> 
> > > If there are properties, then picking them out via employing a predicate denotes what is being picked out (and ascribed as a feature to the subject).   
> > > 
> > >  
> > > > >The fact that "mass/energy" is not an everyday concept however, and is therefore not a simple phenomenon like apples or rocks, tells us that its property (or properties) would also not be simple in the way redness, say, is for an apple when we seee it. That's because seeing is to experience directly while the properties ascribed to something as theoretical as "mass/energy" are part of the description of it for the purposes of the complex theory of how things work that it represents.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Whatever. If you think science ascribes any proeprtes to M/E, say what they are.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > The ability to manifest, in various ways, as physical phenomena for one.
> > 
> > That's just being a bearer of properties.
> >
> 
> So you have proposed a referent that has the property of being a bearer of properties! That's rather like the notion of God, don't you think? Being omnipotent, can God create a rock he cannot lift? But being omnipotent he can do anything. Including make himself not omnipotent. But then he isn't omnipotent which taken as part of the definition of this notion of God.
> 
> Sometimes our problem just lies with a failure to recognize the confusions language can create when we deploy words out of their natural venues. You want to say being infinitely transformative or having the ability to manifest in a myriad of ways as physical phenomena isn't, itself, a property. But then this affects how we use a word like "property" in other contexts such as in physics. Electrons no longer have properties on such a view. But they have features, no? Have we gained anything by using a different term for what amounts to the same thing? After all, systems have properties, too, in terms of their tendencies to do somethings and not others. is "feature" a better term? Well in what sense is it different here than "property". Can't we just say of your "propertyless property bearer" that it is a "featureless bearer of features"? Same difference. Same problems!  
> 
>  
> > > > > Here's a little something on properties and predicates: 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Property:
> > > > > 
> > > > > http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/property
> > > > > 
> > > > > 1 a: a quality or trait belonging and especially peculiar to an individual or thing
> > > > > 
> > > > > b: an effect that an object has on another object or on the senses 
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > http://www.thefreedictionary.com/property
> > > > > 
> > > > > 4. a. A characteristic trait or peculiarity, especially one serving to define or describe its possessor.
> > > > > 
> > > > > b. A characteristic attribute possessed by all members of a class.
> > > > >    See Synonyms at quality.
> > > > > 
> > > > > 5. A special capability or power; a virtue: the chemical properties of a metal.
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Predicate:
> > > > > 
> > > > > http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsAPredicate.htm
> > > > > 
> > > > > Predicates are also commonly used to talk about the properties of objects, by defining the set of all objects that have some property in common. So, for example, when P is a predicate on X, one might sometimes say P is a property of X. Similarly, the notation P(x) is used to denote a sentence or statement P concerning the variable object x. The set defined by P(x) is written as {x | P(x)}, and is just a collection of all the objects for which P is true.
> > > > > 
> > > > > So being "endlessly transformative" may be a set of words in a sentence used to describe the subject of that sentence ("mass/energy") but, as such, what they are describing is some characteristic of the subject, i.e., a property. 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Nope. You do not get to assume that every predcate descrbes somethng real. It is not like every noun does.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > I never said anything about "every". My point is that predicates are parts of speech. They are words that serve a particular role in language (including the languages of logic and mathematics) so you should not be confusing them with the properties they are used to ascribe.
> > 
> > I'm not.
> > 
> > > > > > > > > therefore it can't be a "propertyless bearer of properties" -- in which case it doesn't fill the bill 
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > According to my way of lookig at things, it can. Disbelief on your part is still not incoherence on mine I can pick out examples for
> > > > > > > > my definition of Substance which work according to my definition. 
> > > > > > > > You have a double problem. You think, wrongly, that a concept
> > > > > > > > needs concrete referents to be meaningful; and you think, wrongly,
> > > > > > > > that your theories and opinions automatically override mine.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > A referring term needs to refer 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Says who? If I say "Zeus does  not exist" I am asserting that the 
> > > > > > word Zeus has no referent. Surely that is the point.
> > > > > >
> > > > > 
> > > > > "Zeus" has a referent. It is just not locatable in the real world, hence its non-existence.
> > > > 
> > > > To say that the referent of "Zeus" is non existent is to say "Zeus" has no referent.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Nope.
> > 
> > Oh please. How can what does not exist serve as a referent?
> > 
> 
> 
> The referent of "Zeus" is the fictional character from Greek mythology. It exists in the stories.

Which exist. You don't have a non existent referent, you have
a different kind of existent referent.

> That it doesn't also exist in the world is irrelevant.

Oh please. Your whole schtick is that "substance" doens't refer. Yet you allow any word to refer.

> > > That is only according to one theory about how language works. In fact, a description, however extensive, may also serve as a referent and it does in actual language.
> > 
> > That is according to how one theory about languae works. But an existing description-of-a-refernt is not an existing referent.
> 
> 
> Didn't say it is, insofar as by "existing referent" you mean having physical existence in the world.


If a word does not refer to what it purports to refer to, it does
not refer.

> 
> > Descriptions of Her Majest will continue to exist after she pops her
> > clogs. You need to make your mind up whether you are asserting that
> > terms with  no referents X have some non-existign existign refernt X...or
> > whether they just refer to something ELSE.. a memory or legend 
> > or fiction or whatever OF X.
> >
> 
> I've already explained my view.  

So? I've explained why it doesn't work, and you haven't fixed that.

> > > That you can say "Zeus" and I understand it indicates that there is a referent, 
> > 
> > False. We never need to check the real-world existence of things
> > to understand what each other MEAN. 
> > 
> 
> Getting meaning is an interesting question. My view is that it is an open-ended process that 

Vague. It remains the case that reference is not in general
needed for coherence and intelligibility.


>includes checking the real world but THAT includes also checking what is said which is also part of the real world.  


But not in anything like ther relevant sense.

> > >in this case the character or divinity called by that name in Greek mythology. 
> > 
> > "Zeus" is defined as  a humanoid god, and has no refernt because there
> > are non humanoid gods. You are substituting a story. 
> 
> 
> The character in the myth cycle at issue is the referent. 

Not to a sincere believer in the reality of Zeus. But if such
believers are wrong, then "Zeus" has no referent. There is not
effective difference between saying a belief is factually
false, and that it is a belief in a fiction.

>To speak of Zeus is certainly not to speak of Athena or of Perseus or of the Minotaur, etc. 


So their senses are different.

> >But to say]
> > that Zeus is just a story is to say that there is no Zeus, which is
> > to say "Zeus" has no referent.
> >
> 
> 
> Nope, it's to say that Zeus is a fiction though perhaps at one time it didn't seem that way to some, i.e., they believed in the existence of the referent so named. 


That doens't change anything.

> > > > YOu are just digging yourself into a hole by insistng that
> > > > all words always have referents 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > I am insisting that referring words have to have referents,
> > 
> > 
> > Give the criteria for a word's being a "referring word". 
> > 
> 
> If it is used to designate something (pick it out from among other somethings) for other language users.

If it a term stands for a theoretical posit, is it a referring
terms? Is "magnetic monopole" or "dark matter" a referring term?
Do we have to find out whether a theory is true before we
can tell that it is meaningful?

> 
> > > not that "all words" do. When a referring word fails to refer, you have an empty term. Now some referring words do perform other functions (as Wittgenstein pointed out) vis a vis different language games. Is "God" a word that refers to a certain entity in the universe or beyond it or is it just a way of expressing certain deep feelings one has, a way of being in the world?
> > 
> > See above. If "Zeus" only refers to a character in an untrue fiction, there is no Zeus. To say that some X is fictional is to say there is no X in reality.
> > 
> 
> 
> Saying "there is no Zeus" does not mean the word doesn't refer to one particular character in the story in which it occurs rather than another.

It isn;t intended to refer to a character in a fiction.

> I believe it's a big mistake to confuse reference with assertions of existence. 
> 
> 
> > > The problem for you is that YOUR usage is a referring one 
> > 
> > How? Why?
> >
> 
> "Propertyless property bearer" is the name or designator of something. 

Only if the theory is true.


>Your problem is that you can't say what it is other than to repeat the term or come up with equivalent paraphrases. 

Mass/energy.

>Since you can't, you cannot identify a referent for it in which case you have a referring term that cannot refer.
> 
>  
> > >though as in "propertyless property bearer" names something that's real.
> > 
> > Usage schumasage. I have given a definition. It might not have  a refernt. If it does not, that is not a problem with the definition.
> > 
> 
> 
> If it does not pick out something then the term is empty and if it's empty, relying on it to define what you mean by "substance" (as you do) fails.
>

It will still defines what substance means in my substance theory;
and that remains the case if my theory is wrong. It is ridiculous
to require that all tersm refer upfront--at the stage where ta theory has been formulated but not proven---because that is equivalent to
requiring all theories to be true as soon as they ate stated.

> > > Now if you want to say something like 'my usage is only about how I feel about this' or 'it's only about a something contained in a story I'm telling' then you can get away with it I suppose.
> > 
> > I want to say it is how I define the term in the context of a theory
> > which is meant to be taken realistically.
> >
> 
> And since it turns out to be an empty term it does not provide a useful definition of "substance" in which case the latter term is left without a meaning in the context you've deployed it, another reason to deep-six it.


Being without a referent means the theory is false, not that
the term is meaningless.

> > > It's like a poetic or religious expression. But in that case it fails to do what you claim it does which is to denote something intelligible in terms of describing the world. 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > -- only some of them are unreal
> > > > referents. It is much simpler and clearer to adopt the standard
> > > > theory that Zeus, uncorn, etc don't refer to anythng or denote anythng.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > But they do since we can say what we have in mind, draw a picture which is recognizable by others, etc.
> > 
> > But they don't, since they don't exist as such. On the narrow, precise, philosophical copnstrual of "reference"
> > 
> 
> See above. (By the way the wiki article on Frege's sense and reference has plenty of interesting stuff including philosophical criticisms of his view, so his definition is not "the narrow, precise, philosophical construal of 'reference'". It is, rather, A particular construal by a particular philosopher and those who follow him. In other words, it's controversial not authoritative contra your claim. 
> 
> > 
> >  A picture of a unicorn is a PICTURE NOT A UNICOPRN. You keep doing this thing of switching between broad and narorw reference, where Broad Refenfce is just having some idea of X in mind. But by Broad Refernce I can refer to Substance, Unicorns, Square Circles...you name it. Your position
> > is inconsistent. If you can have your Zeus, I can have my Substance....in mind.
> > 
> 
> So you agree that your "substance" is just a fiction 

No. Note the "if. I am just saying that one of your claims,
that "substance" has no refernt is undemined by your attitude
that concepts and fictions can be referents.

>like my "Zeus"? I have no problem with that and never did. I would just point out that it is a fiction that has no traction in today's scientific worldview though I'm sure there are some of a more religious bent and some with strong metaphysical inclinations who think otherwise.

That would be a case of you abandoning one argument and fallibg
back on another.

> My argument against a notion like substance in "substance dualism" hinges on the fictitious nature of the term which you have acknowledged here.

That's just a way of saying your personally disbelieve in it.
THe issue of Subtance Theory versus Bundle Theory is not
one of generally accepted fact.

> 
> > > That there are particular theories about how these terms work (here we go with Frege again) is not evidence that those theories are true. After all, there have been numerous disputes about how names work with some supposing a direct the idea of a relation between a name and a thing in the world while others suppose names boil down to more complex descriptions while still others think they amount to open ended narratives (as in Wittgenstein's question about whether Moses was real and, if so, who would he have been) which are not definitively set for all times and places.
> > > 
> > >  
> > > > > But your "propertyless bearer of properties" is conceptually unsound because you can offer no thing or concept that is describable, in terms other than the words you have used to denote it, as the referent you have in mind
> > > > 
> > > > I have offered m/e.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Which has properties and hence doesn't qualify.
> > 
> > What properties?
> >
> 
> 
> Being transformative and having the capacity to manifest in a vast array of physical forms, etc.


That's a lack of properties.

> > > > >. On the other hand "Zeus" clearly refers to something.  
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > "Clearly"?!!?!? This non existent referent that isn';t in the real
> > > > world? WHere is it? The unreal world? Does "nothing" have a referent?
> > > >
> > > 
> > > Are you invoking platonism then? The mere fact that you can use the term here and it can be understood is evidence of reference. 
> > 
> > No, just evidence of sense. Read yer Frege.
> >
> 
> Frege is only one thinker on the subject and my view is that his distinctions are inadequate. See the criticisms of his view. Frege ain't the standard for philosophy -- as if any single philosopher ever was!

Irrelevant. There are other ways fo thinking you haven;t considered.

> > >There is no reason to think reference implies or depends on physical existence.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > > > > >and for that you need a referent. If there is nothing that fits the bill, then it doesn't do anything and is without meaning as a referring term.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > "Zeus does not exist" is a meaningful statement
> > > > > >
> > > > > 
> > > > > That's because it has a referent.
> > > > 
> > > > Well Frege would say it has the referent TRUE. You seem
> > > > to have missed the categoreal difference between nouns/phrases
> > > > and sentences/assertions/propositions.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > Say rather I disagree with Frege on this. There is no reason to take having a referent as existing in a physical sense.
> > 
> > It's a stipulation, with ajustification. Your usage collapses Sense and Refernce, and
> > it more productive and enlightening to keep them apart.
> > 
> 
> My usage recognizes that we refer in many ways

That isn;t a fact. Of course if you define any term X vaguely
there will be many kinds of X. That's not a fact about the *world*. Good theories tighten up definitions.

> and that when I say I mean by "Zeus" that character in the mythical narratives who is the king of the pantheon of ancient Greek gods, the sun of Saturn, the father of Heracles, etc., I don't mean Athena or Hera or Saturn or other characters in the myth cycle.

There is no Zeus who is the actual father of an actual
Heracles.

> My referent is a particular character who may or may not exist since existence is not a criterion for getting the usage of the term right.
> 
> That Frege elaborated a theory of meaning doesn't mean that his theory is the best available or definitively correct in how it characterizes our use of terms like "Zeus". Maybe you want to bring your pal Larry back here to pound the table (along with my head) for the unassailable authority of Frege again?
> 
>  
> 
> > > "Zeus" refers to a range of different images and descriptions which we can speak about intelligibly (with each of us understanding much of what is meant).
> > 
> > So you say. It is more coherent to say that it doesn't refer, and
> > expalin our ability to comprehend senteces including "Zeus"
> > in terms of Sense, not Refernce.
> > 
> 
> 
> No, my approach is more coherent, because it is more in keeping with how we actually use words like "Zeus", i.e., as referring to a fictional character.

Answer my objection: how do we comprehend sentences about
non existent and dubious entities?


> Besides, how do you think supposing that referring ONLY means asserting existence explains anything about our "ability to understand sentences"? 
> 

I am saying the exact opposite. I can understand "the King of
France", so reference is not needed for comprehension,

> > > That's all that's required to refer. Supposing there must also be an existing entity for a referring term to refer to is an arbitrary claim that has no basis in how we actuall use language.
> > 
> > It has everyhting to do with Frege's stipulative definitions
> > about Sinn and Bedeuting, and their theoretical matrix.
> 
> 
> So what? Frege's is one account. There are others.
>

So it has everythign  to with *his* account. I don't care
about others.

> > 
> > > Now YOUR referring term, "propertyless property bearer", does not point to anything other than itself
> > 
> > It refers and it doesn't. Sigh. Listen to yourself.
> >
> 
> It tries to refer but doesn't.

Only it does. because it refers to sime cockamamy idea in my head. Remember, you are the guy who believes reference always succeeds, however fictively.

> Yet where "Zeus" clearly refers to a describable fiction, 

>your term cannot refer to anything because there is nothing that is independently describable to which it refers! 

What is independent description?

>No reference, no meaning for this referring term. Best dump it.
> 
>  
> > > which is nothing more than a particular combination of words and so it cannot be explicated except by reference to itself while seeming to point to do otherwise. THAT's the problem with this notion.   
> > > 
> > >  
> > > > > That the referent is non-existent doesn't detract from its meaningfulness. 
> > > > 
> > > > If the referent is non existent, IT HAS NO REFERENT
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > False.
> > 
> > Please look up "exist" in a dictionary.
> > 
> 
> Feel free to offer an excerpt with a link and we can proceed from there.

Do your own homework.

> > > If "Zeus" lacked a referent no one would know what anyone else meant by it. 
> > 
> > UNLESS MEANING IS ***SENSE*** AS WELL AS REFERNCE
> > 
> 
> 
> As I've already said, same difference, different terminology

I don;t rememer your saying that, and it is uselessly vague.


>. Still not an argument for claiming that there are "propertyless property bearers."
> 
> 
> > >Of course, one can simply DEFINE "referent" to mean ONLY something that exists.
> > 
> > > But that is an arbitrary move which runs contrary to how we actually speak. 
> > 
> > Irrelevant. Referene is  translation of "Bedeutung"
> >
> 
> 
> Irrelevant. There are many different translations out there of Frege's term including "meaning".

> 
> 

Irrelevant. You can;t say that a phil, who wrote in German is wrong because of a usage in English!

> > >Why should an arbitrary stipulation take precedence over what we actually do? 
> > >> 
> > > > >But a "propertyless bearer of properties" isn't meaningful because there is nothing outside those words themselves to which they refer, 
> > > > 
> > > > a) phrases can be meangful without (existing!) referents, since
> > > > there is such a thing as Sense.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > 
> > > In Fregean terms "referent" has been pulled out and given a narrower usage, that's all. But this is easily addressed. If you insist on a Fregean usage for "reference" then I'll put this in terms consistent with THAT arbitrary usage:
> > > 
> > > Your "propertyless bearer of properties", on this view, has no sense because there is nothing it describes. 
> > 
> > Invalid. You can't say there is no sense beause there is no
> > referent. You don't understand Frege.
> >
> 
> 
> You don't understand my point.


Of course not. You are operating on definitions of "sense" and
"reference" that are completely non standard. Language is public.

>  
> > >The words are empty because they are without sense in your sense of "sense", just as they are empty because they refer without having a referent to which to refer in my sense of "referent".
> > >  
> > > 
> > > > b) it is nothing but your opinion that has no (existing!) referent. Your disbelief s not myi ncoherence.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > As noted, whether we apply Fregean terms or ordinary language usages, the result is the same. A "propertyless property bearer" has no content and, therefore, no meaning. It merely sounds good to some ears, like yours.
> > 
> > Not shown You analsyis was utterly incompetent.
> >
> 
> 
> Okay, this is long and you are getting nasty as you usually get at this point. Anymore like that one and I'll end responding on this post.
> 
>  
> > > > >hence they have NO referent. "Zeus" clearly refers to a character in certain Greek myths, etc.
> > > > 
> > > > Oh good grief. By that notion of "refernce" "substance" could
> > > > just as easily refer to a posit in a theory that is completely false--it is not as if myths need to be true!
> > > >
> > > 
> > > And I've said that if you wish to hold an archaic theory of the physical universe, "substance" can work for you.
> > 
> > If you want to argue the physics, please do. it would be a huge improvement
> > on the mess you are making of linguistic philosophy.
> >
> 
> Hah, and you are the expert on linguistic philosophy are you?


Under present circumstances, i hardly need to be

> > > But one of the reasons to discard the term is precisely because that sort of theory has long since been discredited. On the other hand, attempting to preserve the term in a way that allows consistency with modern physics theory, forces you to turn the term into an empty usage because you cannot point (either with your fingers or your words) to anything that "substance" is other than to declare it a "propertyless property bearer" which is an empty phrase because it picks out nothing (not even your "mass/energy" which has properties).
> > > 
> > >  
> > > > The problem is that you have defined reference in such a broad
> > > > way that NOTHING can fail to refer. Hey, let;s say that "square circle" refers to a non existent referent in someone's mind!
> > > > 
> > > >
> > > 
> > > The problem with "square circle" is contradiction in terms.
> > 
> > Well,l substance doesn't have that problem.
> >
> 
> You have told us that "substance" is a "propertyless property bearer" but you cannot tell us what the latter is except to name something that actually bears a property ("mass/energy") and/or to claim that YOU can conceive of what you mean even if you cannot describe what you mean to anyone else.


Substance still doens't have that problem.

> But what you claim to conceive is actually inconceivable BECAUSE NOTHING IS CONCEIVABLE APART FROM ITS PROPERTIES 

Says who?

>nor have you shown that anything is, contrary to that claim. So actually it DOES have THAT problem! That is, it's like the notion of a square circle although its self-contradiction lies not in the particular definitions of two terms (as in the latter example) but in the way in which statements of conceivability work, i.e., we can only conceive of things in terms of what we call their properties since everything that exists only does so in its properties.
> 
>  
> > > But sure, people can imagine they can conceive it even though all they are doing is conceiving two pictures in a state of transition from one to the other. The problem with "propertyless property bearer" is that there is nothing that fits the bill, either in the world or conceptually (since every description of what is meant comes back to the same or equivalent combination of words). 
> > >  
> > > > 
> > > > > What does a "propertyless bearer of properties" refer to other than a "propertyless bearer of properties"?
> > > > 
> > > > Mass/energy.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > It has properties.
> > 
> > Which are?
> >
> 
> See above.
> 
>  
> > > > > > > Now you can say I only mean to refer to the idea that I have and you can go on to deny that anyone can question your claim to have such an idea (as you have done). Or you can insist that you are stipulating a meaning, say in the way "unicorn" is taken to mean a certain kind of thing which we can picture but agree doesn't exist.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > This is all beside the point. Language doens't have to refer
> > > > > > to be meaningful, not even to little pictrues inside your head.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > I never said language did. That's another of your misreadings.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Then why do you keep saying thigs like: "What does a "propertyless bearer of properties" refer to other than a "propertyless bearer of properties"?
> > > > 
> > > > If it's OK for reference to fail , then what's the problem? You say there are no substances, I say they are. That's disagreement pon our parts, not incoherence on mine.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > It's not okay for a referring term that cannot conceivably refer to fail and still be taken as meaningful. That some words denote some things which could exist but don't is not to deny their capacity as referring terms. But a word that aims to denote what cannot be (as in the square circle) does not denote and so is nonsense.
> > 
> > Show that substance Cannot Be. Recall your inability to demonstrate a contradiction in it.
> >
> 
> 
> See above.

You still didn;t

> > > It doesn't just fail. It is meaningless.  
> > > 
> > > > > > > But, of course, my point is you cannot picture a "propertyless bearer of properties" because, when you remove all the properties of a thing, nothing remains, i.e, there is no bearer to be found.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > The same misleading argument. You have only ever stripped the properties conceptually, and the result only echoes back the concepts
> > > > > > you have. It does not tell you whether they are correct as  a
> > > > > > real experiment would.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > This is a conceptual question as in what do your words actually mean? Where is the referent they purport to pick out? 
> > > > 
> > > > Those are different questions.
> > > 
> > > No, you are confusing this and so supposing "different questions" since my view is that we can pick out a referent both by pointing and description and that a referent can be conceptual as well as physical. Of course, "propertyless property bearer" doesn't onbly fail in terms of physical reality. It fails conceptually as well.   
> > 
> > How?
> >
> 
> See above.

Not shown.


> > > > If we are switching back
> > > > to the narrow definition of reference as only being to real
> > > > entities,
> > > 
> > > 
> > > We are not.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > that can only be answered by empiricism (taken broadly
> > > > to include "what is the best theory", and "how to interpret
> > > > it best"). Not by your purely apriopri, pure non empiricism.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > There is a big difference between a priori argument and exploring how we use our words.
> > 
> > Nope. use is meaning. Apriori is meaning.
> >
> 
> 
> Exploring use is not arguing from unassailable premises 

Oh good grief. Nothign is arguing from unassailable premises.
That is not what apriori means. 

>though (making a priori claims). rather it is to discover and describe how we actually use our words which is empirical in the end (even if we don't have to go beyond our own knowledge of language in most cases, assuming we have a good feel for the language we speak). 
> 
>  
> > > > > > > But, of course, you can say that's just what I mean, the abstract notion of a bearer. But then all you've done is say when I say X I mean X. Well okay. But that doesn't mean anything in a public way because you still can't say what X is. 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Yes I can. I have said what it is by offering a definition. You are trying to say that the term is meaningless because it has no
> > > > > > referent, and it has no referent because you believe it doesn'.t
> > > > > > Both stages of the arguement are fallacious.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > You cannot claim your "propertyless bearer of properties" has meaning because it refers to "mass/energy" which has properties of its own but which you tell us don't count because they are a "predicate". See above for how predicates relate to properties, i.e., they denote them.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > I can claim that it has meaning on the basis of semantics and syntax
> > > > alone.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > You can and generally do claim whatever suits you. But the fact that words can be put together in ways that seem to make sense at a superficial level is not evidence they make sense when looked at more closely. 
> > 
> > Yeah, right.
> > 
> > > And THAT is the point I've been making about this.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > > > Supposing that defining a thing by stipulating that it just is that thing is not a serious definition. 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Defining a word by stipulating its meaning is legitimate and common.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Not when you're making up your meanings in order to prove you're right. 
> > > > 
> > > > I'm not. My argumnent for the truth/referentiallness of Substance
> > > > comes from physics, and thus from broad empiricism. It does not
> > > > come  from the definition alone. I never said or implied that.
> > > >
> > > 
> > > You simply stipulate that YOUR use of "propertyless property bearer" just means "mass/energy" 
> > 
> > False. Mass/Energy is an plausible concrete example of somehting
> > it coudl denote. "Prime Minister" does not MEAN "David Cameron".
> > I so wish you just understand the basics of language and logic...
> > 
> 
> "Mass/energy" isn't concrete but theoretical to begin with! 

"theoretical" is contrasted with "practical", not "concrete.


>Second, even while being theoretical there are things we say of it, things that make up what we mean by the term, hence it has properties

No, just predicated. You said "things we SAY". Predicates
are linguistic.

> in any ordinary use of that term! Since it has properties, it cannot fit the bill of "propertyless property bearer" so you have to keep looking. However, yourlooking will be useless because anything that can be denoted can either be pointed at (in words or with fingers!) or it can be described -- and you can do neither for a "propertyless property bearer" because, bereft of properties, it cannot be at all. Therefore there is nothing to which the term refers, i.e., no referent.
> 
>    
> <snip>
> 
> 
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